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These proposed Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure are the cul-
mination of a process of study, drafting, and revision that took more than
five years. At present, and unlike the vast majority of other jurisdictions,
Mississippi rules are neither uniform nor comprehensive. Rules governing
criminal cases vary from court to court and from district to district. Moreo-
ver, present rules-now contained as part of the Uniform Rules of Circuit
and County Court Practice-typically address various topics on an ad-hoc
or interstitial basis. And numerous areas presently covered by exiting rules
are in need of update or significant revision.
The project began at the direction of then Chief Justice James W.
Smith, Jr., of the Mississippi Supreme Court, who created the Uniform
Criminal Rules Study Committee and charged its members with drafting a
body of court rules to govern criminal cases. The Committee consisted of
twelve judges, prosecutors, and members of the criminal defense bar: Co-
chair Judge R. I. Prichard, III, Circuit Court District 15; Co-chair Judge
Larry E. Roberts, at first of Circuit Court District 10, then of the Missis-
sippi Court of Appeals; Judge L. Joseph Lee, Mississippi Court of Appeals;
Judge Kent McDaniel, Rankin County Court; Judge Michael W. McPhail,
Forrest County Court; Claiborne "Buddy" McDonald, District Attorney,
Circuit Court District 15, replaced on retirement as District Attorney by
Ronnie Harper, District Attorney, Circuit Court District 6; John R. Young,
District Attorney, Circuit Court District 1; Tom Fortner, Hinds County
Public Defender, then later Jim Lappan, Mississippi Office of Capital De-
fense Counsel; Ed Snyder, Office of the Attorney General; Joe Sam Owen,
Owen & Galloway PLLC; John Colette, Colette & Associates; and Thomas
E. Royals, Royals & Mayfield. The Committee held its first meeting on
September 24, 2004. I joined the Committee as reporter beginning in early
2005, to support the research and rule-drafting functions of the Committee
by researching the law of other jurisdictions, comparing practice elsewhere
with current Mississippi law, and drafting Rules and Comments. The
Committee met monthly until the draft body of proposed Rules was sub-
mitted to the Mississippi Supreme Court in April 2010.
A comprehensive body of Comments followed. The Comments were
submitted in stages. Comments to the first group of Rules were submitted
in April 2011, and the rest followed in April 2012.
The goal was to develop a set of Rules of Criminal Procedure to gov-
ern practice and procedure in criminal cases and be uniform from district to
district and from court to court, including Justice Court, Municipal Court,
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County Court, and Circuit Court. In addition, the Rules strive to be com-
prehensive, and thereby govern criminal practice and procedure from ar-
rest through post-trial motions in each of these courts. Moreover, the
Committee perceived a pointed need to bring criminal practice in Missis-
sippi courts into conformity with the practices of other jurisdictions. To
this end, the Committee:
* Researched and examined the law governing criminal procedure in
other jurisdictions (in particular, the Committee found the models
contained in Alabama and Arizona, as well as the federal system,
especially helpful);
* Reviewed and considered applicable statutes, decisions of the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court and Mississippi Court of Appeals, and pro-
visions of the Mississippi and United States Constitutions;
* Researched and compared present Mississippi practice with proce-
dures employed elsewhere; and
* Drafted a modern, comprehensive body of Rules for Mississippi
criminal practice.
In many instances, the Rules confirm existing law. But because a law
reform project must embrace change, in other areas the proposed Rules
differ significantly from current practice. For example:
* Rule 3.1(b) gives courts, in most cases, discretion to issue a sum-
mons in lieu of an arrest warrant.
* Rule 4.2(b) provides that supplemental statements in support of
search warrants must be recorded or otherwise preserved.
* Rule 4.3 provides for warrants upon remote communication.
* Rule 5.1(b) allows an arresting officer, in cases of a warrantless
arrest, to release an arrestee on written notice of appearance.
* Rule 7.4 establishes standards for appointed counsel in death pen-
alty cases.
* Rule 8.2 establishes a bond schedule, and Rules 5.1(b) and (c) pro-
vide for bond in the minimum amount when a bond is not timely
set.
* Rule 13.8 deems a prosecution abandoned in cases not presented
to the grand jury in a timely manner.
* Rules 13.8 and 15.3 abolish common law terms.
* Rule 14.3 exbands circumstances under which multiple offenses
may be charged in a single indictment.
* Rules 15.3(d) and 26.7(b)(4) permit conditional guilty pleas.
* Rule 17.4 provides for depositions in limited circumstances.
* Rule 18.4 alters the process for selecting and designating alternate
jurors.
* Rule 20 replaces directed verdict with judgment of acquittal.
* Rules 20(e) and 24.3 provides that certain motions are denied by
operation of law.
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* Rule 27.6(d) clarifies when counsel should be appointed in revoca-
tion proceedings.
* Rule 29.3 eliminates the need to post an appearance bond when
incarceration is not imposed.
* Rule 33 provides a comprehensive process for contempt.
The work of the Committee was characterized by consensus, and by a
desire on the part of all members of the Committee to improve the law.
While, naturally, not all members agreed with the final version of all provi-
sions (a result, by definition, not attainable in a group of twelve lawyers
and judges representing differing constituencies) the Committee was united
by a desire to improve the process for prosecutors, defense counsel, judges,
victims, defendants, witnesses, and all others who are drawn into the crimi-
nal justice system.
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MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RULE 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Rule 1.1 -Scope.
These are the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall govern the
procedure in all criminal proceedings in all courts within the State of Mis-
sissippi, except traffic violations in justice and municipal courts. They may
be cited as "MRCrP
Comment
The Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure are designed to provide
comprehensive and uniform practice and procedure for the conduct of
criminal proceedings in all Mississippi courts, including justice and munici-
pal courts, except as otherwise provided. They replace practice under for-
merly applicable provisions of the URCCC.
Rule 1.2 - Purpose and Construction.
These Rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just and speedy deter-
mination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure
and fairness in administration, to eliminate unjustifiable delay and expense,
and to protect the fundamental rights of the individual while preserving the
public welfare.
Comment
Rule 1.2 provides a general policy statement by which problems of
construction may be resolved.
Rule 1.3 - Computation and Enlargement of Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time pre-
scribed or allowed by these Rules, by order of court, or by
any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default
from which the designated period of time begins to run shall
not be included. The last day of the period so computed
shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday, as defined by statute, or any other day when the
courthouse or the clerk's office is in fact closed, whether
with or without legal authority, in which event the period
runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a
Sunday, a legal holiday, or any other day when the court-
house or the clerk's office is in fact closed. In the event any
legal holiday falls on a Sunday, the next following day shall
be a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or
allowed is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the
computation.
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(b) Enlargement. When by these Rules or by notice given
thereunder or by order of court an act is required or al-
lowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for
cause shown may at any time in its discretion:
(1) with or without motion or notice order the period
enlarged if a request therefore is made before the expi-
ration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order; or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the speci-
fied period permit the act to be done where failure to
act was the result of excusable neglect.
But a court may not, except as provided elsewhere in these
Rules, extend the time for making a motion for a new trial,
for taking an appeal, or for making a motion for a judgment
of acquittal.
(c) Unaffected by Expiration of Term. The doing of any act
or the taking of any proceeding permitted by these Rules is
not affected or limited by the existence or expiration of a
term of court.
(d) Motions. A written motion, other than one which may
be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof must be
served not later than 5 days before the time fixed for the
hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these Rules or
by order of the court. Such an order may, for cause shown,
be made on ex parte application. Except as otherwise pro-
vided in these Rules or permitted by the court, opposing
affidavits must be served not later than 1 day before the
hearing.
(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a
party has the right or is required to do some act or take
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the ser-
vice of a notice or other paper and the notice or paper is
served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed
period.
Comment
Rule 1.3 is taken from MRCP 6. The purpose of Rule 1.3 is to provide
reasonably flexible, general guidelines for the measurement of time periods
under these Rules. Section (a) computes time by excluding weekends or
legal holidays from being the last day of a time period, and excluding
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays from the computation
when the total time period is less than 7 days. It is not uncommon for
clerks' offices and courthouses to be closed occasionally during what are
normal working periods, whether by local custom or for a special purpose,
such as attendance at a funeral. Section (a) was drafted to obviate any
[VOL. 31:16
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harsh result that may otherwise ensue when an attorney, faced with an im-
portant filing deadline, discovers that the courthouse or the clerk's office is
unexpectedly closed.
Section (b) provides the court with wide discretion to enlarge various
time periods both before and after the actual termination of the allotted
time, with the notable exceptions of motions for new trial (Rule 24) or
judgment of acquittal (Rule 20), or appeals (Rules 29 and 30). Importantly,
such enlargement is to be made only for cause shown. If the application for
additional time is made before the period expires, the request may be made
ex parte; if it is made after the expiration of the period, notice of the motion
must be given to other parties and the only cause for which extra time can
be allowed is "excusable neglect."
Section (c) does not abolish court terms. Rather, section (c) merely
provides greater flexibility to the courts in attending the myriad functions
they must perform, many of which were previously possible only during
term time. Section (c) is also consistent with other provisions in these
Rules that prescribe a specific number of days for taking certain actions
rather than linking time expirations to the opening day, or final day, or any
other day of a term of court. See Presley v. State, 792 So.2d 950 (Miss.
2001) (recognizing time limits provided by Rules govern over conflicting
limits tied to terms of court).
Rule 1.4 - Definitions.
Unless otherwise defined in a particular Rule, whenever they appear in
these Rules, the terms below shall have the following meanings:
(a) "Charge" means a complaint, indictment, or bill of
information.
(b) "Complaint" includes criminal affidavit.
(c) "Indictment" includes a true bill from the grand jury or a
bill of information in lieu thereof.
(d) "Law Enforcement Officer" means a law enforcement
officer certified pursuant to Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-6-11, or
any other officer, employee or agent of the State of Missis-
sippi or any political subdivision thereof who is required by
law to:
(1) maintain public order;
(2) make arrests for offenses, whether that duty ex-
tends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses; or
(3) investigate the commission or suspected commis-
sion of offenses.
(e) "Offense" means conduct for which a sentence to a term
of imprisonment, or the death penalty, or for which a fine is
provided by any law of this State or by any law or ordinance
of a political subdivision of this State.
2013] 7
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
(f) "Person" means a human being, and where appropriate,
a public or private corporation, an unincorporated associa-
tion, a partnership, a similar legal entity, a government, or a
governmental instrumentality.
(g) "Prosecuting Attorney" means any municipal or county
attorney, district attorney, attorney general, and others act-
ing under their specific direction and authority, or such
other person appointed or charged by law with the responsi-
bility for prosecuting an offense.
(h) "Sentencing Court" includes the court which imposed or
imposes sentence and any court to which jurisdiction has
been transferred.
(i) "Supervising officer" includes those acting under the spe-
cific direction and authority of a public or private supervisor
or supervising agency.
Comment
Rule 1.4 defines certain terms used throughout these Rules. Terms are
defined functionally whenever feasible.
Rule 1.5 - Information on Each Pleading and Motion.
All pleadings, motions, or other applications to the court shall bear the
name, address, and office phone number of the attorney who will try the
case and, if different from the attorney who will try the case, the name,
address, and office phone number of the attorney who will be prepared to
argue the pleading, motion or other application.
Comment
Rule 1.5 continues practice under formerly applicable provisions of
URCCC 1.05.
Rule 1.6 - Size of Paper.
All pleadings and other papers filed in any proceeding governed by these
Rules shall be on paper measuring 8 1/ inches x 11 inches. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, exhibits or attachments to pleadings may be folded and fast-
ened to pages of the specified size. An exhibit or attachment not in compli-
ance with the foregoing provisions may be filed only if it appears that
compliance is not reasonably practicable.
Comment
Rule 1.6 tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.5.
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Rule 1.7 - Service of Copies and Certificate of Service.
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, all pleadings, motions, or applica-
tions to the court, except the initial pleading or indictment, must be served
by any form of service authorized by Rule 5 of the Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure on all attorneys of record for the parties, or on the parties
when not represented by an attorney, and the person filing the same shall
also file an original certificate of service certifying that a correct copy has
been provided to the attorneys or to the parties, the manner of service, and
to whom it was served. Except as allowed by this Rule or allowed by the
court for good cause shown, the clerk may not accept for filing any docu-
ment which is not accompanied by a certificate of service.
Comment
Rule 1.7 carries forward formerly applicable provisions of URCCC
2.06.
Rule 1.8 - Interactive Audiovisual Devices.
(a) General Provisions. When the appearance of a defen-
dant or counsel is required in any court, subject to the provi-
sions of this Rule, the appearance may be made by the use
of an interactive audiovisual device, including video confer-
encing equipment. An interactive audiovisual device shall at
a minimum operate so as to enable the court and all parties
to view and converse with each other simultaneously.
(b) Requirements. In using an interactive audiovisual device
the following are required:
(1) a full record of the proceedings shall be made as
provided in applicable statutes and rules;
(2) the court shall determine that the defendant know-
ingly, intelligently, and voluntarily agrees to appear at
the proceeding by an interactive audiovisual device;
and
(3) provisions shall be made to allow for confidential
communications between the defendant and counsel
before and during the proceeding.
(c) Proceedings. Appearance by interactive audiovisual de-
vice, including video conferencing, may be permitted in the
discretion of the court at any proceeding except that:
(1) written stipulation of the parties is required in all
proceedings before the commencement of the proceed-
ing, except in initial appearance and not guilty
arraignment;
(2) this Rule 1.8 shall not apply to any trial, evidentiary
hearing, or probation violation hearing; and
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(3) this Rule 1.8 shall not apply to any felony
sentencing.
Comment
Rule 1.8 is adapted from Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.6. Section (a) requires
that, at a minimum, video conferencing or other interactive audiovisual de-
vices allow the court and all parties to view and converse with each other
simultaneously. Section (b) provides that a full record must be made as
required by statute or rule, and protects a defendant's right to consult in
confidence with counsel. Section (b) also preserves a defendant's right to
be present personally under Rule 10.1(a), by providing that a defendant
must consent to appear by interactive audiovisual device. While section (c)
generally puts the use of such technology in the discretion of the court,
Rule 1.8 is inapplicable to trials, evidentiary hearings, probation violation
hearings, and felony sentencing.
Rule 1.9 - Local Court Rules.
(a) When Permissible. Any court by action of a majority of
the judges thereof may hereafter make local rules and
amendments thereto concerning practice in their respective
courts not inconsistent with these Rules. In the event there
is no majority, the senior judge shall have an additional
vote.
(b) Procedure for Approval. All such local rules adopted
before being effective must be submitted to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi for approval. Upon receipt of such pro-
posed rules and before any approval of the same, the Su-
preme Court may submit them to the Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Rules for advice as to whether any
such rules are consistent or in conflict with these Rules or
any other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
(c) Publication. All local rules hereinafter approved by the
Supreme Court shall be submitted for publication on the
court's website and in the Southern Reporter (Mississippi
cases).
Comment
Rule 1.9 tracks MRCP 83. Rule 1.9 guarantees the right of trial judges
to prescribe local rules of court, not inconsistent with the Mississippi Rules
of Criminal Procedure. All local rules must be filed with the Supreme




RULE 2 - COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Rule 2.1 - Commencement of Criminal Proceedings.
(a) Commencement. All criminal proceedings shall be com-
menced either by complaint or by indictment.
(b) Complaint. A complaint is a written statement made
upon oath before a judge, clerk of the court, or other officer
authorized by law to administer oaths, setting forth essential
underlying facts and circumstances constituting an offense
and alleging that the defendant committed the offense.
Comment
Under Rule 2.1(a), the procedure for commencing a criminal proceed-
ing is either by complaint or by indictment. By definition, "complaint" in-
cludes "affidavit," and "indictment" includes "information in lieu thereof."
See Rules 1.4(b) and (c). This is in accord with Article 2, Section 27, of the
Mississippi Constitution of 1890, and consistent with Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-1-7. While the usual procedure for commencing a criminal action is by
complaint, the grand jury also may act on matters presented to it without
there being a complaint, and thus the initial charging instrument commenc-
ing the action is the indictment.
Rule 2.2 - Duty of Judge upon Making of a Complaint.
(a) Probable Cause Determination. If it appears from the
complaint and the evidence, if any, submitted that there is
probable cause to believe that the offense complained of
has been committed and that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the defendant committed it, the judge shall pro-
ceed under Rule 3.1. Before ruling on a request for a
warrant, the judge may examine under oath the complain-
ant and any witnesses the complainant may produce.
(b) Evidence. The finding of probable cause must be based
upon evidence, which may be hearsay in whole or in part,
provided there is a substantial basis for believing the source
of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a
factual basis for the information furnished.
Comment
Rule 2.2(a) requires the judge to determine from the complaint and
any evidence submitted therewith whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve that an offense has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the defendant committed it. Rule 2.2(b) allows the
probable cause determination to be made in whole or in part based on
2013] 11
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credible hearsay, and allows the judge to examine under oath the com-
plainant and any witnesses the complainant may produce.
The purposes served by Rule 2.2 are in accord with Mississippi law and
the mandates of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Giordenello v. U.S., 357 U.S.
480, 486 (1958):
The purpose of the complaint, then, is to enable the [judge]
... to determine whether the 'probable cause' required to
support a warrant exists. The [judge] must judge for himself
the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a complaint[ant]
to show probable cause. [The judge] should not accept with-
out question the complainant's mere conclusion that the
person whose arrest is sought has committed a crime.
These Rules, including Rule 2.2, do not disturb the special procedures
established by Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-28, regarding "Warrants against
teachers, jail officers or counselors at adolescent offender programs,"
which provides in part:
[Blefore an arrest warrant shall be issued against any
teacher who is a licensed public school employee as defined
in Section 37-9-1, a certified jail officer as defined in Section
45-4-9, a counselor at an adolescent offender program cre-
ated under Section 43-27-201 et seq., or a sworn law en-
forcement officer within this state as defined in Section 45-
6-3 for a criminal act, whether misdemeanor or felony,
which is alleged to have occurred while the teacher, jail of-
ficer, counselor at an adolescent offender program or law
enforcement officer was in the performance of official du-
ties, a probable cause hearing shall be held before a circuit
court judge. The purpose of the hearing shall be to deter-
mine if adequate probable cause exists for the issuance of a
warrant. All parties testifying in these proceedings shall do
so under oath. The accused shall have the right to enter an
appearance at the hearing, represented by legal counsel at
his own expense, to hear the accusations and evidence




RULE 3 - ARREST WARRANT OR SUMMONS UPON COMMENCEMENT OF
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Rule 3.1 - Issuance of Arrest Warrant or Summons.
(a) Issuance. Upon a finding of probable cause made pursu-
ant to Rule 2.2, or upon a finding that such a determination
has previously been made, the judge shall immediately
cause to be issued a summons or an arrest warrant. More
than one summons or warrant may issue on the same
complaint.
(b) Summons; Subsequent Issuance of Arrest Warrant
(1) Summons. If the defendant is not in custody, if the
offense charged is bailable as a matter of right, and if
there is no reason to believe that the defendant will not
respond to the summons, a summons may be issued, at
the sole discretion of the issuing judge.
(2) Subsequent Issuance of Arrest Warrant. If a defen-
dant who has been duly summoned fails to appear, or if
after issuance of a summons there is reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant will fail to appear, or if for
any reason the summons cannot be served or delivered,
an arrest warrant shall issue.
(c) Docketing Case. A case shall be docketed upon service
of a summons or upon the defendant's arrest.
(d) Traffic Citations Unaffected. The use of tickets, cita-
tions, or affidavits for traffic violations shall be as otherwise
provided by law.
Comment
Rule 3.1(a) provides that, upon a finding of probable cause pursuant
to Rule 2.2, the judge shall cause to be issued a summons or an arrest war-
rant. Rule 3.1(a) also contemplates that a summons or warrant shall issue
upon a finding that a probable cause determination has previously been
made, for example by a competent court of another jurisdiction. See Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-21-1 ("Any conservator of the peace, upon complaint on
oath made before him, or on other satisfactory evidence, that any person
within this state has committed treason, felony, or other crime in some
other state or territory, and has fled from justice may issue a warrant for
the arrest of such person as if the offense had been committed in this
state.") Rule 3.1(a) further recognizes that it is within the power of the
court to issue more than one summons or arrest warrant in a particular
case, as needed, based upon a single complaint.
Rule 3.1(b) gives the judge discretion to cause a summons to be issued
if three criteria are met: if the defendant is not in custody; if the offense is
2013] 13
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bailable as a matter of right; and if there is no reason to believe the defen-
dant will not respond to a summons. Hence the judge is permitted to cause
a summons to be issued in those cases in which an arrest warrant is not
necessary to secure the presence of the defendant and there is little appre-
hension that the defendant will flee. Rule 3.1(b) makes no distinction be-
tween felony and misdemeanor cases.
There are many reasons to use a summons in lieu of an arrest warrant
in appropriate cases. The use of a summons reduces the burden that the
criminal justice system places on those accused of crime. Moreover, while
in custody, a defendant represents a heavy financial burden on the judicial
system. All indications from other jurisdictions and the federal system are
that the use of a summons in lieu of an arrest warrant has been operation-
ally successful, and its use is recommended where indicated. The approach
taken here is consistent with the release standards favoring recognizance
bonds set out in Rule 8.
While there is no specific sanction imposed against one who fails to
respond to a summons, Rule 3.1(b)(2) makes it clear that should the defen-
dant fail to respond, or if there later arises a reasonable likelihood that the
defendant will not respond, or if the summons cannot be served, an arrest
warrant shall issue.
Rule 3.1(c) facilitates the tracking and management of cases by pro-
viding that a case shall be docketed upon the service of a summons or upon
the defendant's arrest on the basis of the warrant.
Rule 3.1(d) provides that these rules do not affect the use of tickets,
citations, or affidavits for traffic violations. Traffic violations are governed
by statute, including the Uniform Traffic Ticket Law, Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 63-9-21, and not, for example, by Rules 3.1 and 3.2 herein.
Rule 3.2 - Contents of Arrest Warrant or Summons; Execution, Return;
Arrest without a Warrant.
(a) Arrest Warrant. An arrest warrant issued upon a com-
plaint must be signed by the issuing judge. The arrest war-
rant must contain the complete name of the defendant, or if
the name is unknown, any name or description by which the
defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty; it
must contain the location of the defendant, if known; it must
state the offense with which the defendant is charged; and it
must command that the defendant be arrested and brought
before the issuing judge, or, if the issuing judge is unavaila-
ble, before the nearest or most accessible judge having juris-
diction. If the defendant is bailable as a matter of right, the
arrest warrant may state the conditions of the defendant's
release on recognizance or an amount of an appearance




(b) Summons. The summons must be in the same form as
the arrest warrant, except that it must summon the defen-
dant to appear at a stated time and place within a reasona-
ble time from the date of issuance. At the discretion of the
issuing judge, the summons may command the defendant to
report to a designated place to be photographed and finger-
printed before appearance in response to the summons.
Failure to so report for photographing or fingerprinting
shall result in the issuance of a warrant for the defendant's
arrest unless good cause for such failure is shown. If, upon
the defendant's appearance, the defendant has not been
photographed and fingerprinted, the issuing judge shall di-
rect that the defendant be promptly photographed and
fingerprinted.
(c) Execution of Arrest Warrant, Return.
(1) By Whom. The arrest warrant shall be directed to
and may be executed by any officer authorized by law
within the State of Mississippi.
(2) Manner of Execution. An arrest warrant shall be
executed by arrest of the defendant.
(3) Return. The officer executing an arrest warrant
must endorse thereon the manner and date of execu-
tion, must subscribe the officer's name, and must
promptly return the arrest warrant to the clerk of the
court specified in the arrest warrant.
(d) Service of Summons. The summons may be served by
any officer authorized by law in the same manner as a sum-
mons in a civil action, except that service may not be by
publication. In addition, at the officer's discretion, a sum-
mons may be served by certified mail, requiring a signed
receipt or some equivalent thereof. In the event the sum-
mons is served by certified mail, return of the receipt signed
by the defendant shall be prima facie evidence of service.
The officer serving the summons must make return of the
summons in the same manner as provided in Rule 3.2(c)(3)
for making return of an arrest warrant.
(e) Defective Arrest Warrant. An arrest warrant shall not
be invalidated nor shall any person in custody thereon be
discharged because of a defect in form. The arrest warrant
may be amended by the court to remedy such defect.
(f) Cancellation. At the request of the prosecuting attorney,
any unexecuted warrant must be returned to the judge by
whom it was issued who shall cancel it if the judge finds the
interests of justice would be served.
(g) Reissuance. At the request of the prosecuting attorney
made at any time while the complaint is pending, a warrant
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returned unexecuted and not cancelled or a summons re-
turned unserved or a duplicate thereof may be delivered by
the judge to any authorized person for execution or service.
(h) Arrest without a Warrant. A law enforcement officer or
private person may arrest a person without a warrant as
provided by law. In all cases of arrests without a warrant,
the person making such arrest must inform the accused of
the object and cause of the arrest, except when the accused
is in the actual commission of the offense, or is arrested on
pursuit. A private person making an arrest shall deliver the
person arrested without unnecessary delay to a judge or law
enforcement officer. If the person arrested is taken to a law
enforcement officer, the officer shall proceed as provided in
Rule 5.1.
Comment
Rule 3.2(a) provides that an arrest warrant based on a complaint must
be signed by the issuing judge, on a finding of probable cause; must contain
the complete name of the defendant or some description by which the de-
fendant can be identified with reasonable certainty; must state the offense
with which the defendant is charged; and must command the defendant be
arrested and brought before the issuing judge, if available, or otherwise
before the nearest or most accessible judge having jurisdiction. The name
and description are matters of form, which may be amended as provided in
Rule 3.2(e).
Where circumstances dictate issuance of an arrest warrant rather than
a summons, yet there is reason for use of recognizance release, Rule 3.2(a)
gives the issuing judge the flexibility of allowing a personal recognizance
release on certain conditions as contemplated in Rule 8. The release of an
arrested defendant on recognizance would not preclude the defendant's
having to appear at the initial hearing, but might preclude the defendant's
spending the night in jail unnecessarily. Alternatively, the issuing judge has
discretion to set an appearance bond or secured appearance bond in the
warrant, if the defendant is bailable as a matter of right.
Rule 3.2(b) specifies that the defendant shall be required to report at a
specified time and place within a reasonable time from the issuance of the
summons. The issuing judge has discretion to order that the defendant be
fingerprinted and photographed prior to appearance; if the summons does
direct the defendant to so appear, the rule makes clear that failure to com-
ply will result in the issuance of a warrant for the defendant's arrest, unless
"good cause" is shown. Otherwise, the judge shall direct that the defendant




Rule 3.2(c)(1) states that an arrest warrant be directed to and executed
by "any officer authorized by law within the State of Mississippi." Pres-
ently, Mississippi Law authorizes a broad range of officers to make arrests.
See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-1(1) ("Arrests for crimes and offenses may be
made by the sheriff or his deputy or by any constable or conservator of the
peace within his county, or by any marshal or policeman of a city, town or
village within the same, or by any United States Marshal or Deputy United
States Marshal, or, when in cooperation with local law enforcement of-
ficers, by any other federal law enforcement officer who is employed by the
United States government, authorized to effect an arrest for a violation of
the United States Code, and authorized to carry a firearm in the perform-
ance of his duties."); § 99-3-2 (federal law enforcement officers' authority
to make arrests). Rule 3.2(c)(2) provides that an arrest warrant is executed
by arrest of the defendant and Rule 3.2(c)(3) requires that an executed
arrest warrant be endorsed, subscribed, and returned promptly to the speci-
fied clerk of court.
Rule 3.2(d) is designed to make service of the summons as easy and
expeditious as possible. The function of the summons is solely to apprise
the defendant of the charges and to notify the defendant to appear; accord-
ingly, the rule provides that service may be made in the same manner as in
a civil action, except that service by publication is prohibited. The person
serving the summons should be guided by considerations of convenience
and economy, as well as the likelihood that the defendant will personally
receive the notification.
Under Rule 3.2(e), a mere defect in form will not invalidate an arrest
warrant. Normally, aliases, fictitious names, and descriptions are matters
of form and may be amended if shown to be incorrect.
Rule 3.2(f) provides that an unexecuted warrant shall be returned to
and cancelled by the issuing judge at the request of the prosecuting attor-
ney. Similarly, Rule 3.2(g) provides that at the request of the prosecuting
attorney made while the complaint is pending, a warrant returned unexe-
cuted and not cancelled, or a summons returned unserved, (or a duplicate
of either), may be delivered by the judge for execution or service.
Rule 3.2(h) states that a law enforcement officer or private person may
make warrantless arrests as provided by law. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(1)
provides that:
An officer or private person may arrest any person without
warrant, for an indictable offense committed, or a breach of
the peace threatened or attempted in his presence; or when
a person has committed a felony, though not in his presence;
or when a felony has been committed, and he has reasona-
ble ground to suspect and believe the person proposed to be
arrested to have committed it; or on a charge, made upon
reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party
proposed to be arrested.
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Warrantless arrests are also authorized by Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-3-7(2)
("Any law enforcement officer may arrest any person on a misdemeanor
charge without having a warrant in his possession when a warrant is in fact
outstanding for that person's arrest and the officer has knowledge through
official channels that the warrant is outstanding for that person's arrest.");
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3) (warrantless arrests by law enforcement of-
ficers for acts of domestic violence and related matters); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-3-7(2)(a) and (4)(a) ("Any person authorized by a court of law to su-
pervise or monitor a convicted offender who is under an intensive supervi-
sion program may arrest the offender when the offender is in violation of
the terms or conditions of the intensive supervision program, without hav-
ing a warrant" on the conditions required therein.); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-
3-15 (warrantless arrest of escaped offender).
In all cases of arrests without a warrant, the person making such arrest
must inform the accused of the object and cause of the arrest, except when
the accused is in the actual commission of the offense or is arrested on
pursuit. Because Mississippi law authorizes private persons to make war-
rantless arrests, it is important to note that Rule 3.2(h) requires a private
person making an arrest to deliver the person arrested directly to a judge or
law enforcement officer; if the person arrested is taken to a law enforce-
ment officer, the officer shall proceed as provided in Rule 5.1.
RULE 4 - SEARCH WARRANTS
Rule 4.1 - Issuance of Search Warrants.
(a) Definition of Search Warrant. A search warrant is a
written order, in the name of the State, county, or munici-
pality, signed by a judge authorized by law to issue search
warrants, directed to any law enforcement officer as defined
by Rule 1.4(d), commanding the officer to search for and
seize a person or property. "Property" includes documents,
books, papers, any other tangible objects, and information.
(b) Persons or Property Subject to Search and Seizure. A
search warrant authorized by this Rule may be issued for
any of the following:
(1) evidence of a crime;
(2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other things crimi-
nally possessed;
(3) property designed for use, intended for use, or
which is being or has been used in committing a crime;
and





Rule 4.1 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 3.6 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c).
Generally, Rule 4 protects the rights guaranteed by Art. III, § 23, of the
Mississippi Constitution ("The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search; and no war-
rant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, specially designating the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized."). Rule 4.1 applies to judges "authorized by law," and there-
fore does not enlarge, restrict, or affect in any way the authority of a judge
to issue a search warrant. Rule 4 is broad enough to embrace the issuance
of anticipatory search warrants; a warrant to search for property that is not
within the jurisdiction when the warrant is issued, but that is expected to be
within the jurisdiction when the search is conducted, is valid if it otherwise
complies with Rule 4. See U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006).
Section (b) describes the property or persons that may be seized with a
lawfully issued search warrant. Issuance of a search warrant to search for
items of solely evidential value is authorized. See Warden v. Haden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967). Section (b)(4) permits issuance of a warrant to search for
a person under two circumstances: when there is probable cause to arrest
that person; or when that person is being unlawfully restrained. There may
be instances in which a search warrant would be required to conduct a
search in either of these circumstances. Even when a search warrant would
not be required to enter a place to search for a person, a procedure for
obtaining a warrant should be available so that law enforcement officers
will be encouraged to resort to the preferred alternative of acquiring "an
objective predetermination of probable cause" Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), in this instance, that the person sought is at the place to be
searched. See also ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
§ 210.3(1)(d) (Proposed Official Draft, 1975).
Rule 4.2 - Warrant on Affidavit.
(a) In General. A warrant other than under Rule 4.3 shall
issue on sworn affidavit presented to the issuing judge au-
thorized by law to issue search warrants, establishing
grounds for issuing the warrant.
(b) Examination. Before ruling on a request for a warrant,
the judge may further examine, under oath, the affiant and
any witnesses the affiant may produce. Such additional
sworn examination shall be recorded by a court reporter, by
recording equipment, or preserved by other means, and
shall be considered part of the affidavit for purposes of
those proceedings; provided, however, that in reproducing
any additional sworn testimony, the confidentiality of confi-
dential informants shall be preserved.
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(c) Issuance. If the judge is satisfied that probable cause to
believe that grounds for the application exist, the judge shall
issue a warrant naming or describing the person or property
to be seized, and naming or describing the person or place
to be searched.
Comment
Rule 4.2 is adapted from Ala. R. Crim. P. 3.9(a) and N. D. R. Crim. P.
41(c). Section (a) generally requires that a sworn affidavit be presented to
the judge, establishing grounds for issuing the warrant.
The provision in section (b) for examination of the affiant before the
judge is intended to assure the judge an opportunity to make a careful deci-
sion as to whether there is probable cause based on legally obtained evi-
dence. The requirement that the testimony be recorded verbatim (by court
reporter, recording equipment, or other means) is to ensure an adequate
basis for determining the sufficiency of the evidentiary grounds for the issu-
ance of the search warrant if a motion to suppress is later filed. If only a
small amount of additional testimony is required, or if no court reporter or
recording equipment is available, the additional examination can be typed
or written in longhand. Section (c) provides that the confidentiality of in-
formants is not to be jeopardized by the method of reproducing additional
examination. For example, the judge could decide to examine the confiden-
tial informant under oath before issuing the warrant and preserve the ex-
amination by recording it. If any part of that examination is made available
in a subsequent proceeding, it should be made in such a manner that the
identity of the informer is not revealed. If the defendant might recognize
the informant's voice on the recording, a transcript could be used instead.
Under section (c), probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
should be assessed under the totality-of-circumstances test. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Flake v. State, 948 So.2d 493 (Miss. Ct. App.
2007).
Rule 4.3 - Warrant Upon Remote Communication.
(a) General Rule. When reasonable under the circum-
stances, a judge may issue a warrant based upon sworn testi-
mony communicated by telephone or other reliable
electronic means. The finding of probable cause for a war-
rant upon such testimony may be based on the same kind of
evidence as is sufficient for a warrant upon affidavit.
(b) Recording and Certification of Testimony.
(1) Oath. When a telephone caller informs the judge
that the purpose of the telephone call is to request a
warrant, the judge shall immediately place under oath
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each person whose testimony forms a basis of the appli-
cation and each person applying for the warrant.
(2) Preparation of the Record.
(A) If a voice-recording device is available,
the judge must record by means of such device
all of the call after the caller informs the judge
that the purpose of the call is to request a
warrant.
(B) Otherwise, an accurate and complete re-
cord must be made by other means.
(C) If a voice-recording device is used or a
stenographic record made, the judge must
have the record transcribed, must certify the
accuracy of the transcription, and must file a
copy of the original record and the transcrip-
tion with the court.
(D) If a record is made by other means, the
judge must file a signed copy with the court.
(c) Application. The person who is requesting the warrant
shall prepare a document to be known as a duplicate origi-
nal warrant and must read or otherwise transmit the con-
tents of such duplicate original warrant verbatim to the
issuing judge. If the applicant reads the contents of the pro-
posed duplicate original warrant, the judge must enter what
is so read on a document to be known as the original war-
rant. If the applicant transmits the contents by reliable elec-
tronic means, the transmission may serve as the original
warrant.
(d) Modification. The issuing judge may modify the original
warrant. The judge must transmit any modified warrant to
the applicant by reliable electronic means or direct the ap-
plicant to modify the proposed duplicate original warrant
accordingly.
(e) Issuance. If the judge is satisfied that there is probable
cause to believe that the grounds for the application exist,
the judge shall order the issuance of a warrant and immedi-
ately sign the original warrant, enter on its face the exact
date and time it is issued, and transmit it by reliable elec-
tronic means to the applicant or direct the person request-
ing the warrant to sign the judge's name on the duplicate
original warrant.
(f) Contents. The contents of a warrant upon remote com-
munication shall be the same as the contents of a warrant
upon affidavit.
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(g) Additional Rule for Execution. The person who exe-
cutes the warrant must enter the exact time of execution on
the face of the duplicate original warrant.
(h) Motion to Suppress Precluded. Absent a finding of bad
faith, evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant issued under
this Rule 4.3 is not subject to a motion to suppress on the
ground that the circumstances were not such as to make it
reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit.
Comment
Rule 4.3 is based on N. D. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(2). Rule 4.3 authorizes
the issuance of a search warrant on remote communication, similar to prac-
tice under Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1. See also ABA, Criminal Justice Section,
Guidelines for the Issuance of Search Warrants § 73-76 (1990). The Rule
establishes a procedure for the issuance of a search warrant when it is not
reasonably practical for the person obtaining the warrant to present a writ-
ten affidavit to a judge under Rule 4.2. Rule 4.3 recognizes that modern
technology has improved access to judicial officers, thereby reducing the
necessity of government action without prior judicial approval. Moreover,
Rule 4.3 will minimize the need of law enforcement officers to engage in
other practices which may threaten to a greater extent those values pro-
tected by the warrant requirement, for example having an officer in the
field relay information by radio or telephone to another officer who has
more ready access to a judge and who would act as the affiant.
Under Rule 4.3, a warrant may therefore be issued on the basis of a
sworn statement of a person not in the physical presence of a judge. Tele-
phone, facsimile, radio, email, and other electronic methods of transmis-
sion and communication are contemplated by section (a). As a threshold
matter, the judge must determine that the circumstances of time and place
make it reasonable to issue a warrant on such a basis. This requirement
recognizes the inherent limitations of this procedure, including the lack of
demeanor evidence (when oral testimony is involved) and the lack of a
written record for the judge to consider before issuing the warrant. Cir-
cumstances making it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit exist if
delay might result in the destruction or disappearance of the property; or
because of the time when the warrant is sought, or the distance between
the judge and the person seeking the warrant, or both.
This is a change in Mississippi practice. See White v. State, 842 So.2d
565 (Miss. 2003). But see Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-513 (wiretaps) (not af-
fected by Rule 4.3). Section (b)(1) requires that the judge immediately
place an applicant under oath over the telephone, and permits the judge to
examine the applicant. Section (b)(2) proscribes procedures to ensure an
accurate record. Under section (c), when electronic means are used to is-
sue a warrant, the judge retains the original warrant.
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Rule 4.4 - Contents of Search Warrants; Time of Execution; Incidental
Authority.
(a) Contents of Search Warrant. The search warrant shall
be directed to and served by a law enforcement officer. It
shall command such officer (or such officer's designees) to
search, within a specified time not to exceed 10 days, the
person or place named for the person or property specified
and to bring an inventory thereof before the court. The
warrant shall designate the court to which the warrant and
an inventory of the property seized shall be returned. The
judge shall endorse the warrant, showing the hour, date, and
the name of the law enforcement officer to whom the war-
rant was delivered for execution. A copy of such warrant
and the endorsement thereon shall be admissible in evi-
dence in the courts.
(b) Time of Execution. A search warrant must be executed
in the daytime unless the issuing judge states in the warrant,
according to the character of the application, that it may be
executed any time of the day or night.
(c) Authority to Break and Enter. To execute the warrant,
the law enforcement officer may break into any house,
dwelling, vehicle, or structure, or any part thereof, or any-
thing therein, if:
(1) after notice of the officer's authority and purpose,
the officer receives no response within a reasonable
time;
(2) after notice of the officer's authority and purpose,
the officer is refused admittance; or
(3) the particular circumstances and the objective ar-
ticulable facts are such that a reasonable officer would
believe that giving notice of the officer's authority and
purpose before entering would endanger the safety of
any person or result in the destruction of evidence.
(d) Incidental Seizure of other Property. A law enforce-
ment officer executing a search warrant may seize any prop-
erty discovered in the course of the execution of the warrant
if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the item is
subject to seizure under subsection 4.1(b) of this Rule, even
if the property is not enumerated in the warrant.
(e) Photographs, etc. A law enforcement officer executing
a search warrant may make or cause to be made photo-
graphs, measurements, impressions or scientific tests.
(f) Incidental Search of a Person. A law enforcement of-
ficer executing a search warrant directing a search of any
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premises or vehicle may search any person present on the
premises or in the vehicle if either of the following applies:
(1) it is reasonably necessary to protect the officer or
others from the use of any weapon that may be con-
cealed upon the person; or
(2) it reasonably appears that property or items enu-
merated in the search warrant may be concealed upon
the person.
Comment
Rule 4.4 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 3.10 and 3.12, and N. D. R. Crim.
P. 41. Section (a) prescribes generally the contents of a warrant. A warrant
must be directed to and served by a law enforcement officer (defined by
Rule 1.4(d)), and is returnable to court. A warrant is valid for a specified
time not to exceed 10 days. See Taylor v. State, 102 So. 267 (Miss. 1924).
Section (b) provides that the warrant must be executed in the daytime,
unless the judge states otherwise in the warrant. Section (c) grants author-
ity to break and enter to execute a warrant, either when the officer is not
admitted after announcing the officer's authority and purpose, or when the
circumstances indicate that such an announcement risks injury or destruc-
tion of evidence. Section (d) authorizes the incidental seizure of property
not enumerated in the warrant under limited circumstances. Section (e)
allows the officer executing the warrant to make photographs and the like.
Section (f) allows incidental seizure of a person who may be concealing
evidence or a weapon.
Rule 4.5 - Execution and Return with Inventory; Custody of Property;
Return of Papers to Court.
(a) Receipt and Inventory. The law enforcement officer tak-
ing property or items under the search warrant shall give to
the person from whom or from whose premises the property
was taken, or shall leave at the place from which the prop-
erty was taken, a copy of the search warrant endorsed with a
copy of an inventory of the property taken. The inventory
shall be made in the presence of the person from whose pos-
session or premises the property was taken, if that person is
present, and shall be verified by the law enforcement officer
executing the search warrant.
(b) Return of Papers to Court. The law enforcement officer
executing the search warrant must promptly return the
search warrant, along with any inventory of property seized,
to the court specified in the search warrant, who must for-
ward the documents to the appropriate clerk for retention.
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Unexecuted search warrants must be returned to and may
be destroyed by the court.
(c) Custody of Property. All property or things taken pur-
suant to a warrant shall be retained in the custody of the
seizing officer or agency, subject to the order of the court in
which the warrant was issued, or any other court in which
such property or things is sought to be used as evidence.
Comment
Rule 4.5 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 3.11 and 3.14, N. D. R. Crim. P.
41, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1). Section (a) is intended to make clear that
a copy of the warrant and an inventory receipt for property taken must be
left at the premises at the time of the search or with the person, if present,
from whose premises the property is taken. Section (b) requires prompt
return of the executed warrant and inventory. See Brown v. State, 534
So.2d 1019 (Miss. 1988) (describing return as ministerial act and noting im-
proper return does not invalidate search). Under section (b), unexecuted
search warrants should be sealed for confidentiality.
Rule 4.6 - Unlawfully Seized Property; Disposition of Seized Property.
(a) Motion for Return of Unlawfully Seized Property. A
person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may
move the court for the return of the property seized on the
ground that the person is entitled to lawful possession of the
property which was illegally seized. The judge shall receive
evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the
motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be re-
stored. If a motion for return of property is made or comes
on for hearing after an indictment or information is filed, it
may be treated also as a motion to suppress evidence.
(b) Motion to Suppress. A motion to suppress may be made
after indictment. However, any evidence that is seized pur-
suant to a search warrant shall not be suppressed as a result
of a violation of these Rules except as required by the
United States Constitution or the Constitution of the State
of Mississippi.
(c) Disposition of Seized Property.
(1) Generally. When property is seized pursuant to a
search warrant, it shall be retained under the direction
of the judge. If seized property is not to be used as evi-
dence, or is no longer needed as evidence, it shall be
disposed of as follows.
(2) Property Governed by Statute. If there is a specific
statute concerning disposition of the seized property,
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disposal of the property shall be in accordance
therewith.
(3) Procedure in Absence of Statutory Provisions. If
there is no specific statute concerning disposition of the
seized property, the seized property shall be returned
to the owner, unless:
(A) a statute declares the property to be contra-
band, in which event the court shall order the
property destroyed, if the court determines that
destruction is in the public interest; otherwise
(B) if the court does not order destruction of con-
traband property, or if the owner of non-contra-
band property does not claim it within 6 months
after it is no longer needed as evidence, the court
shall order:
(i) sale of the property at a public sale or auc-
tion, if the court concludes that such will prob-
ably result in a bid greater than the costs of
the sale. The proceeds of the sale shall be ad-
ministered by the court; or
(ii) if the court concludes that the cost of a
public sale would probably exceed the highest
bid, the court may order the property trans-
ferred to a public or a nonprofit institution or
destroyed, or may otherwise order such dispo-
sition as it deems appropriate.
(4) Motions; Ex Parte Orders. The court may, on its
own motion or the motion of any interested person,
render an ex parte order for the disposition of property
as herein provided. Otherwise, the court, in its discre-
tion, may require a motion from the apparent owner or
the person in possession of the property at the time of
the seizure.
(5) Destruction of Controlled Substances. Unless other-
wise provided by law, an official laboratory may de-
stroy any controlled substance, controlled substance
paraphernalia, or both, in its possession without an or-
der of court after a period of 5 years from the date of
seizure. Any laboratory intending to destroy a con-
trolled substance, controlled substance paraphernalia,
or both, pursuant to this subsection shall give the seiz-
ing agency and the district attorney 30 days written no-
tice filed with the clerk before such destruction. If the,
seizing agency or the district attorney objects to such




Rule 4.6 governs motions for return of unlawfully seized property and
disposition of seized property generally. Sections (a) and (b) are based on
Ala. R. Crim. P. 3.13, N. D. R. Crim. P. 41(e) and (f), and Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(g) and (h). Section (a) provides for a return of the property if: the per-
son is entitled to lawful possession, and the seizure is illegal. However, con-
traband property does not have to be returned even if seized illegally. The
last sentence of section (a) provides that a motion for return of property,
made after indictment or information, may be treated as a motion to sup-
press under Rule 16; the purpose of this provision is to have a series of
pretrial motions disposed of in a single appearance, rather than in a series
of pretrial motions made on different dates causing undue delay. Section
(b) makes clear that Rule 4 is not intended to modify the substantive exclu-
sionary rules of evidence. The provisions in section (c) are adapted from
La. Code Crim. Pro. § 15:41. The procedures set forth in section (c)(3)
apply only in the absence of a specific statutory directive. See, e.g., Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-29-181.
RULE 5 - ARREST AND INITIAL APPEARANCE
Rule 5.1 - Procedure upon Arrest.
(a) Telephone Call. Any person under arrest must be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to make a telephone call
to, or otherwise make effective communication with, any
person the accused may choose, without undue delay.
(b) On Arrest without a Warrant. A person arrested with-
out a warrant:
(1) may, unless prohibited by law, be notified in writing
by a law enforcement officer to appear either at a speci-
fied time and place or at a time and place set forth in a
subsequent notice and may be released;
(2) shall be released by a law enforcement officer upon
execution of an appearance bond set according to Rule
8, unless the charge upon which the person was ar-
rested is not a bailable offense, and directed to appear
either at a specified time and place or at a time and
place set forth in a subsequent notice;
(3) if not released pursuant to subsections (b)(1) or
(b)(2) above, the accused must be taken without undue
delay, except in no event later than 48 hours after ar-
rest, before a judge who shall proceed as provided in
Rule 5.2 for initial appearances. If the person arrested
is not taken before a judge as so required, then, unless
the offense for which the person was arrested is not a
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bailable offense, the person must be released upon exe-
cution of an appearance bond in the amount of the
minimum bond set in Rule 8, and shall be directed to
appear either at a specified time and place or at a time
and place set forth in a subsequent notice; or
(4) in the event the defendant is released on the mini-
mum bond amount provided in the bail schedule, the
prosecuting attorney may file a motion with the court
to reconsider the bond amount and the conditions of
release, and the procedures thereafter shall be in accor-
dance with Rule 8.
If a person arrested without a warrant has been released
and directed to appear without having been taken before a
judge for a probable cause determination, the officer or pri-
vate person who made the arrest shall without undue delay
make a complaint before a judge as provided in Rule 2.1. If
the judge finds probable cause, the complaint shall be
served on the defendant in the manner provided in Rule 3.2
for service of summons, or shall be delivered to the defen-
dant at the time of the defendant's appearance. If no com-
plaint is filed, or if the judge does not find probable cause,
the proceedings shall be terminated and the person arrested
shall promptly be notified and advised that an appearance
will not be required. Notification shall be made by the judge
or clerk of the court by mail directed to the defendant at the
defendant's last known address.
(c) On Arrest with a Warrant.
(1) If provision therefore has been made by the judge
issuing the arrest warrant, a person arrested with a war-
rant shall be released on an appearance bond in the
amount set in accordance with Rule 8 and directed to
appear either at a specified time and place or at a time
and place set forth in a subsequent notice.
(2) If the person arrested cannot meet the conditions of
release provided in the warrant, or if no such conditions
are prescribed:
(A) if such person was arrested pursuant to a war-
rant issued on a complaint, the accused must be
taken without undue delay, except in no event
later than 72 hours after arrest, before a judge,
who shall proceed as provided in Rule 5.2. If the
person arrested has not been taken before a judge
as required herein, unless the charge upon which
the person was arrested is not a bailable offense,
such person shall be released upon execution of an
appearance bond in the amount of the minimum
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bond set forth in Rule 8 and shall be directed to
appear either at a specified time and place or at a
time and place set forth in a subsequent notice; or
(B) if such person was arrested pursuant to a war-
rant issued upon an indictment, the accused must
be taken without undue delay before a circuit
judge, who shall proceed as provided in Rule 8.
(3) Upon request, the defendant shall be given a copy
of the charges.
Comment
Rule 5.1(a) gives official sanction to common existing practice. The
opportunity to make a telephone call represents the minimum requirement,
and should therefore not be read to deny the appropriate use of additional
means of communication, electronic or otherwise. Fundamental fairness
dictates that a person who has been taken into custody be allowed to com-
municate to another that the accused is being held by the police and
charged with a crime. Rule 5.1(a) thus serves to protect an accused's state
and federal constitutional rights to bail, counsel, and due process.
Rule 5.1(b) lists the options available to law enforcement officers in
the case of warrantless arrests. An officer may: (1) release the offender on
personal recognizance and issue a notice requiring the person to appear at
a specified or subsequently scheduled time and place; or (2) release the
offender on execution of an appearance bond set according to Rule 8 and
direct the person to appear at a specified or subsequently scheduled time
and place; or (3) take the offender into custody and provide the person
with an opportunity to make bail. A person may not be released on recog-
nizance where prohibited by law, such as Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-5-37
("Mandatory appearance in domestic violence cases. In any arrest for a
misdemeanor which is an act of domestic violence, as defined in § 97-3-7,
no bail shall be granted until the person arrested has appeared before a
judge of the court of competent jurisdiction. The defendant shall be
brought before a judge at the first reasonable opportunity, not to exceed 24
hours from the time of the arrest. In calculating the 24 hours, weekends
and holidays shall be included. The appearance may be by telephone.").
Under Rule 5.1(b)(3), if a person is taken into custody, the person
shall be taken without undue delay, and in no event later than 48 hours
after arrest, before a judge who shall proceed with an initial appearance as
provided in Rule 5.2. If the person arrested is not taken before a judge
within 48 hours as so required, the person detained must be released on
execution of an appearance bond in the minimum amount set pursuant to
Rule 8 and directed to appear at a specified or subsequently scheduled
time and place. Rule 5.1(b)(3) conforms to the United States Supreme
Court's holdings in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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Pursuant to Rule 5.1(b)(4), if a person arrested without a warrant has
been released and directed to appear without having first been taken
before a judge, the officer or private person who made the arrest must
"without undue delay" make a complaint before a judge as provided in
Rule 2.1. If the judge finds probable cause, the complaint may be given to
the defendant at the defendant's first appearance or may be served on the
defendant as provided in Rule 3.2. Under this procedure, many, if not
most, defendants charged with a felony will make their first court appear-
ance at arraignment, or perhaps even at trial if arraignment is waived. In
the event no complaint is filed or probable cause for the warrantless arrest
is not found, the proceedings shall be terminated and the judge or court
clerk must promptly notify the person by mail that appearance in court will
not be required.
Under Rule 5.1(c), a person arrested pursuant to a warrant is in a dif-
ferent situation. If the warrant is issued on a complaint or an indictment,
there has been an ex parte probable cause determination by a judge or
grand jury. The issuing judge will also usually have set conditions of re-
lease. Even so, if the person cannot meet the conditions of release, or if no
such conditions are prescribed, a person arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued on a complaint is entitled to go before a judge within 72 hours after
arrest for an initial appearance; if the person so arrested is not taken before
a judge within 72 hours, the person must be released on execution of an
appearance bond in the minimum amount set pursuant to Rule 8 and di-
rected to appear at a specified or subsequently scheduled time and place.
If a person is arrested pursuant to a warrant issued on an indictment, the
authority to review release conditions is reserved to the circuit court, which
must proceed without undue delay.
Rule 5.2 - Initial Appearance.
(a) Generally. Every person in custody and not under in-
dictment shall be taken, without unnecessary delay and in
accordance with Rule 5.1, before a judge for an initial ap-
pearance. At the defendant's initial appearance, the judge
shall:
(1) ascertain the defendant's true name and address,
and amend the formal charge if necessary to reflect this
information, instructing the defendant to notify the
court promptly of any change of address;
(2) inform the defendant of the charges and provide
the defendant with a copy of the complaint; and
(3) if the arrest has been made without a warrant, de-
termine whether probable cause exists to believe that
the defendant committed the charged offense, in accor-
dance with the procedures for making a probable cause
determination provided in Rule 2.2(a). If the judge
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finds there is probable cause, a complaint shall
promptly be prepared, filed, and served on the defen-
dant. If the judge finds no probable cause for the war-
rantless arrest, or if the judge fails to make a probable
cause determination, the defendant must be released.
(b) Further Requirements. At the defendant's initial ap-
pearance, the judge shall also advise the defendant of the
following:
(1) that the defendant has the right to remain silent and
that any statements made may be used against the
defendant;
(2) if the defendant is unrepresented, that the defen-
dant has the right to assistance of an attorney, and that
if the defendant is unable to afford an attorney, an at-
torney will be appointed as required by law;
(3) that the defendant has the right to communicate
with an attorney, family or friends, and that reasonable
means will be provided to enable the defendant to do
so; and
(4) the conditions under which the defendant may ob-
tain release, if any.
(c) Felony Cases. When a defendant is charged by complaint
with commission of a felony, the judge shall also:
(1) inform the defendant of the right to demand a pre-
liminary hearing and the procedure by which that right
may be exercised; and
(2) if so demanded, set the time for a preliminary hear-
ing in accordance with Rule 6.1.
(d) Initial Appearance Not Required. In all cases where the
defendant is released from custody, or has been indicted by
a grand jury, the defendant shall not be entitled to an initial
appearance.
Comment
The purpose of Rule 5.2 is to insert the judicial process between the
police and the defendant at the earliest practicable time in order to mini-
mize the effects of carelessness, abuse of power, or unavoidable error in the
police function. Rule 5.2 insures procedural compliance with Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
as well as provides for the prompt determination of the conditions for re-
lease. This continues the policy contained in Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-17
and prior URCCC 6.03. Rule 5.2(a) dispenses with this procedure where
the defendant has already been released or has been indicted. See also
Rule 5.2(d). This likewise continues the rule previously contained in
URCCC 6.05.
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Subsection (a)(1) assures the formal accuracy of the defendant's name
and address in the official records. Subsection (a)(2) assures that the de-
fendant is properly advised of the charges, which can be accomplished by
giving the defendant a copy of the complaint. Subsection (a)(3) provides
for a probable cause determination in cases of arrest without a warrant
employing the procedures provided in Rule 2.2. If probable cause is found,
a complaint shall promptly be prepared, filed, and served on the defendant.
If no probable cause is found, or if no probable cause determination is
made, the defendant shall be released.
Rule 5.2(b)(1) requires the judge to advise the defendant of the right
to remain silent. Under subsection (b)(2), the judge must give notice to the
defendant of the right to counsel and of the right to appointed counsel
under Rule 7.1. It is neither intended nor expected that a determination of
the defendant's right to appointed counsel would be made or counsel ap-
pointed at the initial appearance. Under subsection (b)(4), the judge is
required to determine the conditions of release. The range of possible con-
ditions and the standards and procedures are set forth in Rule 8.
Rule 5.2(c)(4) imposes the additional burden at the initial appearance
of informing a defendant charged with a felony but not yet indicted of the
right to demand a preliminary hearing and, if demanded, of setting a time
for the hearing in accordance with Rule 6.1. Under Rule 5.2(a)(4), if the
defendant has been released from custody, or has been indicted, there is no
right to a preliminary hearing. See Rule 6.1(a).
Pursuant to Rule 1.8, with the defendant's consent, initial appearances
may be held via interactive audiovisual devices. See also Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-1-23. Specifically the statute provides that "[w]hen the physical ap-
pearance in person in court is required of any person who is represented by
counsel and held in a place of custody or confinement operated by the state
or any of its political subdivisions, upon waiver of any right such person
may have to be physically present, such personal appearance may be made
by means of closed circuit television from the place of custody or
confinement."
Rule 5.2(d) also underscores that a defendant who has been released
from custody, or who has been indicted, is not entitled to an initial
appearance.
RULE 6 - PRELIMINARY HEARING
Rule 6.1 - Right to a Preliminary Hearing; Waiver; Postponement.
(a) Right to a Preliminary Hearing.
(1) Generally. A defendant who has been released
from custody, or who has been indicted by a grand jury,
shall not be entitled to a preliminary hearing. Other-
wise, a defendant charged by complaint with the com-




(2) When Commenced. If demanded, the prelimi-
nary hearing shall commence within 30 days fol-
lowing the demand for preliminary hearing unless:
(A) the complaint has been dismissed;
(B) the hearing is subsequently waived;
(C) the hearing is postponed as provided in
subsection (d); or
(D) before commencement of the hearing, the
defendant is released from custody or an in-
dictment charging the same offense has been
returned by the grand jury.
(b) Waiver. A preliminary hearing, once demanded,
may be subsequently waived in open court or by writ-
ten waiver, signed by the defendant and defendant's
counsel, if any.
(c) Delay.
(1) Release on Recognizance. If a preliminary
hearing has not been commenced within 30 days as
required by subsection (a), unless postponed as
provided in subsection (d), the defendant shall be
released on recognizance.
(2) Non-bailable Offenses; Notice to Circuit Court.
However, if the defendant is charged with a non-
bailable offense, or if release is prohibited by Arti-
cle 3, § 29, paragraph (2), of the Mississippi Consti-
tution of 1890, the court shall immediately notify a
judge of that circuit of the delay and the reasons
therefore. The circuit judge may thereupon order
the hearing be set for a specified time.
(d) Postponement. Upon motion of any party, or upon
the judge's own initiative, the preliminary hearing may
be postponed beyond the time limits specified in sub-
section (a), upon a finding that circumstances exist that
justify delay, and in that event the court shall enter a
written order detailing the reasons for the finding and
shall give the parties prompt notice thereof.
Comment
Rule 6.1(a) grants an accused held in custody and charged with a fel-
ony (and not under indictment) the right to a preliminary hearing. How-
ever, Rule 6.1(a)(2)(d) provides that, where the defendant is released from
custody or an indictment is returned prior to commencement of the hear-
ing, the accused is no longer entitled to the preliminary hearing.
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Rule 6.1(c) states that if a preliminary hearing is not commenced
within 30 days as required by subsection (a), and is not postponed as al-
lowed by subsection (d), the defendant shall be released on recognizance,
unless the offense is non-bailable or, importantly, unless release is prohib-
ited by Article 3, § 29, paragraph (2), of the Mississippi Constitution of
1890, which provides:
If a person charged with committing any offense that is pun-
ishable by death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for one
(1) year or more in the penitentiary or any other state cor-
rectional facility is granted bail and (a) if that person is in-
dicted for a felony committed while on bail; or (b) if the
court, upon hearing, finds probable cause that the person
has committed a felony while on bail, then the court shall
revoke bail and shall order that the person be detained,
without further bail, pending trial of the charge for which
bail was revoked. For the purposes of this subsection (2)
only, the term "felony" means any offense punishable by
death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for more than
five (5) years under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the
crime is committed. In addition, grand larceny shall be con-
sidered a felony for the purposes of this subsection.
Under Rule 6.1(d), postponement is readily allowed for any reasons
that "justify delay."
Rule 6.2 - Proceedings at Preliminary Hearing.
(a) Procedure. At a preliminary hearing the judge shall de-
termine probable cause and the conditions for release, if
any. All parties shall have the right to cross-examine the
witnesses testifying and, subject to the provisions herein, in-
troduce evidence. Only evidence that is relevant to these
questions shall be admitted.
At the close of the prosecution's case, including cross-exam-
ination of prosecution witnesses by the defendant, the judge
shall determine and state for the record or state in open
court whether the prosecution's case establishes probable
cause. The defendant may then make a specific offer of
proof, including the names of witnesses who would testify or
produce the evidence offered. The judge shall allow the de-
fendant to present the offered evidence, unless the judge de-




(b) Process. Unless otherwise ordered by the court for
good cause shown, process shall issue to secure the attend-
ance of witnesses requested by the defendant, the prosecut-
ing attorney, or the court.
(c) Hearsay Evidence. The findings by the court shall be
based on substantial evidence, which may be hearsay, in
whole or in part.
(d) Suppression Motions Inapplicable. Objections to evi-
dence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means
are not properly made at the preliminary hearing.
(e) Amendment of Complaint. The complaint may be
amended at any time to conform to the evidence, unless
substantial rights of the defendant would be prejudiced.
(f) Presenting the Case to the Grand Jury. If, from the evi-
dence, it appears that there is probable cause to believe that
a felony has been committed, and that the defendant com-
mitted it, the judge shall bind the defendant over to await
action of the grand jury.
(g) Discharge of the Defendant. If, from the evidence, it
appears that there is no probable cause to believe that a fel-
ony has been committed or that the defendant committed it,
the defendant shall be discharged from custody. The dis-
charge of the defendant shall not preclude the state from
presenting the same offense to a grand jury.
Comment
Rule 6.2(a) limits the issues at a preliminary hearing to probable cause
and the conditions of release. A defendant is permitted to cross-examine
witnesses and, on a proper showing of relevance, present testimony and
evidence. Rule 6.2(b) complements these rights by providing defendants
with process to secure the attendance of witnesses, unless otherwise or-
dered by the court on a showing of good cause.
Rule 6.2(a) strives to serve judicial economy by requiring the judge, at
the close of the prosecution's case, to determine whether the prosecution
has established probable cause. If so, the defendant may then make a spe-
cific offer of proof. The judge must allow the defendant to present the
offered evidence, unless the judge determines that it would be insufficient
to rebut the existing probable cause finding.
Rule 6.2(c) notes the admissibility of hearsay, which is in accord with
MRE 1101(b)(3) (except for rules pertaining to privileges, rules of evi-
dence inapplicable in probable cause hearings in criminal cases). There is
no constitutional requirement that hearsay evidence be excluded from a
probable cause hearing. See Rule 5.1(a), Fed. R. Crim. P.; Coleman v. Bur-
nett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1203 n. 89 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Costello v. U.S., 350 U.S.
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359 (1956) (upholding a grand jury indictment based solely on hearsay tes-
timony). See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Allowing
hearsay at preliminary hearings is in keeping with the diminished role as-
signed such hearings.
Rule 6.2(f) provides that if probable cause is found, the judge shall
bind the defendant over to the grand jury. In making a determination of
probable cause, the United States Supreme Court has adopted the "totality
of the circumstances" approach. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983);
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). Subsection (g) requires the
defendant to be discharged if probable cause is not found, without
prejudice to the state from presenting the same offense to a grand jury.
RULE 7 - COUNSEL
Rule 7.1 - Right to Counsel; Waiver.
(a) Right to be Represented by Counsel. A defendant shall
be entitled to be represented by counsel in any criminal pro-
ceeding, except in those petty offenses such as traffic viola-
tions where there is no prospect of imprisonment or
confinement after a judgment of guilty. The right to be rep-
resented shall include the right to consult in private with an
attorney, or the attorney's agent, as soon as feasible after a
defendant is taken into custody, at reasonable times thereaf-
ter, and sufficiently in advance of a proceeding to allow ade-
quate preparation therefore.
(b) Right to Appointed Counsel. An indigent defendant
shall be entitled to have an attorney appointed in any crimi-
nal proceeding which may result in punishment by loss of
liberty, in any other criminal proceeding in which the court
concludes that the interests of justice so require, or as re-
quired by law.
(c) Waiver of Right to Counsel. A defendant may waive the
right to counsel in writing or on the record, after the court
has ascertained that the defendant knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily desires to forego that right. At the time of
accepting a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel, the
court shall inform the defendant that the waiver may be
withdrawn and counsel appointed or retained at any stage
of the proceedings. When a defendant waives the right to
counsel, the court may appoint an attorney to advise the de-
fendant during any stage of the proceedings. Such advisory
counsel shall be given notice of all matters of which the de-
fendant is notified.
(d) Unreasonable Delay in Retaining Counsel. If a non-in-
digent defendant appears without counsel at any proceeding
after having been given a reasonable time to retain counsel,
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the cause shall proceed. If an indigent defendant who has
refused appointed counsel in order to obtain private counsel
appears without counsel at any proceeding after having
been given a reasonable time to retain counsel, the court
shall appoint counsel unless the indigent defendant waives
the right under this Rule. If the indigent defendant contin-
ues to refuse appointed counsel, the cause shall proceed.
(e) Withdrawal of Waiver. A defendant may withdraw a
waiver of the right to counsel at any time but will not be
entitled to repeat any proceeding previously held or waived
solely on the grounds of the subsequent appointment or re-
tention of counsel.
Comment
Rule 7.1 establishes guidelines for the representation of both indigent
and non-indigent criminal defendants. The basis of Rule 7.1 is the right of
an accused to be represented by counsel in all criminal prosecutions under
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 3, Sec. 26,
of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890.
For the purposes of subsection (a), the term "criminal proceeding" in-
cludes any stage of the criminal process, from accusation through appeal,
and in collateral proceedings arising from the initiation of a criminal action
against the defendant, such as post-conviction proceedings and appeals
therefrom, extradition proceedings, probation revocation proceedings, and
other like proceedings which are adversary in nature, regardless of the des-
ignation of the court in which they occur or the classification of the pro-
ceedings as civil or criminal, and without regard to whether a "criminal
proceeding" has or has not been commenced under Rule 2.1. The provi-
sion that a defendant may consult with the attorney's agent is added for the
convenience of the attorney.
Rule 7.1(b) is adopted from Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), on remand 153 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-15; and ABA, Standards for
Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services § 4.1 (Approved Draft, 1968).
Counsel may be appointed at any point in the proceedings.
Under subsection (b), there are two facets to the question of when
counsel is to be appointed to represent an indigent defendant. The first is
whether the right to appointed counsel arises at all. In Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the Supreme Court held that counsel must be
appointed in any criminal prosecution, "whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, ... that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief
period." While under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), counsel need not
be appointed in misdemeanor cases when the defendant is merely fined,
pursuant to Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), a suspended sentence
that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not
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be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of coun-
sel." Necessarily, this will require that the judge determine before trial
that, regardless of the evidence presented, the maximum punishment will
not include incarceration or a suspended sentence of imprisonment. This
already occurs in traffic cases where the judge knows in advance that upon
conviction the punishment will not be imprisonment and that the custom
and practice is to fine, even when imprisonment is a legal alternative.
The second is that, if the defendant is entitled to appointed counsel, at
what point in the process is counsel to be appointed. Under the Sixth
Amendment, there is clearly a right to counsel at trial. Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Prior to trial the right exists at arraignment and
at a preliminary hearing. Following the "critical stage" test, the United
States Supreme Court has also held that an indigent is entitled to ap-
pointed counsel at a pre-trial, post-indictment lineup, U.S. v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), but not at a pre-indictment lineup, Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682 (1972). Using a different test, namely whether the proceeding is a
"trial-like adversary confrontation" between the defendant and govern-
ment, the Court has held there is no right to have appointed counsel pre-
sent at a photographic display. US. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). Under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964), presence of counsel is required, if requested, during pre-indict-
ment questioning if information so obtained is to be admitted as evidence
at trial. At the other end of the criminal prosecution, an indigent has a
right to appointed counsel at sentencing, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967), and in a first appeal granted as a matter of right from a criminal
conviction, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Mississippi Law is more expansive. As the Mississippi Supreme Court
stated in Ormond v. State, 599 So.2d 951, 956 (Miss. 1992):
[T]he right to counsel [under Mississippi law] attaches ear-
lier than does the sixth amendment right. Williamson, 512
So.2d at 876; Page v. State, 495 So.2d 436, 439 (Miss. 1986).
This right attaches "once the proceedings against the defen-
dant reach the accusatory stage." Williamson, 512 So.2d at
876; Page, 495 So.2d at 439. The "accusatory stage" is de-
fined by Mississippi law to occur when a warrant is issued
or, "by binding over or recognizing the offender to compel
his appearance to answer the offense, as well as by indict-
ment or affidavit." Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7 (1972). This
right to counsel [also] "attaches at the point in time when
'the initial appearance ought to have been held"' Veal, 585
So.2d at 699 (emphasis added).
(Under Rule 5.1(b)(3), an initial appearance is to be held within 48




In this vein, under Mississippi law, a participant in a lineup is entitled
to have a lawyer present if the lineup is held after proceedings have
reached the accusatory stage. Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1324 (Miss. 1990);
Magee v. State, 542 So.2d 228 (Miss. 1989).
Rule 7.1(c) provides the standards for waiver of the rights to counsel,
applicable throughout these rules. It adopts the constitutional standard set
down in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708 (1948); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh'g den. 385
U.S. 890; and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); and followed in
Conn v. State, 170 So.2d 20 (Miss. 1964). Generally, a defendant must be
advised of the charges; of the possible maximum sentence; whether, if con-
victed, the defendant is likely to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment;
and of the rights to be represented by counsel and to have counsel ap-
pointed if the defendant is indigent. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981), established that, once the right to counsel has been invoked, a
waiver (no matter how voluntary) is invalid if made in response to further
police questioning.
Subsection (c) also allows but does not require the court to appoint
advisory or standby counsel. Although a criminal defendant has an abso-
lute right to defend pro se under the Sixth Amendment, Faretta v. Califor-
nia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), there may be instances where a court will deem
the appointment of standby counsel advisable and in the defendant's best
interest. See Faretta, supra; McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (rea-
sonable actions by standby counsel did not violate Sixth Amendment rights
even though the defendant objected to the appointment of standby coun-
sel); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); U.S. v. Theriault, 474
F.2d 359 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984 (1973); ABA, Standards for
Criminal Justice, Special Functions of the Trial Judge § 6-3.7 (2d ed. 1986).
The court is required to inform the defendant that the waiver may be with-
drawn, as under subsection (e) the defendant has the burden of requesting
counsel if the defendant later decides to withdraw the waiver.
Rule 7.1(d) protects the court against dilatory tactics by the defendant
in retaining counsel while at the same time preserving the defendant's right
to counsel. It allows an indigent defendant the opportunity to make a good
faith, though unsuccessful, effort to obtain counsel, even though as a result
the proceeding will be delayed. See Cleveland v. U.S., 322 F.2d 401 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963); McConnell v. U.S., 375 F.2d 905 (5th
Cir.1967). The procedure may have the salutary effect of allowing an other-
wise indigent defendant an opportunity to raise funds to employ counsel of
the defendant's choosing and thus reduce the burden on the appointed
counsel system.
Under Rule 7.1(e), the defendant can decide at any time that it was a
mistake to waive counsel; the court should encourage an unrepresented
defendant, at all stages, to obtain counsel. The defendant's right to with-
draw a waiver of counsel is unlimited; however, a defendant is not allowed
to use late appointment or retention of counsel to disrupt orderly and
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timely processing of the case. Thus, a defendant cannot delay a scheduled
proceeding, nor repeat one already held, solely because of a change of
heart concerning the need for counsel.
Rule 7.2 - Procedure for Appointment of Counsel for Indigent
Defendants; Appearance; Withdrawal.
(a) Procedure for Appointment of Counsel for Indigent
Defendants.
(1) Generally. A procedure shall be established in each
Circuit for appointment of counsel by the Circuit
Court, or by limited jurisdiction courts, for each indi-
gent person entitled thereto.
(2) Appointment of Two Attorneys; Death Penalty
Cases. In all trial proceedings, the court may appoint 2
attorneys. In all death penalty trial proceedings, the
court shall appoint 2 attorneys pursuant to the stan-
dards in Rule 7.4. At the time of the appointment and
subject to the approval of the court, lead counsel may
select co-counsel so long as co-counsel is willing to ac-
cept the appointment and, in death penalty cases, meets
all of the requirements of Rule 7.4. If lead counsel does
not name co-counsel upon accepting an appointment,
the court shall select co-counsel.
(b) Notice of Appearance. Before or at a first appearance in
any court on behalf of a defendant, an attorney, whether
privately retained or appointed by the court, shall file a no-
tice of appearance or, in lieu thereof, the court shall note
the attorney's appearance on the record.
(c) Duty of Continuing Representation. Counsel represent-
ing a defendant at any stage following indictment shall con-
tinue to represent that defendant in all further proceedings
in the trial court, including filing of notice of appeal, unless
counsel withdraws for good cause as approved by the court.
(d) Withdrawal. Counsel may be permitted to withdraw for
good cause shown; however, no attorney shall be permitted
to withdraw after a case has been set for trial except upon
written motion stating the attorney's reasons therefore.
Comment
The purpose of Rule 7.2 is to define minimum standards for the repre-
sentation of criminal defendants. Rule 7.2(a) requires that each circuit
shall establish governing local procedures for the appointment of counsel




Rule (a)(2) recognizes the court's authority to appoint two attorneys
in any appropriate case, and the court's duty to do so in all death penalty
proceedings. A "death penalty" proceeding is one in which the death pen-
alty is a possible sentence. In this way, the term is synonymous with "capi-
tal crime." See Campbell v. State, 749 So.2d 1208 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
("Capital" crimes are those in which death or life imprisonment are each a
possible sentence.) See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-15-15 & 17.
Rule 7.2(b) insures that defendants are in fact represented by requir-
ing counsel to file a notice of appearance either at or before counsel's first
appearance or, instead, by requiring that the court note the attorney's ap-
pearance on the record.
Rule 7.2(c) contemplates that the usual procedure will be that counsel
retained privately or appointed at any stage following indictment will con-
tinue to represent the defendant through all stages of the trial proceedings,
including filing notice of appeal. In addition to being familiar with the
case, continued representation guarantees that a defendant's right of ap-
peal is not lost in the period between termination of trial counsel's respon-
sibilities and retention or appointment of appellate counsel.
Rule 7.2(d) provides that once a case has been set for trial, counsel
may move to withdraw only by means of a written motion. Withdrawal will
be permitted only on order in response to such motion. Normally, ap-
pointed counsel will not be permitted to withdraw prior to appeal. Of
course, if the court allows counsel to withdraw, the court must see that new
counsel is retained or appointed, unless the right to counsel has been prop-
erly waived pursuant to Rule 7.1(c). In this way, subsection (d) seeks to
maintain the integrity of the trial date while also protecting the interests of
the defendant and aiding the trial court in providing continuity in legal
representation.
Nothing in Rules 7.2(c) or (d) limits the ability of a court to employ a
local procedure whereby an attorney is appointed to represent a defendant
for a limited purpose or time, after which another attorney is appointed or
retained to represent the defendant for subsequent proceedings.
Rule 7.3 - Determination of Indigency; Appointment of Counsel;
Compensation.
(a) Standard for Indigency. The term "indigent" as used in
these Rules means a person who is not financially able to
employ counsel.
(b) Affidavit of Substantial Hardship. A defendant desiring
to proceed as an indigent shall complete under oath an affi-
davit concerning that defendant's financial resources, on a
form approved by the court. The defendant may be ex-
amined under oath regarding defendant's financial re-
sources by the judge responsible for determining indigency;
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the defendant shall, before said questioning, be advised of
the penalties for perjury as provided by law.
(c) Reconsideration. After a determination of indigency or
non-indigency has been made, if there has been a material
change in circumstances, either the defendant, the ap-
pointed attorney, or the prosecutor may move for
reconsideration.
(d) Order of Appointment. Whenever counsel is appointed,
the court shall enter an order to that effect, a copy of which
shall be given or sent to the defendant, the attorney ap-
pointed, and the prosecutor.
(e) Appointment of Public Defender. In counties which
have a public defender, the public defender shall represent
all persons entitled to appointed counsel whenever author-
ized by law and able in fact to do so.
(f) Other Appointments. If the public defender is not ap-
pointed, a private attorney shall be appointed to the case.
All criminal appointments shall be made in a manner fair
and equitable to the members of the bar, taking into ac-
count the skill likely to be required in handling a particular
case.
(g) Requests for Representation Before Indictment. A re-
quest for appointment of counsel under Rule 7.1 shall be
made and processed as if proceedings had already com-
menced in Circuit Court.
(h) Appointment of Counsel During Appeal. The trial or
appellate court shall appoint new counsel for a defendant
legally entitled to such representation on appeal, when prior
counsel is permitted to withdraw.
(i) Compensation. A private attorney appointed to re-
present an indigent is entitled to compensation for services
rendered as provided by law. A private attorney so ap-
pointed shall be entitled to compensation for services ren-
dered whether or not a criminal case reaches circuit court.
Otherwise, no appointed counsel may request or accept any
payment or promise of payment for assisting in the repre-
sentation of a defendant.
(j) Expenses. As used herein the term "compensation for
services" shall include any reasonable expenses necessarily
incurred by appointed counsel in defense of an indigent cli-
ent, including fees and expenses of expert or professional
persons, provided that the incurring of such expenses has





Rule 7.3 establishes a procedure for the determination of indigency.
Under Rule 7.3(a), a defendant is indigent if financially unable to employ
counsel. In making a determination of indigency, the court should consider
factors such as the defendant's income and sources of income; employment
status; real or personal property owned; outstanding obligations; and the
number and ages of any dependants. The court should not consider the
fact that the defendant has been released on bond, or consider the financial
ability of friends or relatives not legally responsible for the defendant. The
ability to post bond should not be a preclusive factor because it would
place the defendant in the dilemma of choosing between the constitutional
right to legal representation and the constitutional right to liberty pending
trial. Moreover, as the defendant's liberty prior to trial may be essential to
defense preparations, placing the defendant in such a dilemma may deny
the right to an effective defense.
Rule 7.3(b) permits the court to make the determination of indigency
based solely on the affidavit submitted by the defendant. The court may,
but need not, examine the defendant under oath regarding the defendant's
financial resources. Prior to any such questioning, the defendant shall be
advised of the penalties for perjury as provided by law.
Rule 7.3(c) allows the court to reconsider the question of a defendant's
indigency if there has been a material change in circumstances. A motion
for redetermination of indigency may be made at any stage of the proceed-
ings. The ability to reconsider indigency insures both that indigent defend-
ants receive representation and that scarce judicial resources are
conserved.
Rule 7.3(d) insures that adequate records of appointment and service
of counsel are maintained by all courts and that the persons involved are
properly notified.
Rule 7.3(e) establishes a preference for appointment of public defend-
ers over private counsel in counties that have a public defender's office.
When the public defender's office cannot represent an indigent defendant,
as when there is a conflict of interest or when the public defender is unable
to provide prompt and adequate representation, private counsel shall be
appointed.
Rule 7.3(g) provides that a request for appointment of counsel under
Rule 7.1 is to be treated as if proceedings had already commenced in Cir-
cuit Court, because under Rule 7.1 the right to appointed counsel can exist
even before such proceedings have commenced. Under Rule 7.1(b), the
right to appointed counsel attaches "once the proceedings against the de-
fendant reach the accusatory stage." Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 876
(Miss. 1987); Page v. State, 495 So.2d 436, 439 (Miss. 1986). The "accusatory
stage" occurs when a warrant is issued or, "by binding over or recognizing
the offender to compel his appearance to answer the offense, as well as by
indictment or affidavit." Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-7 (1972). This right to
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counsel [also] "attaches at the point in time when 'the initial appearance...
ought to have been held. . . .' " Veal v. State, 585 So.2d 693, 699 (Miss. 1991)
(emphasis added). Under Rule 5.2, an initial appearance is to be held
within 48 hours when the defendant is arrested without a warrant and held
in custody. Moreover, under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), presence of counsel is required, if
requested, during pre-indictment questioning if information so obtained is
to be admitted as evidence at trial.
Rule 7.3(h) provides for continuity of representation by requiring the
trial or appellate court to appoint new counsel for a defendant legally enti-
tled to such representation on appeal, when prior counsel is permitted to
withdraw.
Rules 7.3(i) and (j) do not change existing law regarding the payment
of appointed counsel. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17, "Compensation of
counsel," provides in part:
The compensation for counsel for indigents . . . in any one
(1) case may not exceed one thousand dollars
($1000.00).... Provided, however, in a capital case two (2)
attorneys may be appointed, and the compensation may not
exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per case. If the case
is appealed ... the allowable fee for services on appeal shall
not exceed one thousand dollars ($1000.00) per case. In ad-
dition, the judge shall allow reimbursement of actual
expenses.
See also Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 125 (Miss. 1991) (State must pay
for non-legal experts on showing of "substantial need"); Wilson v. State,
574 So.2d 1338, 1341 (Miss. 1990) ("§99-15-17 will allow an attorney to re-
ceive $1,000.00 in profit plus his or her actual expenses. A rebuttable pre-
sumption arises that the actual cost contemplated by the statute is the
average of $25.00 per hour.")
Rule 7.4 - Standards for Appointment of Trial and Appellate Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases.
(a) In General. To be eligible for appointment in a death
penalty case, an attorney:
(1) shall have been a member in good standing of the
State Bar of Mississippi for at least 5 years immediately
preceding the appointment, or admitted pro hac vice
pursuant to an order entered under MRAP 46 and be a
member in good standing of that attorney's home juris-




(2) shall have practiced in the area of state criminal liti-
gation for 3 years immediately preceding the
appointment;
(3) shall have in the 3 years before appointment com-
pleted 12 hours training or educational programs in the
area of death penalty defense through a program ac-
credited by the Mississippi Commission on Continuing
Legal Education or by the American Bar Association;
and
(4) shall have demonstrated the necessary proficiency
and commitment which exemplify the quality of repre-
sentation appropriate to death penalty cases.
(b) Lead Trial Counsel. To be eligible for appointment as
lead trial counsel, an attorney must meet the qualifications
set forth in subsection (a) of this Rule and the following:
(1) shall have practiced in the area of state criminal liti-
gation for 5 years immediately preceding the
appointment;
(2) shall have been lead counsel in at least 5 felony jury
trials that were tried to completion, including at least 1
death penalty murder jury trial that was tried to com-
pletion in which the attorney was lead or co-counsel;
and
(3) shall be familiar with the American Bar Association
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
(c) Appellate Counsel. To be eligible for appointment as
appellate counsel on behalf of a defendant sentenced to
death, an attorney must meet the qualifications set forth in
section (a) of this Rule and, within 5 years immediately pre-
ceding the appointment, have been lead counsel in an ap-
peal or post-conviction proceeding in a case in which a
death sentence was imposed, as well as prior experience as
lead counsel in the appeal of at least 3 felony convictions
and at least 1 post-conviction proceeding. Alternatively, an
attorney must have been lead counsel in the appeal of at
least 6 felony convictions, at least 2 of which were appeals
from murder convictions, and lead counsel in at least 2 post-
conviction proceedings.
(d) Exceptional Circumstances. In exceptional circum-
stances enumerated by the trial judge on the record, an at-
torney may be appointed who does not meet the
qualifications set forth in sections (a)(1)-(3), (b) and (c) of
this Rule, providing that the attorney's experience, stature
and record enable the court to conclude that the attorney's
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ability significantly exceeds the standards set forth in this
Rule.
Comment
The purpose of Rule 7.4 is to establish standards for appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants in the trial and appellate stages of capital
litigation. The provisions of this rule generally parallel the qualifications set
forth in MRAP 22 regarding qualifications for post-conviction counsel.
Section (b) establishes elevated standards for lead trial counsel. Sec-
tion (c) sets out standards for sole or lead counsel in appellate proceedings.
(Of course, MRAP 22, not Section (c), governs appointment of post con-
viction counsel.) Rule 7.2(a)(2) requires that co-counsel be appointed in
all death penalty trial proceedings; co-counsel should ordinarily be ap-
pointed at the appellate stage as well.
Under Rule 7.4(d), in the court's discretion an attorney need not meet
all of the stated requirements to be eligible for appointment. Section (d) is
designed to allow appointment of an attorney who technically does not
meet the requirements of Sections (a)(1) through (3), (b), or (c), but whose
demonstrated ability and experience significantly exceeds the standards
contemplated by the rule.
RULE 8 - RELEASE
Rule 8.1 - Definitions and Requirements.
(a) Personal Recognizance. A release on defendant's "per-
sonal recognizance" means release without any condition of
an undertaking relating to, or a deposit of, security.
(b) Unsecured Appearance Bond. An "unsecured appear-
ance bond" is an undertaking to pay a specified sum of
money to the clerk of the circuit, county, justice, or munici-
pal court, for the use of the State of Mississippi or the mu-
nicipality, on the failure of a person released to comply with
its conditions.
(c) Secured Appearance Bond. A "secured appearance
bond" is an appearance bond secured by deposit with the
clerk of security equal to the full amount thereof.
(d) Cash Deposit Bond. A "cash deposit bond" is an ap-
pearance bond secured by deposit with the clerk of security,
in the form of a cash deposit or certified funds, in an
amount set by the judge.
(e) Security. "Security" is cash, certified funds, or a surety's
undertaking, deposited with the clerk to secure an appear-
ance bond.
(f) Surety. A "surety" is someone (other than the person
released) who executes an appearance bond and is therefore
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bound to pay its amount, if the person released fails to ap-
pear for any proceeding as ordered by the court. A surety,
except one governed by Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-39-1, shall
file with an appearance bond a sworn affidavit or
certification:
(1) stating that the surety is not an attorney, judicial
official, or person authorized to take bail (or if the
surety is an attorney, judicial official, or person author-
ized to take bail, then the affidavit or certification shall
state the surety's relationship to the person released).
An attorney, judicial official, or person authorized to
accept an appearance bond shall not be precluded from
being a surety for a member of the surety's immediate
family. For purposes of this Rule, the term "immediate
family" shall be limited to include only: a spouse, a sib-
ling, a spouse's sibling, a lineal ancestor or descendant,
a lineal ancestor or descendant of a spouse, a sibling, or
a spouse's sibling or a minor or incompetent person de-
pendent upon the surety for more than 1/2 of their
support;
(2) stating that the surety owns property in this state,
which property, when aggregated with that of other
sureties, is worth the amount of the appearance bond
(provided, that the property must be exclusive of prop-
erty exempt from execution and its value equaling the
amount of the appearance bond must be above and
over all liabilities, including the amount of all other
outstanding appearance bonds entered into by the
surety) and specifying that property and the exemp-
tions and liabilities thereon; and
(3) specifying the number and amount of other out-
standing appearance bonds entered into by the surety.
(g) Insurer. The terms "insurer," "professional bail agent,"
"soliciting bail agent," "bail enforcement agent," and per-
sonal surety agent" shall be defined as in Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 83-39-1, et seq.
(h) Compliance Required. All agents and insurers shall
comply fully with Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-39-1, et seq., and
§ 99-5-1, et seq., and all related statutes and regulations.
Comment
Rule 8.1 provides definitions for use in Rule 8 and throughout these
Rules. Rule 8 is based generally on Ala. R. Crim. P. 7, Fed. R. Crim. P.46,
and 18 U.S.C. 3142 et seq., and supplants practice under former URCCC
6.02. With few exceptions, the statutory provisions currently governing
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professional bail bond companies regulated by the Mississippi Commis-
sioner of Insurance, as provided in Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-39-1 et seq., are
largely unaffected by Rule 8. Likewise, existing statutory provisions gov-
erning bail matters in the courts, as provided in Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-5-1
et seq., remain mostly unchanged, and the forms required by Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 99-5-1 & 99-5-3 are unaffected.
Under section (a), "personal recognizance" means a release of the de-
fendant without any condition of an undertaking relating to, or deposit of,
security. Such release is distinguishable from release conditioned on the
posting of bond or other security.
Section (b) describes a type of bond not currently used in state court
practice, but used extensively in federal criminal cases pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 3142(b).
Sections (c) and (d) reflect current practice under Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-5-9. The form of a cash deposit bond previously prescribed by
URCCC 6.02(C) is retained. The amount of the cash deposit is set by the
judge, up to the full amount of the bond, but often less.
Section (f) tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.1(e) and clarifies the procedure
when a person is arrested and permitted to post an appearance bond se-
cured by sureties who may own equity in real property.
Sections (g) and (h) make clear that the statutory requirements and
procedures related to professional bond companies and their bail bonds
continue in full force.
Rule 8.2 - Right to Pretrial Release on One's Own Personal
Recognizance or on Bond.
(a) Right to Release. Any defendant charged with an of-
fense bailable as a matter of right may be released pending
or during trial on the defendant's own personal recogni-
zance or on an appearance bond unless the court before
which the charge is filed or pending determines that such a
release will not reasonably assure the defendant's appear-
ance as required, or that the defendant's being at large will
pose a real and present danger to others or to the public at
large. If such a determination is made, the court may im-
pose the least onerous condition or conditions contained in
Rule 8.3 or 8.4 that will reasonably assure the defendant's
appearance or that will eliminate or minimize the risk of
harm to others or to the public at large. In making such a
determination, the court may take into account the
following:
(1) the age, background and family ties, relationships
and circumstances of the defendant;
(2) the defendant's reputation, character, and health;
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(3) the defendant's prior criminal record, including
prior releases on recognizance or on unsecured or se-
cured appearance bonds, and other pending cases;
(4) the identity of responsible members of the commu-
nity who will vouch for the defendant's reliability;
(5) violence or lack of violence in the alleged commis-
sion of the offense;
(6) the nature of the offense charged, the apparent
probability of conviction, and the likely sentence, inso-
far as these factors are relevant to the risk of
nonappearance;
(7) the type of weapon used, e.g., knife, pistol, shotgun,
sawed-off shotgun, assault or automatic weapon, explo-
sive device, etc;
(8) threats made against victims or witnesses;
(9) the value of property taken during the alleged com-
mission of the offense;
(10) whether the property allegedly taken was recov-
ered or not; damage or lack of damage to property al-
legedly taken;
(11) residence of the defendant, including considera-
tion of real property ownership, and length of residence
in the defendant's place of domicile;
(12) in cases where the defendant is charged with a
drug offense, evidence of selling or distribution activity
that should indicate a substantial increase in the
amount of bond;
(13) consideration of the defendant's employment sta-
tus and history, the location of defendant's employ-
ment, e.g., whether employed in the county where the
alleged offense occurred, and the defendant's financial
condition;
(14) any enhancement statutes related to the charged
offense; and
(15) any other fact or circumstance bearing on the risk
of nonappearance or on the danger to others or to the
public.
(b) Bond Schedule. The following schedule is established as
a general guide for circuit, county, justice, and municipal
courts in setting bail for persons charged with bailable of-
fenses. Except in situations where release is required in the
minimum scheduled amount pursuant to Rule 5.1(b) or (c),
or any other Rule, courts may and should exercise discre-
tion in setting bail above or below the scheduled amounts,
as supported by consideration of the factors listed in Rule
8.2(a). When a statute limits a judge's bail authority, such
2013] 49
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
statutory limits shall apply to the extent any of the amounts
listed below are in conflict therewith.
SECURED OR UNSECURED APPEARANCE BOND SCHEDULE
RECOMMENDED RANGE
FELONIES:
Capital felony: $25,000 to No Bail Allowed
Manslaughter (or any other non-capital crime involving
loss of human Life): $10,000 to $1,000,000
Drug Distribution and Trafficking: $5,000 to $1,000,000
All other non-capital felonies:
- punishable by maximum 20 years or more: $20,000 to $250,000
- punishable by maximum 10 years to 20 years: $10,000 to $100,000
- punishable by maximum up to 10 years: $5,000 to $50,000
MISDEMEANORS (not included elsewhere in the schedule):
- punishable by maximum 1 year: $500 to $2,000
- punishable by maximum 6 mos.: $250 to $1,000
- punishable by less than 6 mos.: $100 to $500
- punishable by fine only: $50 to Max. Fine/Costs*
Municipal Ordinance Violations: $100 to $1,000
Traffic Related Offenses:
Misdemeanor DUI and DWLS: $500 to $2,000
Reckless/careless driving: $100 to $300
Speeding: $50 to Max. Fine/Costs*
Other traffic violations: $50 to Max. Fine/Costs*
*Maximum amount of fine(s), court costs, and statutory assessments which
might be due upon conviction.
Comment
Rule 8.2 tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2(a), and embodies the guarantee
against excessive bail provided by Article 3, § 29, of the Mississippi Consti-
tution, within the limitations proscribed therein. Rule 8.2 is based on the
presumption of innocence of the accused, the constitutional right of a de-
fendant charged with a noncapital offense to be released on bail, and the
policy that a defendant should be released pending trial whenever possible.
Under section (a), a defendant charged with an offense that is bailable as a
matter of right is eligible for a recognizance release unless the judge deter-
mines that the defendant's presence would not thereby be reasonably as-
sured or that the defendant poses a real and present danger of harm to
others. See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1986) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of pretrial detention based on dangerousness). Section (a) makes
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it possible to release on bail indigent defendants on non-financial condi-
tions that make it reasonably likely that the defendant will appear. See
Bandy v. U.S., 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) (questioning constitutionality of holding
indigent defendant in custody for no reason other than the inability to raise
money for bond).
Sections (a)(1) - (15) provide detailed guidance for the judge setting
bond as to the range of inquiries that might - and perhaps ought - be made
prior to setting the conditions on, or the amount of, any recognizance or
appearance bond. While no current rule or statute requires the inquiry
described in section (a), such an inquiry has always been within the sound
discretion and inherent power of a court setting terms of release. See Lee v.
Lawson, 375 So. 2d 1019 (Miss. 1979) (suggesting similar inquiry); ABA,
Standards for Criminal Justice, Pretrial Release (3d ed. 2002). Section (a) is
intended to provide a helpful, non-exclusive list for any court making such
an inquiry, and is written to ensure that a judge not give inordinate weight
to the nature of the present charge.
Section (b) is new and tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2(b). A defendant
who has been arrested, and is not promptly brought before a judge for
determination of bail as required by Rule 5.1(b) and (c), must be released
on a bond at the minimum end of the applicable range. While section (b)
makes clear that otherwise the judge retains discretion to set any bond
above or below the suggested range, the bond schedule set forth in section
(b) should help reduce the disparities - often dramatic- between courts
who now set bail without the guidance of a scheduled range. Although
custodial arrest is not employed for most traffic offenses, these offenses are
listed within recommended ranges to serve as a guide in instances where
the defendant refuses to sign the promise-to-appear portion of the uniform
traffic citation. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-9-21.
Rule 8.3 - Release after Conviction and Sentencing.
(a) No Release when Sentence Exceeds Twenty Years. A
defendant shall not be released pending appeal to the Su-
preme Court if the defendant has been convicted:
(1) of felony child abuse;
(2) of sexual battery of a minor; or
(3) of any offense and who for that offense has been
sentenced to punishment by death, by life imprison-
ment, or by imprisonment for a term in excess of 20
years.
(b) Release.
(1) When Filed. A person convicted and sentenced for
a felony, not enumerated in section (a), may file an ap-
plication for release concurrently with the filing of a
notice of appeal.
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(2) When Available. Such person may be released
from imprisonment on bail pending an appeal to the
Supreme Court, within the discretion of the judge, if
the defendant shows by clear and convincing evidence
that:
(A) release would not constitute a special danger
to any other person or to the community;
(B) that a condition or a combination of conditions
may be placed on release that will reasonably as-
sure the appearance of the defendant as required;
(C) that the defendant has complied with MRAP
11(b) and will properly prosecute the appeal; and
(D) only when the peculiar circumstances of the
case render it proper.
Comment
Rule 8.3 tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2(c) and Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-
115. Section (a) reflects the existing prohibitions on post-conviction bail
pending appeal of convictions for certain crimes found in Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-35-115(1). Section (b)(2) embodies the statutory requirement of clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant's appearance will be reasona-
bly assured and that the defendant's release would not pose a special dan-
ger to any member of the community. The defendant is assigned the
burden establishing that grounds for release since the conviction justifies
retention in custody in situations where doubt exists as to whether a defen-
dant can be safely released. Section (b)(2)(C) ensures that release is avail-
able only on proof that the defendant will actually and properly prosecute
an appeal by, among other things, complying with the requirement in
MRAP 11(b) of prepaying the cost of the record on appeal.
Rule 8.4 - Conditions of Release.
(a) Mandatory Conditions. Every order of release under
this Rule shall contain the conditions that the defendant:
(1) appear to answer and to submit to the orders and
process of the court having jurisdiction of the case;
(2) refrain from committing any criminal offense; and
(3) promptly notify the court of any change of address.
(b) Additional Conditions. An order of release may include
any one or more of the following conditions reasonably nec-
essary to secure a defendant's appearance or to protect the
public:
(1) execution of an appearance bond in an amount specified by
the court, either with or without requiring that the defendant
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deposit with the clerk security in an amount as required by the
court;
(2) execution of a secured appearance bond;
(3) placing the defendant in the custody of a designated person
or organization agreeing to supervise the defendant;
(4) restrictions on the defendant's travel, associations, or place
of abode during the period of release;
(5) restrictions on the defendant's direct or indirect contact
with any specified person or persons;
(6) return to custody after specified hours;
(7) Participation in and successful completion of any drug, al-
cohol, anger management, mental health, or other treatment
required by the court;
(8) Participation in G.E.D. classes and testing or in any other
educational activities required by the court; or
(9) Any other conditions which the court deems reasonably
necessary.
Comment
Rule 8.4 follows Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.3. Rule 8.4 further adds additional
specific conditions of release drawn from portions of 18 U.S.C. 3142(c) and
from current practice in various Mississippi courts in the exercise of their
discretion and experience in such matters. Section (b)(9) vests the judge
setting bond conditions with broad latitude to insure appearance of the
defendant and protection of the public, and gives the judge flexibility in
fashioning conditions of release.
Rule 8.5 - Procedure for Determination of Release Conditions
(a) Initial Decision. If a defendant has not been released
from custody and is brought before a court for initial ap-
pearance, a determination of the conditions of release shall
be made. The judge shall issue an order containing the con-
ditions of release and shall inform the defendant of the con-
ditions, the possible consequences of their violation, and
that a warrant for the arrest of the defendant may be issued
immediately upon report of a violation.
(b) Amendment of Conditions. If the defendant is in cus-
tody, the court may, for good cause shown, either on its own
initiative or on application of either party, modify the condi-
tions of release, after first giving the parties an adequate op-
portunity to respond to the proposed modification.
(c) Review by Circuit Court. No later than 7 days before the
commencement of each term of court, the officials having
custody of felony defendants who are being held in jail
2013] 53
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
pending trial or extradition shall provide the presiding
judge, the district attorney, and the clerk of the circuit court
for the county in which such defendant is being held, the
names of all defendants in their custody, the charge or
charges upon which they are being held, and the date they
were most recently taken into custody. The circuit court or
the court's designee shall review the conditions of release
for every felony defendant who is eligible for bail and has
been in jail for more than 90 days.
Comment
Rule 8.5 is consistent with Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.4(a) - (c) and establishes
a mechanism for setting bonds, and for periodically reviewing bonds which
have been set but which for whatever reason have not been posted. The
conditions of release will usually be set on the arrest warrant at the time of
its issuance, pursuant to Rule 3.2(a). If not, or if the defendant cannot
meet the conditions, the defendant will be afforded a release hearing at
initial appearance as provided by Rules 5.1 and 5.2. Thereafter, under sec-
tion (b), the conditions can be modified, to be made either more or less
stringent, depending on the circumstances. Section (c) is particularly im-
portant in requiring that the court and other interested personnel in the
judicial system receive notice prior to each court term of the identity of
those being held in custody, either without bond or without the ability to
post bond. Section (c) also requires a review of the detention or bond sta-
tus of those who have remained in custody for more than 90 days. These
notice and review requirements should enhance the procedure for insuring
speedy trials or other dispositions of criminal cases, and should help avoid
the possibility that a person in detention is forgotten or overlooked by
those charged with the custody of that person.
Rule 8.6 - Review of Conditions; Revocation
(a) Issuance of Warrant. Upon motion of the prosecuting
attorney or on the court's own motion stating with
particularity
(1) the facts or circumstances constituting a material
breach of the conditions of release;
(2) that material misrepresentations or omissions of
fact were made in securing the defendant's release; or
(3) that revocation is otherwise required by law,
the court having jurisdiction over the defendant released
may secure the defendant's presence in court by issuing an
order to appear before the court to show cause or an arrest
warrant under Rule 3.1 to secure the defendant's presence
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in court. A copy of the motion shall be served with the or-
der or warrant, and a hearing shall be held on the motion
without undue delay, except in no event later than 72 hours
after the arrest of the defendant released, as provided in
Rule 5.1.
(b) Hearing; Review of Conditions; Revocation of Release.
If, after a hearing on the matters set forth in the motion, the
court finds that the defendant released has not complied
with or has violated the conditions of release, or that mate-
rial misrepresentations or omissions of fact were made in
securing the defendant's release, the court may modify the
conditions or revoke the release. If a ground alleged for rev-
ocation of the release is that the defendant released has vio-
lated the condition under Rule 8.3(a)(2) by committing a
criminal offense, or that there was a misrepresentation or
omission concerning other charges pending against the de-
fendant released, the court may modify the conditions of re-
lease or revoke the release, if the court finds that there is
probable cause (or if there has already been a finding of
probable cause) to believe that the defendant released com-
mitted the other offense or offenses charged.
(c) Cases Governed by Article 3, Section 29(2). In cases
governed by Article 3, section 29(2) of the Mississippi Con-
stitution of 1890, on motion of the prosecuting attorney or
on the court's own motion, a court having jurisdiction over
the defendant may revoke the defendant's bond by order
and without further action by the court.
Comment
Rule 8.6 tracks closely provisions in Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.5 and Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 7.5. Section (a) permits either a warrant or a summons to be is-
sued to take the person into custody for bond review or revocation pro-
ceedings. Section (c) makes clear that Article 3, Section 29(2), of the
Mississippi Constitution governs those situations where one previously ad-
mitted to bail for a felony has been charged with a new felony offense
punishable by more than 5 years imprisonment. Upon finding probable
cause for the new offense, either by the reviewing court or another court
with jurisdiction (such as the court in which the new charge has been filed),
this constitutional provision requires revocation of the prior bond and di-
rects that the person will not be admitted to further bail. When the original
charge and the new charge are pending in two different courts, either court
may revoke the prior bond and decline to set a new bond. See Dendy v.
State, 931 So.2d 608, 614-15 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), cert denied 933 So2d 303
(2006).
2013]1 55
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Rule 8.7 - Transfer and Disposition of Bond.
(a) Transfer Upon Supervening Indictment. An appearance
bond or release order issued to assure the defendant's pres-
ence for proceedings following the filing of a complaint shall
automatically be transferred to the same, related, or lesser
charge prosecuted by indictment, even though the com-
plaint is superseded by return of the indictment unless, fol-
lowing indictment, the judge presiding, for good cause, shall
order revocation or modification of the conditions of re-
lease, as provided in Rule 8.6(a) and (b).
(b) Filing and Custody of Appearance Bonds and Security.
Appearance bonds and security shall be filed with the clerk
of the court in which the case is pending. Whenever the case
is transferred to another court, any appearance bond and
security shall be transferred also.
(c) Surrender of Defendant by Surety. At any time, a surety
may surrender to the sheriff a defendant released, and the
sheriff shall certify such surrender to the court. The defen-
dant may then obtain other sureties under the same condi-
tions of release. In municipal ordinance cases, surrender
may be to the chief of police of the municipality, who shall
certify to the court the defendant's surrender. In the event
that a Professional Bail Agent, Soliciting Bail Agent, or In-
surer has provided a surety bond or other form of bail for a
defendant without first obtaining payment in full for the
premium on the bond, that defendant may not be surren-
dered because the defendant, or anyone assuming financial
responsibility on the defendant's behalf for the bond pre-
mium, has failed to make any agreed-upon payment to the
surety following release.
(d) Forfeiture. If at any time it appears to the court that a
defendant fails to appear, the court shall proceed as appro-
priate pursuant to Miss. CODE ANNV. § 99-5-25 or § 21-23-8
and any related statutes or regulations which may apply.
(e) Exoneration. At any time that the court finds there is no
further need for an appearance bond, the court shall exon-
erate the appearance bond and order the return of any se-
curity deposited with the clerk.
Comment
Rule 8.7 follows practice under Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.6 and Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 7.6. Section (a) is consistent with current Mississippi practice regarding
appearance bonds. The last sentence of section (c) addresses the situation
where a bail bond company attempts to surrender the principal solely on
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the basis of non-payment of the fee or commission, or any portion thereof,
which was not collected at the time of issuance of the bond. Miss. CODE
ANN. § 83-29-25 plainly directs that the professional bail agent "shall
charge and collect" the premium, commission, or fee due. However, if the
bail agent nevertheless elects to contract with the principal to issue bail on
the payment of less than the full amount due, any subsequent collection
effort is merely a contractual matter which must be resolved in civil court,
not in criminal court by means of incarceration for non-payment. Involving
criminal courts would improperly condone using criminal process to en-
force a civil debt. In addition, doing so threatens to involve criminal courts
in interminable civil disputes, thereby wasting precious judicial resources.
The statutes governing bail permit wide latitude to the surety to surrender
a person on bail; however, non-payment of a contractual obligation be-
tween the principal and professional bail agent is not, standing alone, a
proper basis for surrender. Section (c) authorizes a court to whom bail is
surrendered to inquire of the surety to insure that the criminal justice sys-
tem is not co-opted by those who write corporate surety bonds as a mecha-
nism for debt collection. Section (d) defers to the extensive statutory
procedure governing forfeiture of bail bonds provided in Miss. CODE ANN.
H§ 99-5-25 and 21-23-8. Section (e) provides for the return of any security
deposit upon exoneration of the bond.
RULE 9 - TRIAL SErING
Rule 9.1 - Trial Setting.
(a) Trial Docket. Within 60 days after arraignment (or
waiver thereof), the case shall be set for trial. Trial shall be
set for no later than 270 days after arraignment (or waiver
thereof). A docket of cases ready for trial shall be main-
tained by the clerk or the court administrator. Cases set by
the judge for hearing must be ready at the appointed time.
(b) Priorities in Scheduling. Insofar as is practicable, trials
of criminal cases shall have priority over trials of civil cases.
In determining priority among criminal cases, the court shall
consider, among others, the following factors:
(1) the right of a defendant to a speedy trial under the
constitutions and laws of the United States and the
State of Mississippi;
(2) whether the defendant is in custody;
(3) whether the defendant's pretrial liberty may present
unusual risks;
(4) the relative gravity of the offense charged; and
(5) the relative complexity of the case.
(c) Duty of Prosecutor. The prosecutor shall advise the
court of facts relevant to determining the order of cases on
the docket.
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(d) Motion for Continuance. A continuance may be
granted by written order of the court on its own motion, or
on the motion of a party stating with specificity the reasons
justifying the continuance and supported by affidavits as re-
quired by the court.
Comment
Rule 9.1(a) continues the procedure set forth in prior URCCC 9.02.
Rule 9.1 has three main purposes: (1) to effectuate the right of the accused
to a speedy trial; (2) to further the interests of the public, including victims
and witnesses, in the fair, accurate, and timely resolution of criminal cases;
and (3) to ensure the effective use of resources. Preventing undue delay in
the administration of criminal justice has become an object of increasing
interest and concern. Historically, the right to a speedy trial has been
thought of as a protection for the defendant. Obviously, delay can cause a
hardship to a defendant who is in custody awaiting trial. Even if afforded
the opportunity for pretrial release, a defendant nonetheless is likely to
suffer anxiety during a period of unwanted delay, and runs the risk that the
defendant's memory and the memory of defense witnesses may suffer as
time goes on. Delay can also adversely affect the prosecution. Witnesses
may lose interest or disappear, or their memories may fade thus making
them more vulnerable to cross-examination. There is also a larger public
interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, which may transcend
the interest of the particular prosecutor, defense counsel, and defendant.
Section (b) is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 50. Section (b) gives special
priority to five classes of criminal cases, including those involving defend-
ants whose pretrial liberty presents unusual risks. Thus, section (b) pro-
vides the community with the protection of a speedy trial for those who,
though released on bond, still constitute a threat to the public, to witnesses,
to evidence, or to anything else.
Section (c) is an explicit directive to the prosecutor to provide the
court with appropriate information to determine the order of cases for the
calendar.
Section (d) requires that a party's motion for a continuance state with
specificity the reasons justifying the continuance. Such a motion must be
supported by affidavits if the court so requires. The court may, but need
not, order that supporting affidavits follow the prior practice set forth in
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-29, which required:
On all applications for a continuance the party shall set forth in his
affidavit the facts which he expects to prove by his absent witness or docu-
ments that the court may judge of the materiality of such facts, the name
and residence of the absent witness, that he has used due diligence to pro-
cure the absent documents, or presence of the absent witness, as the case
may be, stating in what such diligence consists, and that the continuance is
not sought for delay only, but that justice may be done. The court may
58 [VOL. 31:1
MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
grant or deny a continuance, in its discretion, and may of its own motion
cross-examine the party making the affidavit. The attorneys for the other
side may also cross-examine and may introduce evidence by affidavit or
otherwise for the purpose of showing to the court that a continuance
should be denied.
See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-43-19 ("The victim shall have the right
to a final disposition of the criminal proceeding free from unreasonable
delay. To effectuate this right, the court, in determining whether to grant
any continuance, should make every reasonable effort to consider whether
granting such continuance shall be prejudicial to the victim.")
RULE 10 - PRESENCE OF DEFENDANT, WITNESSES, AND SPECTATORS
Rule 10.1 - Right of Defendant to be Present; Waiver.
(a) Right to Be Present. The defendant has the right to be
present at the arraignment and at every stage of the trial,
including the selection of the jury, the giving of additional
instructions pursuant to Rule 22.3, the return of the verdict,
and sentencing.
(b) Waiver of the Right to Be Present.
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a defendant
may waive the right to be present at any proceeding in
the following manner:
(A) with the consent of the court, by an under-
standing and voluntary waiver in open court or by
a written consent executed by the defendant and
by the defendant's attorney of record, filed in the
case;
(B) by the defendant's absence from any proceed-
ing, upon the court's finding that such absence was
voluntary and constitutes an understanding and
voluntary waiver of the right to be present. The
court may infer that the absence was voluntary and
constitutes an understanding and voluntary waiver
if the defendant had notice of the time and place of
the proceeding, had notice of the right to be pre-
sent at it, and was warned that the proceeding
would go forward in the defendant's absence
should the defendant fail to appear; or
(C) if the defendant was initially present at trial, or
if the defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere,
the defendant also waives the right to be present
when the defendant is voluntarily absent after the
plea was entered or after trial has begun, regard-
less of whether the court informed the defendant
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of an obligation to remain during trial or
sentencing.
(2) A defendant may not waive the right to be present:
(A) during the imposition of a sentence in a death
penalty case; or
(B) if the defendant is not represented by counsel
at the proceeding at which the defendant is absent,
except:
(i) in minor misdemeanor cases;
(ii) in proceedings conducted after the defen-
dant has been adjudicated guilty; or
(iii) when the defendant has waived the right
to counsel.
(c) Effect. If the defendant waives the right to be present,
the trial may proceed to completion, including the verdict's
return and sentencing, during the defendant's absence.
(d) Obtaining Presence of Unexcused Defendant. If a de-
fendant is not present at the trial, or at any stage thereof, or
at any other proceeding, and the defendant's right to be pre-
sent has not been waived or the absence has not been ex-
cused, the court, by order, may direct law enforcement
officers to bring the defendant forthwith before the court
for the trial or proceeding.
(e) Appearance of a Corporation. A corporation may ap-
pear by counsel for all purposes at any proceeding.
COMMENT
Rule 10.1 sets forth the right of the defendant to be present at every
stage of the trial and provides for waiver of that right. Rule 10.1 is based on
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. Rule 10.1(a) states the right of a defendant to be pre-
sent at all stages of the criminal prosecution. The right of the defendant to
be present also protects various other rights of the accused. See Miss.
Const. Art. III, § 26 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a
right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both [and] to be confronted by
the witnesses against him"); Fed. R. Crim. P. 43.
Section (b) allows a defendant to waive the right to be present, consis-
tent with prior practice. The standards for waiver are those required for
waiver of other constitutional rights. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938) ("an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege").
The defendant may make an express waiver under section (b)(2)(i). In
addition, under sections (b)(2)(ii) and (iii), the defendant may waive the
right through voluntary absence from the proceeding. See Taylor v. U.S.,
414 U.S. 17 (1973). Under section (b)(2)(ii), the court may find a valid
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waiver when the defendant had personal notice of the proceeding, had per-
sonal notice of the right to be present at it, and was warned that the pro-
ceeding would go forward in the defendant's absence should the defendant
fail to appear. It is quite practical to add the warning required by section
(b)(2)(ii) to the release order received by the defendant after the defen-
dant posts bond or is released on recognizance. Under Taylor, it is not
incumbent on the court to warn the defendant expressly of these three fac-
tors where the defendant has personally appeared at the commencement of
trial and therefore it can reasonably be assumed that the defendant has
knowledge of the right to be present. Thus, section (b)(2)(iii) allows the
court to find an implied waiver when the defendant was present at the com-
mencement of the trial and fails to appear at some later stage.
The presumption of voluntariness is rebuttable. A defendant deemed
to have waived the right to be present pursuant to sections (b)(2)(ii) or (iii)
might still be involuntarily absent and should be permitted to prove that
fact in a subsequent or collateral proceeding.
Under section (b)(2), a defendant is prohibited from waiving the right
to be present in two situations. One is during pronouncement of a sen-
tence of death by the judge after the jury has returned its verdict. The
other is when the defendant will not be represented by counsel, except that
an unrepresented defendant may waive the right to be present: in minor
misdemeanor cases; in proceedings conducted after the defendant has been
adjudicated guilty; or when the defendant has waived the right to counsel.
Fundamental fairness is violated if neither the defendant nor counsel for
the defendant is present at trial. If a defendant who has waived counsel is
subsequently absent during trial under circumstances from which the court
may infer a waiver of the right to be present under Rule 10.1(b)(1)(ii) or
(iii), the court may then appoint counsel to represent the defendant in the
defendant's absence and resume trial unless the circumstances would re-
quire a mistrial or continuance in the interest of justice.
Pursuant to section (c), if the defendant waives the right to be present,
the trial may proceed to completion during the defendant's absence. The
decision to proceed in light of a voluntary waiver is discretionary, not
mandatory, with the court. The court is in no instance required to proceed.
Rule 10.2 - Effect of Defendant's Disruptive Behavior.
(a) Disruptive Conduct. A defendant who engages in dis-
ruptive or disorderly conduct after having been warned by
the court that such conduct will result in the defendant's ex-
pulsion from a proceeding shall forfeit the right to be pre-
sent at that proceeding.
(b) Re-acquisition of Right. The court shall grant any de-
fendant so excluded reasonable opportunities to return to
the court upon the defendant's personal assurance of good
behavior. Any subsequent disruptive conduct on the part of
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the defendant may result in exclusion without additional
warning.
(c) Continuing Duty of Court. The court shall employ every
practicable means to enable a defendant removed from a
proceeding under this Rule to hear, observe or be informed
of the further course of the proceeding, and to consult with
counsel at reasonable intervals.
Comment
Rule 10.2 provides a procedure for dealing with disruptive and disor-
derly defendants. It is based upon Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), r'hg
den. 398 U.S. 915, and ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Special Func-
tions of the Trial Judge § 6-3.8 (3d ed. 2000).
Under Rule 10.2(a), a defendant, by disruptive conduct, may forfeit
the right to be present, even in circumstances where the right could not be
waived under Rule 10.1(b)(1)(ii) or (iii). In such circumstances, the court
would be on safer ground to appoint advisory counsel even if the defendant
had refused to accept appointed counsel.
Section (c) directs the court to use every feasible means to permit the
defendant to hear and observe the proceedings. The language is intended
to encourage use of any practical audiovisual devices in communicating the
progress of the trial to the defendant. The rule directs the court to employ
means that will let the defendant hear and observe, not participate. No
court is required to use impractical and expensive technology.
Of course, the court's contempt power is also applicable to such situa-
tions. See Rule 33.
Rule 10.3 - Presence of Witnesses and Spectators.
(a) Witnesses. The court may, and at the request of either
party shall, exclude prospective witnesses from the court-
room during opening statements and the testimony of other
witnesses. The court shall also direct them not to communi-
cate with each other concerning the case until all have testi-
fied. If the court finds that a party's claim that a person is a
prospective witness is not made in good faith, the person
shall not be excluded from the courtroom. Once a witness
has testified on direct examination and has been made avail-
able to all parties for cross-examination and excused by the
court, the witness shall be allowed to remain in the court-
room unless the court finds, upon application of a party or
witness, that the presence of the witness would be prejudi-




(1) Proceedings to be Open. All proceedings shall be
open to the public unless the court finds, upon applica-
tion of the defendant, that an open proceeding presents
a clear and present danger to the defendant's right to a
fair trial by an impartial jury.
(2) Exception for Certain Crimes. In prosecutions for
rape, adultery, fornication, sodomy or crime against na-
ture the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the
courtroom all persons except such as are necessary in
the conduct of the trial.
(3) Victims. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the victim
has the right to be present throughout all criminal
proceedings.
(c) Removal. Any or all individuals may be removed from
the courtroom for engaging in disorderly, disruptive, or con-
temptuous conduct, or when their conduct or presence con-
stitutes a threat or menace to the court, parties, attorneys,
witnesses, jurors, officials, members of the public, or a fair
trial.
(d) Record of Closed Proceedings. A complete record of
any closed proceedings shall be kept and made available to
the public following the completion of trial or disposition of
the case without trial.
(e) Investigator. If an exclusion order is entered, both the
defendant and the prosecutor shall nevertheless be entitled
to the presence of one investigator at counsel table.
(f) Electronic Coverage of Proceedings. Electronic cover-
age of judicial proceedings shall be governed by the Rules
for Electronic and Photographic Coverage of Judicial
Proceedings.
Comment
Rule 10.3(a) is consistent with, but expands on, MRE 615. The power
to exclude and separate witnesses at trial has long been held to be an ele-
ment of the trial court's discretionary power. The policy underlying the
sequestration rule is that, by preventing a witness from hearing the testi-
mony of another witness, the risk of fabrication, collusion, inaccuracy, and
shaping of testimony is minimized. Section (a) permits witnesses to attend
the trial after they have concluded their testimony on cross-examination. It
also permits them, even before concluding their testimony on cross-exami-
nation, to be present at all phases of the trial except opening statements or
other testimony. Because it is only at those phases where exclusion pro-
motes the truth-finding process, prospective witnesses are permitted to at-
tend during other phases, such as jury selection and legal argument. It is
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believed that the rule harmonizes the interest of a fair trial with the interest
of witnesses in being personally present at the trial. The trial court retains
discretion to exclude witnesses from the courtroom in those rare cases
where it can be demonstrated that a fair trial cannot be held without such
exclusion.
Rule 10.3(b)(1) sets forth the right of a defendant to a public trial as
guaranteed by Art. III, § 26, of the Mississippi Constitution, and section
(b)(2) sets forth the exception for certain crimes contained therein. Rule
10.3(b)(3) embodies a victim's right to be present set forth in Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-43-21. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-43-3(t) defines victim to mean "a
person against whom the criminal offense has been committed, or if the
person is deceased or incapacitated, the lawful representative." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-43-3(h) defines criminal proceeding as "a hearing, argu-
ment or other matter scheduled by and held before a trial court but does
not include a lineup, grand jury proceeding or other matter not held in the
presence of the court."
Section (c) gives the judge clear authority to clear the courtroom of
any and all persons whose conduct is disruptive of the proceedings or
whose presence poses a threat to others or to the proceedings. Section (d)
requires a complete record of any closed proceedings be kept and be made
available to the public. Section (e) entitles both parties to the presence and
advice of an investigator, to call attention to factual matters of which coun-
sel may not be aware.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has promulgated an entirely separate
body of "Rules for Electronic and Photographic Coverage of Judicial
Proceedings."
RULE 11 - CHANGE OF THE PLACE OF TRIAL
Rule 11.1 - Change of Venue.
(a) Grounds. In any criminal case, any defendant shall be
entitled to a change of venue, if a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had for any reason.
(b) Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity. Whenever the grounds
for change of venue are based on pretrial publicity, the de-
fendant shall be required to prove that the dissemination of
the prejudicial material will probably result in the defendant
being deprived of a fair trial.
(c) Time for Filing Motion. A motion for change of venue
shall be made at the earliest opportunity before empanelling
the trial jury.
(d) Waiver. The defendant loses the right to challenge
venue pursuant to this Rule when the defendant allows a
proceeding to commence or continue without objection af-
ter learning of the cause for challenge.
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(e) Renewal. When an action is remanded by an appellate
court for a new trial on one or more offenses charged in the
indictment or information, all rights to change of venue are
renewed, and no event connected with the first trial shall
constitute a waiver.
Comment
Rule 11.1(a) is in accord with Mississippi constitutional and statutory
provisions. Art. III, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that "all
prosecutions by indictment or information, [an accused shall have the right
to] trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was commit-
ted." See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-35. A change of venue must be
ordered if a fair and impartial trial cannot be had for any reason. If the
request for a change of venue is based on pretrial publicity, section (b)
requires the defendant to prove that the dissemination of prejudicial mater-
ials will likely result in the deprivation of a fair trial. See Skilling v. U.S.,
130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
Rule 11.1(c) requires a motion for a change of venue be made at the
earliest opportunity prior to empanelling the trial jury in the case. Simi-
larly, section (d) provides for an implied waiver where a defendant, after
learning of grounds for a change in place of trial, allows a proceeding to
commence or to continue without objection. A defendant may not let a
proceeding continue in the hope of prevailing but, upon losing, assert a
challenge to the proceeding. Under Rule 11(e), an application for change
of venue may be made when a new trial is granted by an appellate court, as
early as practicable before the next trial.
Rule 11.2 - Transfer to another County.
(a) Proceedings on Transfer. The judge, if a change in
venue is granted pursuant to Rule 11.1, shall direct that a
certified copy of the order granting the change of venue be
transmitted to the circuit clerk of the county to which the
venue has been changed. The circuit clerk of the county to
which the venue has been changed must file the certified
order and designate a docket number for said case for fu-
ture reference. Unless otherwise directed by the judge, all
pleadings, motions, orders of the court, and other matters
thereafter filed shall bear both the original number of the
county of original venue and the assigned number of the
county of changed venue and shall be filed with the circuit
clerk of the county of original venue. The judge may hear or
determine all pretrial and post-trial matters in the county to
which venue has been changed or in any county of the
judge's district.
2013] 65
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
(b) Place of Trial. In all cases in which venue has been
changed it shall be within the judge's discretion, after the
jury has been selected, to conduct the trial in the county of
original venue, or in the county to which venue has been
transferred.
(c) Costs. All costs of a trial transferred from one county to
another county, including the cost of transporting the jury
from one county to another where the same is ordered, shall
be borne by the county of original venue. The clerk of the
county of original venue shall handle any appeal.
Comment
Rule 11.2 continues verbatim the practice under prior URCCC 6.06. It
is also essentially consistent with prior statutory practice, see Miss. Code.
Ann. §§ 99-15-37 and 99-15-43.
RULE 12 - INCOMPETENCY AND MENTAL EXAMINATIONS
Rule 12.1 - Effect of Incompetency; Definition.
(a) Effect of Incompetency. A person shall not be tried,
convicted, or sentenced for a criminal offense while, as a
result of a mental illness, defect, or disability, the person is
unable to understand the proceedings or to assist in the per-
son's defense.
(b) Definition of Mental Illness, Defect, or Disability.
Mental illness, defect, or disability means a psychiatric or
neurological disorder that is evidenced by behavioral or
emotional symptoms, including congenital mental condi-
tions, conditions resulting from injury or disease, and devel-
opmental disabilities. The presence of a mental illness,
defect or disability alone is not grounds for finding a defen-
dant incompetent to stand trial.
Comment
Rule 12.1 tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1. The central concept underlying
Rule 12 is that no defendant may be prosecuted or sentenced if, because of
mental incompetence, the defendant lacks the present ability to consult
with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational comprehension or is una-
ble to understand the nature of the proceedings. The Rule broadly applies
to any psychiatric or neurological disorder, including mental retardation.
Once reasonable grounds exist to doubt the defendant's competence to
stand trial, the procedures in Rules 12.2 through 12.6 should be followed.
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The rule tracks the definition of "incompetency" articulated in Dusky
v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 402-03 (1960):
[I]t is not enough . . . that 'the defendant [is] oriented to
time and place and [has] some recollection of events[;]' .. .
the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'
Rule 12 conforms to both the ULC Unif. R. Crim. P. 463(a) and (b),
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (1987), and
the ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice and Mental
Health Standards § 7-4.1(a), (b), and (c) (1989). It recognize the distinction
between the standard for determining competency to stand trial and the
"mental disease or defect" standard by which criminal responsibility is de-
termined. Lyles v. U.S., 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See Caylor v. State,
437 So.2d 444 (Miss. 1983); Thomas Grisso, Evaluating Competencies, p. 64
("Questions of criminal responsibility ... refer to mental state at the time
of the offense, whereas competency to stand trial refers to a defendant's
current mental state and functional capacities as they relate to a pending
trial process. A defendant may be competent to stand trial yet have good
grounds for an insanity defense. Incompetency and insanity questions are
often raised in the same case, but they are distinctly separate questions
controlled by different legal standards.")
Rule 12.2 - Examination of Defendant's Mental Condition.
(a) Competency to Stand Trial or Be Sentenced. If at any
time before or after indictment, the court, on its own motion
or the motion of any party, has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the defendant is incompetent as set forth in Rule
12.1, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a
mental examination.
(b) Insanity Defense. If the defendant has timely raised a
defense of insanity pursuant to Rule 17.3(b), the court, on
its own motion or the motion of any party, may order the
defendant to submit to a mental examination to investigate
the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense.
(c) Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases. If at any
time the court, on its own motion or the motion of any
party, has reasonable grounds to believe that the defen-
dant's mental retardation may bar imposition of a sentence
of death, the court, on its own motion or the motion of any
party, may order the defendant examined to determine
whether the defendant is mentally retarded.
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(d) Contents of Motion; Order. The motion shall state the
facts upon which the mental examination is sought. The
mental examination shall be conducted by a competent psy-
chiatrist or psychologist selected by the court in accordance
with Miss. Code § 99-13-11.
(e) Medical and Criminal History Records. All available
medical and criminal history records shall be provided to
the examining mental health expert as and when ordered by
the court.
Comment
Rule 12.2 is consistent with Ala. R. Crim. P. 11.2 and Ariz. R. Crim. P.
11.2, and incorporates the standard of former URCCC 9.06. Rule 11.2 con-
templates that a procedure to have the defendant's mental competency de-
termined should be set in motion at the earliest practicable date, even
before indictment. Although the issue of competency will generally be
raised during pretrial proceedings, in some instances the question will arise
in the midst of a trial or during the sentencing stage. Also implicit in the
rule is the recognition that it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney and the
trial judge to make appropriate inquiry concerning the mental responsibil-
ity of the accused and competency to waive and plead or to stand trial on
the charges. The state must have the right to request an examination to
determine competency, as the U. S. Supreme Court has held that the fail-
ure to make a determination of competency when reasonable grounds ap-
pear is fundamental constitutional error. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375
(1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); House v. State, 754 So.2d
1147 (Miss. 1999). The motion is also available to a co-defendant, who
might be interested in the determination of the defendant's mental condi-
tion. Ordering an examination pursuant to this rule is discretionary, and
should be exercised only if the court has reasonable cause to believe the
defendant may not be mentally competent. In exercising judicial discre-
tion, the court is authorized to deny the motion if there is no reasonable
basis shown for questioning or examining the defendant's competency. If
ordered, the defendant is compelled to submit to the examination.
Sections (a) and (b) make clear that the determination of the defen-
dant's competency to stand trial is separate and distinct from the determi-
nation of his sanity at the time of the offense. Indeed, a motion under
section (b) may prompt an investigation into the defendant's mental condi-
tion at the time of the offense, whether or not the defendant's competency
to stand trial is at issue. Still, there is no reason why an examination to
investigate competency cannot be combined with an examination to inves-
tigate the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, provided that the
judicial order makes a clear distinction between the two purposes for eval-
uation to ensure that the correct legal criteria are applied. While the test
for competency is distinct, as a matter of law, from the test for sanity at the
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time of the offense, the reports prepared will necessarily contain informa-
tion having a substantial bearing on both issues.
Section (c) extends this process to cases in which there are reasonable
grounds to believe the defendant's mental retardation may preclude the
imposition of a death sentence. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002);
Chase v. State, 873 So.2d 1013 (Miss. 2004).
Section (d) requires that the factual basis in support of the requested
mental examination be included in the motions that are filed, and that the
psychiatrist or psychologist be selected by the court in accordance with
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-13-11.
Under section (e), the medical and criminal history records are pro-
vided to the examining expert, and are not to be filed with the court.
Rather, a certificate of compliance should be filed with court documenting
that the records were submitted as ordered.
Rule 12.3 - Appointment of Experts.
(a) Grounds for Appointment. If the court determines that
reasonable grounds for an examination exist, it shall appoint
a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist to examine the de-
fendant and, if necessary, to testify regarding the defen-
dant's mental condition. If necessary, the court may
appoint more than one examiner.
(b) Examination; Commitment. The court may order that a
defendant be examined in an appropriate mental health fa-
cility, and it may commit a defendant to the Mississippi
State Hospital or other appropriate mental health facility
for a reasonable period of time necessary to conduct the ex-
amination if:
(1) the defendant cannot be examined on an outpatient
basis;
(2) examination in an out-patient setting is unavailable;
or
(3) commitment for examination is indispensable to a
clinically valid diagnosis and report.
A court may not order a defendant committed for a time
longer than that reasonably necessary to conduct the
examination.
(c) Reports.
(1) Opinion on Competency. If the court so orders, a
psychiatrist or psychologist appointed by the court pur-
suant to this Rule shall submit a report containing an
opinion as to whether the defendant is incompetent as
defined in Rule 12.1 and the basis therefore. The report
2013] 69
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
may also include additional findings and opinions con-
cerning whether the defendant's mental condition cre-
ates a present danger to the defendant or to others.
(2) Cause and Treatment of lncompetency. If the opin-
ion is that the defendant is incompetent as defined in
Rule 12.1, the report shall also state the psychiatrist's
or psychologist's opinion of:
(A) the condition causing the defendant's incom-
petency and the nature thereof;
(B) the treatment required for the defendant to at-
tain competency;
(C) the most appropriate form and place of treat-
ment, in view of the defendant's therapeutic needs
and potential danger to the defendant or to others,
and an explanation of appropriate treatment
alternatives;
(D) the likelihood of the defendant's attaining
competency under treatment and the probable du-
ration of the treatment;
(E) the availability of the various types of accept-
able treatment in the local geographic area, speci-
fying the agencies or the settings in which the
treatment might be obtained and whether the
treatment would be available on an out-patient ba-
sis; and
(E) whether the treatment identified in Rule
12.3(c)(2)(B) is in the best medical interest of the
defendant in light of the defendant's medical
condition.
(3) Mental Condition at Time of the Offense. In addi-
tion, if the court so orders, the report shall contain a
statement of the psychiatrist's or psychologist's opinion
of the following:
(A) the mental condition of the defendant at the
time of the alleged offense;
(B) if the psychiatrist's or psychologist's opinion is
that at the time of the alleged offense the defen-
dant suffered from a mental disease or defect, the
relation, if any, of such disease or defect to the al-
leged offense, including:
(i) whether the defendant knew the nature
and quality of the act the defendant was do-
ing; and
(ii) if the defendant did know it, whether the
defendant knew that what the defendant was
doing was wrong; and
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(C) such other matters as the court may deem
appropriate.
(4) Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases. In addi-
tion, if the court so orders in a death penalty case, the
report shall contain a statement of the psychiatrist's or
psychologist's opinion as to whether the defendant is
mentally retarded.
(d) Additional Expert Assistance. The court may, in its dis-
cretion, appoint additional experts and order the defendant
to submit to physical, neurological, psychiatric, or psycho-
logical examinations, if necessary for an adequate determi-
nation of the defendant's mental condition.
(e) Costs. Reasonable fees and expenses incurred by per-
sons appointed by the court, other than as employees of the
State of Mississippi, may be assessed as part of the costs of
the proceeding. If the defendant is indigent, any cost or ex-
pense incurred in connection with such examinations shall
be paid by the county in which the action is pending.
Comment
Rule 12.3 tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 11.3. Rule 12.3(a) provides that
where "reasonable grounds" exist, the court must appoint a psychiatrist or
psychologist to examine the defendant and to testify regarding the defen-
dant's mental condition. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), the
Supreme Court recognized the difficulties inherent in making the threshold
decision as to what facts constitute "reasonable grounds." In Pate v. Robin-
son, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), the Court suggested that the judge should con-
sider, among other things, the defendant's medical history, any evidence of
irrational behavior, and the defendant's demeanor. The standard set by the
Court in Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960), probably means that compe-
tency requires only that the defendant be able to confer with counsel and
have some appreciation of the proceedings against the defendant and the
defendant's involvement in them. The Dusky standard is one of degree,
and it recognizes that many defendants have mental or emotional problems
that prevent them from functioning normally in society, but that the mere
existence of an emotional disturbance is not equivalent to incompetency.
Inevitably, determinations of competency or incompetency must be made
on a case-by-case basis.
Section (b) ensures that a defendant will not be subjected to confine-
ment in a mental institution, unless a less restrictive alternative (such as
local out-patient services) is unavailable, and it ensures that any confine-
ment will be for only the minimum time required to conduct necessary ex-
aminations. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244. A court can commit a defendant for only
the minimum time required to conduct the necessary examinations. Com-
mitment for a time longer than that reasonably required to conduct the
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examinations can be ordered only if the same stringent standards for civil
commitment are followed. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (in-
definite commitment based on incompetence to stand trial unconstitu-
tional). Given the availability of outpatient services, a defendant may be
committed for evaluation only if such confinement is determined to be in-
dispensable to a clinically valid diagnosis and report. Once an examination
is completed, the examiner's report shall be filed the court. Continued
commitment of the defendant for restoration of competence is governed by
Rule 12.5(e).
Section (c) states the contents of the psychologist's or psychiatrist's
report and is patterned after ALI Unif. R. Crim. P. Rule 464(h), and ABA,
Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards
§ 7-4.5 (2d ed. 1986). The examiner is required to provide an opinion on
competency, and the basis therefore. If the psychiatrist's or psychologist's
opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, then the psychi-
atrist or psychologist is directed to report on several different items to aid
the court in making the complex decisions required by Rules 12.5 and 12.6:
the nature of the defendant's incompetence; the likelihood that the defen-
dant may become competent; the professional's recommendations for
treatment of the defendant's mental condition, in view of the defendant's
therapeutic needs and potential dangerousness; and an explanation of al-
ternative forms of treatment that would be acceptable and available for the
defendant.
Because the Rule 12.3 examination is also intended to provide infor-
mation concerning a possible insanity defense, the psychologist or psychia-
trist may be required, pursuant to Rule 12.2(c)(3), to report on the mental
status of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense and on the rela-
tionship, if any, of any mental defect or disease to the alleged criminal act.
Rule 12.3(c)(3) was not intended to establish a new legal test for insanity. It
was not intended to change the tests that were in use before these criminal
rules were adopted. It merely requires the psychiatrist or psychologist to
describe the defendant's mental condition in broad medical language. See
Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173 (Miss. 1990). Whether a person is men-
tally ill is a medical judgment that a psychologist or psychiatrist should
make; whether the defendant is sufficiently ill to be exonerated of criminal
responsibility, i.e., whether the defendant is legally insane, is a legal judg-
ment for the jury or trier of fact to make after proper instructions. In some
circumstances, either the psychiatrist or the psychologist or the circuit court
may desire the assistance of other experts to carry out physical, neurologi-
cal, or psychological tests. Section (c)(4) extends these procedures to the
question of the defendant's possible mental retardation in death penalty
cases.
Section (d) authorizes the court to appoint additional psychologists or
psychiatrists and to order the defendant to undergo further examinations
and tests. The reports of these psychiatrists or psychologists should include
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the required information and should be submitted to the court along with
those of the other appointed examiners.
Subsection (e) expressly provides for payment of the expenses of such
professionals, within limits provided by law. See Miss. CODE Am. § 99-13-
11. The exclusion of reimbursement of fees and expenses of state employ-
ees acting as state employees, applicable in all cases, is not intended to be
discriminatory, but rather presupposes that such services will be rendered
as part of their job. It should be noted that the holding in Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), that an indigent defendant is constitution-
ally entitled to a psychiatrist provided at state expense, is applicable only
when the defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that the defendant's
sanity (or insanity) at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at
trial or that the defendant's mental state is to be a significant factor. Where
a defense consultant psychologist or psychiatrist is constitutionally re-
quired, such an expert may be appointed under Rule 12.3(a).
Rule 12.4 - Disclosure of Mental Health Evidence.
(a) Reports of Appointed Experts. The reports of experts
made pursuant to Rule 12.3 shall be submitted to the court
within 10 working days of the completion of the examina-
tion and be made available to all parties, except that any
statements of the defendant (or summaries thereof) con-
cerning the offense charged shall be made available only to
the defendant. Upon receipt, the clerk shall copy and dis-
tribute the expert's report to the court and to defense coun-
sel. Defense counsel is responsible for editing a copy for the
state which is to be returned to the clerk within 72 hours of
receipt and made available to the State. All original reports
shall be filed with the clerk, under seal.
(b) Reports of Other Experts. At least 15 working days
before any hearing, any party shall make available to any
other party for examination and reproduction:
(1) the names and addresses of mental health experts
who have personally examined the defendant in con-
nection with the case or examined any evidence in the
case;
(2) the data resulting from mental examinations, scien-
tific tests, experiments, or comparisons in connection
with the case; and
(3) all written reports or statements made by mental
health experts in connection with the case.
This provision does not limit the state's duty to disclose such
information under other rules, or the duty to produce excul-
patory evidence.
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Comment
Under Rule 12.4, all expert reports produced pursuant to Rule 12 are
to be disclosed to the court, to the defendant's attorney, and to the prose-
cuting attorney. This rule is in keeping with the general philosophy of the
rules, which is to keep both sides apprised of what they are to be con-
fronted with at a competency hearing or trial. This philosophy encourages
the parties to stipulate or settle matters, and preserves valuable court time
for the trial of genuinely contested issues. Only one item of the report is
excepted-the defendant's statements concerning the actual offense, which
will be given only to the defendant. Defense counsel has 72 hours to re-
move privileged information. The Supreme Court has recognized that use
of a defendant's statements during a court-ordered examination may com-
promise the defendant's right against self-incrimination. See Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
was violated when he was not advised of right to remain silent during
court-ordered examination and prosecution introduced statements). If a
defendant subsequently intends to pursue a defense of insanity pursuant to
Rule 17.3(b), the redacted statements of the defendant concerning the of-
fense must be disclosed to the prosecuting attorney. See Buchanan v. Ken-
tucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987).
Rule 12.5 - Hearing and Orders.
(a) Hearing. If after submission of the reports to the court,
reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's competency
remain, the court shall promptly hold a hearing to deter-
mine the defendant's competency. The parties may intro-
duce other evidence regarding the defendant's mental
condition or, by written stipulation, submit the matter on
the experts' reports.
(b) Procedure. Any time a competency hearing is held, the
defendant shall be represented by counsel and, if the defen-
dant is financially unable to obtain adequate representation,
counsel shall be appointed for the defendant. The defendant
shall also be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present
evidence, to subpoena witnesses, and to confront and cross-
examine witnesses who appear at the hearing.
(c) Finding of Competence. If the court finds that the de-
fendant is competent to stand trial, then the court shall
make the finding a matter of record and order the case to
proceed to trial.
(d) Finding of Incompetence; No Restoration. If the court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
is incompetent to stand trial, but finds no substantial
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probability that the defendant will be restored to compe-
tency within a reasonable period of time, it shall proceed
pursuant to subsection (g) below.
(e) Finding of Incompetence; Restoration. If the court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, but finds that there is a substan-
tial probability that the defendant will be restored to com-
petency within a reasonable period of time, it shall order
competency restoration treatment, and may enter an order
committing the defendant to the Mississippi State Hospital
or other appropriate mental health facility. The compe-
tency restoration treatment order shall require that the de-
fendant be examined, and a written report be furnished to
the court, every 4 calendar months, stating:
(1) whether there is a substantial probability that the
defendant will become competent to stand trial within
the foreseeable future; and
(2) whether progress toward that goal is being made.
All such treatment orders shall further specify the place
where treatment will occur; whether the treatment is inpa-
tient or outpatient; transportation to the treatment site;
length of treatment; and transportation after treatment.
The treatment order shall also specify that the court shall be
notified if the defendant regains competency before the ex-
piration of the treatment order. Upon notice to the parties,
the treatment order may be modified by the court.
(f) Consent to Treatment. The defendant's attorney, as the
defendant's representative, shall not waive any hearing re-
quired by this Rule, but is authorized to consent, on behalf
of the defendant, to necessary surgical, psychiatric, or medi-
cal treatment, and procedures.
(g) Release from Commitment. If within a reasonable time
after entry of a treatment order pursuant to section (e)
above, there is neither a determination that there is a sub-
stantial probability that the defendant will become compe-
tent to stand trial nor progress toward that goal, the court
shall, on the request of any party or on the court's own
motion:
(1) order that civil proceedings as provided in Miss.
CODE Arm. § 41-21-61 to 41-21-107 be instituted; or
(2) release the defendant and dismiss the charges with-
out prejudice.
In addition, the court may order appointment of a
guardian as provided by law.
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Comment
Rule 12.5 is modeled in part after Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.5 and Ala. R.
Crim. P. 11.6. In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court held that if "sufficient doubt" exists as to the defendant's
present competency to stand trial, then the defendant is constitutionally
entitled to a hearing on that question. Following Pate, the United States
Supreme Court in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), further con-
cluded that a competency hearing is not limited to pretrial procedures, but
exists where the defendant's present competency is brought into question
during trial and reasonable grounds exist to doubt the defendant's compe-
tency to stand trial. See Sanders v. State 9 So.3d 1132 (Miss. 2009). How-
ever, if after submission of the reports no reasonable grounds still exist to
doubt the defendant's competency, a hearing is not mandatory. This repre-
sents a departure from practice under former URCCC 9.06. See Hearn v.
State, 3 So.3d 722 (Miss. 2008); Sanders v. State, 9 So.3d 1132 (Miss. 2009)
(because URCCC 9.06 provides that the court "shall conduct a hearing,"
the court must hear testimony and make record findings before or at trial).
Rather, section (a) authorizes the court to make a preliminary determina-
tion that reasonable grounds exist to conduct a competency hearing. Au-
thorizing the court to make this initial determination will avoid mandating
a competency hearing when reasonable grounds no longer exist to doubt
the defendant's competency to stand trial, as evidenced by the reports of
the examining psychologists or psychiatrists. While this procedure safe-
guards valuable court time and resources, it also ensures that the defen-
dant's right to a competency hearing before a judge will be preserved when
reasonable grounds exist to doubt the defendant's mental competency. Of
course, the reports remain part of the record, whether a hearing is held or
not, and section (a) permits the parties by written stipulation to submit the
competency question to the court on the basis of solely the written reports.
Section (b) describes the hearing that a defendant must be afforded
after the reports have been complied and the court has made its prelimi-
nary review. The right to counsel is recognized in federal practice. See 18
U.S.C.A. 4247(d). One who has been adjudged incompetent and commit-
ted to a hospital or therapeutic program for even a short time is hardly
capable of defending one's own interests.
Under section (e), if the court finds the defendant to be incompetent,
but not permanently so, it has a wide range of options. It can commit the
defendant to a mental institution, if it finds that institutional treatment
would be the most appropriate form of therapy. No order made under this
section is to be effective for longer than 4 months, thereby insuring a fre-
quent review of each incompetent's status and progress. See O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Section (e) largely continues the proce-
dure applicable under former URCCC 9.06.
Section (g) has been drafted to comply explicitly with the Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), which held that the state's power to commit
an incompetent person accused of a criminal offense to a mental institution
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is severely limited by the due process and equal protection clauses. If the
court finds the condition of the defendant to be permanent, it can either
order commitment proceedings be commenced pursuant to Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-21-61 et. seq., or release the defendant outright. Moreover,
while the Supreme Court in Jackson did not reach the question of the dis-
position of the charges against the defendant, it broadly implied that the
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial may be applicable to such situa-
tions. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 740. See Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967) (indefinite suspension of a prosecution violated the
petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial).
Rule 12.6 - Subsequent Hearings.
(a) Grounds. The court shall hold a hearing to redetermine
the defendant's competency:
(1) on receiving a report from an authorized treating
official stating that in the official's opinion the defen-
dant has become competent to stand trial;
(2) on motion of the defendant, accompanied by the
certificate of a mental health expert stating that in the
expert's opinion the defendant is competent to stand
trial;
(3) at the expiration of competency restoration treat-
ment ordered pursuant to Rule 12.5(d); or
(4) on the court's motion at any time.
The parties may, by written stipulation, submit the matter
on the experts' reports.
(b) Finding of Competency. If the court finds by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant is competent,
the regular proceedings shall recommence without delay.
The defendant shall be entitled to repeat any proceeding if
there are reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was
prejudiced by the defendant's previous incompetency.
(c) Finding of Continuing Incompetency. If the court finds
that the defendant is still incompetent, the court shall pro-
ceed in accordance with Rules 12.5(e) or (g).
Comment
Rule 12.6 follows Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.6. Section (a) is intended to
insure that the mental condition of all defendants adjudicated incompetent
will be thoroughly reviewed at reasonably frequent intervals. This is in-
tended to obviate the very real danger that a defendant could be incarcer-
ated for a number of months or years on minor charges when the condition
would not justify civil commitment (e.g., in any case where a defendant is
incompetent but not a danger to one's self or others). Competency hearings
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are normally considered to be a protective device for the defendant; it is an
abuse of due process to try a person who is not able to defend. See Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). In addition, the holding in Jackson v. Indi-
ana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), established the necessity for frequent review, by
requiring that the continuing (as opposed to initial) commitment of the
defendant must be justified by a showing of progress toward recovery of
competency.
Section (c) directs the court upon finding that the defendant is still
incompetent to reconsider the alternatives presented in Rule 12.5(e) and
(g). Jackson v. Indiana held that the continuing commitment of a defen-
dant must be justified by an appropriate showing by the state; therefore,
the initial findings of the court are not relevant to its options at this point,
which should be considered anew.
Rule 12.7 - Privilege.
(a) General Restriction. No evidence of any kind obtained
under this Rule 12 shall be admissible at any proceeding to
determine guilt or innocence unless the defendant presents
evidence intended to rebut the presumption of sanity.
(b) Privileged Statements of Defendant.
(1) Charged Events. No statement of the defendant ob-
tained under this Rule 12, or evidence resulting there-
from, concerning the events which form the basis of the
charges against the defendant shall be admissible at the
trial of guilt or innocence, or at any subsequent pro-
ceeding to determine guilt or innocence, without the
defendant's consent.
(2) Other Events. No statement of the defendant or
evidence resulting therefrom obtained under this Rule
12, concerning any other events or transactions, shall be
admissible at any proceeding to determine the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence of criminal charges based on
such events or transactions.
Comment
Rule 12.7 tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.7. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that use of a defendant's statements during a court-ordered examina-
tion may compromise the defendant's right against self-incrimination. See
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). Thus, the prosecution may not make
use of evidence obtained by compulsory mental examination of the defen-
dant unless the defendant offers, either directly or through cross-examina-
tion, evidence in support of the affirmative defense of insanity. Powell v.
Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1989) (defendant waives the privilege if the
defendant introduces expert testimony on mental condition); Jordan v.
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State, 786 So.2d 897 (Miss. 2001). A defendant compelled to submit to a
mental examination can self-incriminate in four ways. First, admissions and
statements may implicate the defendant in the crime charged. Second,
statements and admissions may implicate the defendant in other different
crimes. Third, the evidence of the defendant's mental condition may help
the state build its prima facie case by establishing the mens rea element
(whether or not the defendant attempts an insanity defense). Finally, if the
defendant raises the insanity defense, the compulsory examination has
forced the defendant to provide the state with evidence, which might well
defeat it. Rule 12.7(b)(1) privileges absolutely any statement made by the
defendant during the course of the examination, which concerns the events
from which the criminal charges stem, "unless the defendant presents evi-
dence intended to rebut the presumption of sanity."
RULE 13 - THE GRAND JURY
Rule 13.1 - Selection and Preparation of Grand Jurors.
(a) Summons. Grand jurors shall be summoned and em-
panelled as provided by law.
(b) Service of Grand Jury.
(1) Generally. Grand juries may serve both in term
time and vacation and any circuit judge may empanel a
grand jury (including an appropriate number of alter-
nate grand jurors) in term time or vacation.
(2) Number of Grand Jurors. The grand jury shall con-
sist of at least 15 persons, but not more than 20 persons,
the exact number to be within the discretion of the
judge empanelling the jury. If during the service of a
grand jury the number of grand jurors, including alter-
nates, able to serve on the grand jury shall become less
than 15, then the circuit judge may have additional
grand jurors summoned and empanelled.
(3) Convening the Grand Jury; Adjournment. Upon
empanelment, a grand jury may be convened and re-
convened by order of the court. The grand jury will
continue to serve until the next grand jury is empanel-
led and it may return indictments to court in term or
vacation notwithstanding intervening terms of court be-
tween the time the grand jury is empanelled and the
time an indictment is returned. The court may adjourn
the grand jury in its discretion.
(c) Voir dire.
(1) Examination of Prospective Jurors. The examina-
tion of prospective grand jurors shall include, but need
not be limited to, inquiries to determine that a juror is
2013] 79
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
qualified according to law and that the juror will act
impartially and without prejudice.
(2) Empanelling Conclusive Evidence of Grand Jury
Competency. After the grand jurors have been sworn
and empanelled, no objection shall be raised, by plea or
otherwise, to the grand jury, but the empanelling of the
grand jury shall be conclusive evidence of its compe-
tency and qualifications. However, any party interested
may challenge or except to the array for fraud.
Comment
Rule 13.1 follows former URCCC 7.01 and 7.02, and specifically incor-
porates the procedure for summoning and impaneling grand juries pro-
vided by statute, Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 et. seq., as provided in Article
14, Section 254 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Rule 13.1(b) per-
mits regular and alternate grand jurors to be sworn and empanelled at the
same time; when the grand jury is then convened, the alternate grand jurors
may be dismissed until their service becomes necessary.
Rule 13.2 - Instructions, Duties, and Powers of Grand Jury.
(a) Charge to the Grand Jury.
(1) By Whom. Only the circuit judge shall deliver the
charge to the grand jury, except that the circuit clerk
may read the charge as proposed by the circuit judge
when the judge shall be unable to deliver the charge by
reason of physical infirmity.
(2) Charge. The circuit judge shall charge the grand
jury according to the matters required by law and other
statutes as the judge deems fit and proper. In addition,
the court shall inform the grand jurors of:
(A) their duty to be present at each session of the
grand jury;
(B) their duty to inquire into every matter
presented pursuant to law;
(C) their duty to return an indictment only if they
are convinced that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that an offense has been committed and that
the person under investigation committed it;
(D) their right to request the presentation of addi-
tional evidence by the prosecutor; and
(E) those grand jury matters which are confiden-




(b) Access to Papers, Records, Accounts, and Books of
County Officers. The grand jury shall have free access at all
proper hours to the papers, records, accounts and books of
all county officers, for all examinations which, in its discre-
tion, it may see fit to make, and may make report to the
court in relation thereto.
Comment
Rule 13.2(a) is derived from former URCCC 7.01 and 7.02 and Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 12.1(d). Rule 13.2(b) incorporates Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-57.
Rule 13.3 - Grand Jury Foreperson.
(a) Selection of Foreperson; Oath.
(1) Foreperson and Acting Foreperson. The court shall
appoint a foreperson of the grand jury, and an acting
foreperson to act in the foreperson's absence, to whom
the following oath shall be administered in open court,
in the presence of the rest of the grand jurors:
You, as foreperson of this grand inquest, shall diligently
inquire into, and true presentment make, of all such
matters and things as shall be given you in charge, or
otherwise come to your knowledge, touching the pre-
sent service. The counsel of the state, your fellows, and
your own you will keep secret. You shall not present
any person through malice, hatred or ill will, nor shall
you leave any person unpresented through fear, favor
or affection, or for any reward, hope or promise
thereof, but in all your presentments, you shall present
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to
the best of your skill and understanding. So help you
God.
(2) Oath of Other Grand Jurors. The following oath
shall be administered to the other jurors:
The same oath that your foreperson has now taken
before you on the foreperson's part, you, and each of
you, shall well and truly observe, and keep on your re-
spective parts. So help you God.
(3) Replacement of Foreperson. If a foreperson or act-
ing foreperson becomes unable to continue service as a
grand juror, the court shall appoint another member of
the grand jury as replacement. The fact that the origi-
nal foreperson or acting foreperson was replaced shall
not be grounds for attacking the validity of the acts or
indictments of the grand jury.
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(b) Powers of Foreperson. The foreperson shall preside
over the grand jury proceedings and act as the court's repre-
sentative by maintaining order, administering oaths, exclud-
ing unauthorized persons and persons acting in an
unauthorized manner, appointing such officers within the
grand jury as are necessary for its orderly functioning, and
performing such other duties as may be imposed on the
foreperson by law or by order of the court.
(c) Duties of Foreperson. It is the duty of the foreperson to:
(1) preside over the grand jury proceedings;
(2) issue or cause to be issued subpoenas and subpoe-
nas duces tecum for any witnesses whom the grand jury
may require to give evidence, and if witnesses so sum-
moned fail to appear, to endorse the returned subpoe-
nas as defaulted;
(3) perform the following functions with respect to wit-
nesses appearing before the grand jury:
(A) swear witnesses before the grand jury or cause
them to be sworn by the prosecutor; and
(B) maintain a list of all witnesses summoned and
in attendance before the grand jury during each
session; and
(4) endorse any indictment returned by the grand jury a
"True Bill" and sign the foreperson's name thereto; and
(5) submit a written report of the proceedings of the
grand jury to the court or clerk.
Comment
Rule 13.3 is modeled after URCCC 7.02, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.4, and
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6. The oaths are taken from statute, see Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 13-5-35. The oaths may be administered to all grand jurors - including
the foreperson and alternates - at the same time. The powers of the
foreperson should be included in the charge to the grand jury.
Rule 13.4 - Recalcitrant Witnesses; Contempt.
(a) Recalcitrant Witnesses. When a witness under examina-
tion before the grand jury refuses to testify, to answer a
question or to give evidence, the grand jury shall proceed
with the witness in open court. The foreperson shall then
distinctly state to the court the question or evidence re-
quested and the refusal of the witness. If, after inquiry, the
court decides that the witness is bound to testify, answer or
give the evidence, the court shall so inform the witness. If
the witness persists in refusing to answer the question, or
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testify, or to give evidence, the court shall proceed with the
witness as in cases of similar refusal in open court.
(b) Request for Contempt Proceedings. The foreperson
may also request the court to initiate a contempt proceeding
against any person whose conduct violates these Rules or
disrupts the grand jury proceedings.
Comment
Rule 13.4(a) preserves prior URCCC 7.05. Rule 13.4(b), taken from
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.4(b), authorizes the foreperson to request the court to
employ its enforcement powers to secure compliance with these rules
through a contempt proceeding under Rule 33.3.
Rule 13.5 - Persons Authorized to be Present During Sessions of the
Grand Jury; Grand Jury Secrecy.
(a) Persons Authorized to be Present. No person other
than the witness under examination, prosecutors authorized
to present evidence to the grand jury, and the interpreter, if
any, shall be present during sessions of the grand jury. No
person other than the grand jurors shall be present during
their deliberation and voting.
(b) Grand Jury Secrecy.
(1) Generally. A grand juror, except when called as a
witness in court, shall keep secret the proceedings and
actions taken in reference to matters brought before
the grand jury for 6 months after final adjournment of
the grand jury and the name and testimony of any wit-
ness appearing before the grand jury shall be kept
secret.
(2) Announcements Concerning Deliberations Prohib-
ited. No attorney general, district attorney, county at-
torney, or any other prosecuting attorney or any other
officer of the court shall announce to any unauthorized
person what the grand jury will consider in its delibera-
tions. If such information is disclosed, the disclosing
person may be found in contempt of court punishable
by fine or imprisonment.
(3) Disclosure of Indictments Prohibited. No grand ju-
ror, witness, attorney general, district attorney, county
attorney, other prosecuting attorney, clerk, sheriff or
other officer of the court shall disclose to any unautho-
rized person that an indictment is being found or re-
turned into court against a defendant or disclose any
action or proceeding in relation to the indictment
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before the finding of an indictment or within 6 months
thereafter or before the defendant is arrested or gives
bail or recognizance.
Comment
Rule 13.5(a) embraces Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.5. Rule 13.5(b) preserves
prior URCCC 7.04. Rule 13.5(b)(2) authorizes the court to employ its con-
tempt powers pursuant to Rule 33.3 to punish unauthorized disclosure of
grand jury deliberations. But see Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-7-9 (permitting
prosecuting attorney with knowledge of the status of a criminal charge to
inform victim). While no provision provides for the recording of grand jury
proceedings, Rule 13.5 does not prohibit recording of grand jury testimony
by persons authorized to be present under section (a). When a recording is
made, it must be disclosed: under Rule 17.2(a)(1) if the witness to whom
the recording relates is to testify for the state at trial; under Rule 17.2(a)(8)
if the recorded testimony is exculpatory; or on a showing of "substantial
need" under Rule 17.2(f). This is consistent with prior practice. See
Addkison v. State, 608 So.3d 304 (Miss. 1992) (disclosure of recorded state-
ments of prosecution witness); De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547
(Miss. 1997) (disclosure of recorded inconsistent statements of defense wit-
ness); Kelly v. State, 783 So.2d 744 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (defendant must
show "particular need" for record of grand jury material other than state-
ments of prosecution witnesses). As many jurisdictions require the record-
ing of grand jury proceedings (see, e.g., Ala. R. Crim. P. 12.6, Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 12.8, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)), the law regarding disclosure of recorded
grand jury testimony is well developed.
Rule 13.6 - Grand Jury Proceedings.
(a) Number of Grand Jurors Necessary to Indict; Grand
Jury Not To Do Certain Things. A grand jury has the
power to indict any person upon affirmative vote of 12 or
more grand jurors. The grand jury report should not accuse
any person by name of an offense, malfeasance or misfea-
sance unless an indictment is returned. If accusations are in-
cluded in a grand jury report, the comments may be
expunged upon the motion of the individual, or on motion
of the court.
(b) Return of Indictment. When an indictment is found, it
must be endorsed "A True Bill," and the indictment must be
signed by the foreperson and one of the prosecuting
attorneys.
(c) Presentment of Indictments and Grand Jury Reports.
All indictments and grand jury reports must be presented to
the clerk of the circuit court by the foreperson or the
84 [VOL. 31:1
MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
foreperson's designee, must be endorsed with the foreper-
son's name, and must be accompanied by the foreperson's
affidavit that all indictments were concurred in by 12 or
more members of the grand jury and that at least 15 grand
jurors were present during all deliberations. Indictments
and reports must be marked "filed" and dated and signed by
the clerk. Unless the party indicted is in custody or on bond
or recognizance, entry of the indictment shall be by number
only, and no publicity may be given to the existence of the
indictment. An arrest warrant for the person indicted shall
immediately issue and be served. After the arrest of the per-
son indicted, and before arraignment, a copy of the indict-
ment shall be served on such person.
(d) Notice of Supervening Indictment. If the defendant has
previously been released on bond or on recognizance, or
had an initial appearance under Rule 5.2, the court or the
circuit clerk may prepare and send to the defendant, defen-
dant's counsel, or defendant's bondsperson a notice of in-
dictment in lieu of issuing a warrant or summons.
(e) Failure to Return an Indictment. If the defendant is in
custody or has been conditionally released, and the charge
has been presented to the grand jury and no indictment is
returned, the foreperson shall promptly so report to the
court in writing, and, unless the court shall order otherwise,
the defendant held shall be released forthwith from custody
or if the defendant has previously been conditionally re-
leased, the defendant shall be relieved of any obligation
made in connection with such conditional release.
Comment
Rule 13.6 generally follows Ala. R. Crim. P. 12.8. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-7-11 requires the concurrence of 12 grand jurors to indict. Rule 13.6(b)
requires the indictment be endorsed "A True Bill" and be signed by both
the foreperson and a prosecuting attorney. Rule 13.6(c) embodies the stat-
utory requirements contained in Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-7-9.
Section (d) tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.7, and is intended to conserve
the time of the court and law enforcement personnel that would otherwise
be spent issuing and serving a warrant or summons following return of an
indictment in those cases in which an initial release decision has already
been made.
Under section (e), it is the explicit duty of the foreperson to inform the
court immediately of the inability of the grand jury to return an indictment.
Section (e) provides that the defendant is entitled immediately to be re-
leased from custody or other condition-unless the court orders otherwise,
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for instance when excusable delay prevents the collection of necessary lab
results or other reports.
Rule 13.7 - Appearance of Persons Under Investigation; Immunity and
Privilege.
(a) Appearance. A person under investigation by the grand
jury may be invited to appear before the grand jury, or,
upon that person's written request, may be permitted to ap-
pear before the grand jury. Unless immunity has been
granted to the witness as provided in section (b) hereof, the
witness shall be advised of the right to remain silent, that
anything the witness says may be used against the witness in
a court of law, that the witness has the right to consult in
private with an attorney outside the grand jury room at rea-
sonable intervals while giving testimony, that, if the witness
is unable to employ counsel because of indigency as defined
in Rule 7.3, the court will appoint an attorney to represent
the witness, and that the witness can at any time stop giving
testimony and refuse to answer further questions.
(b) Immunity and Privilege. In any investigation before a
grand jury, the court, on written motion of the prosecuting
attorney may, in writing, order that any material witness be
granted immunity from prosecution for the offense or of-
fenses under investigation and any related or lesser included
offense or offenses thereof. In considering whether to grant
immunity, the court shall take into consideration the possi-
bility that the testimony of the witness may tend to incrimi-
nate the witness for another offense or offenses against the
State of Mississippi, or for an offense or offenses over which
the United States government, or another state or territory
of the United States, or a foreign jurisdiction with which the
United States has treaties of extradition has jurisdiction. In
such case, the court shall grant immunity only if the prose-
cuting attorney has procured binding assurance from the ap-
propriate officials that the witness shall be granted
immunity from prosecution for such other offense or of-
fenses and any related or lesser included offenses thereof.
Immunity granted by court order pursuant to this rule may
be pleaded in bar of any prosecution of the witness for any
offense for which immunity was granted.
(c) Compelling a Witness to Testify. No witness granted im-
munity under section (b) above (other than a person under
investigation) may refuse to testify on the ground that such
testimony may self-incriminate. No person under investiga-




Rule 13.7 is modeled after Ala. R. Crim. P. Rule 12.7. Rule 13.7 ap-
plies only to persons under investigation by the grand jury and does not
reach persons called only as witnesses and not under suspicion.
Section (a) permits a person under investigation by the grand jury to
appear before that body by written request. The rule is discretionary, and
does not create an absolute right on the part of a person under investiga-
tion to appear before the grand jury. Federal courts have long held that a
potential defendant has no absolute right to appear before a grand jury.
See, e.g., Duke v. U.S., 90 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 685
(1937). Still, the interests of justice are served by allowing the grand jury, in
its discretion, to either permit or disallow the person under investigation to
appear: "[t]he grand jury has in all ages stood between the accused and his
unjust accusers." While there is no right to cross-examine witnesses or to
introduce evidence in rebuttal, "one accused of crime may often times, by
himself testifying before the grand jury clear up the charges against him so
that no indictment is returned." U.S. v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 958 (1968). Consistent with practice in federal
courts, a person under investigation is given the right to consult with an
attorney outside the grand jury room, as a means of safeguarding the right
against self-incrimination.
Section (b) provides for a grant of transactional immunity to witnesses
who are called to appear before the grand jury. The difficult part of a rule
granting immunity is the scope of the immunity. On one hand, it is imper-
missible for the state to coerce testimony under a grant of immunity-
which removes the protection of the Fifth Amendment-and then use in-
formation gained to prosecute for related offenses. Thus, the scope of the
immunity to be granted takes into consideration incrimination for other
offenses in Mississippi, the United States, other states, and United States
territories and foreign jurisdictions with whom the United States has trea-
ties providing for extradition. It should also be clear that a witness, who has
been called to appear before a grand jury without a grant of immunity, may
not waive the right to remain silent and still obtain immunity by testifying
voluntarily. Similarly, a witness appearing under a specific grant of immu-
nity may not voluntarily give incriminating testimony about offenses be-
yond the scope of the immunity granted and thereby extend the immunity
into an area broader than intended by the court. See Kastigar v. U.S., 406
U.S. 441 (1972). "Related" offenses under Rule 13.7(b) means those of-
fenses that could be joined in the same indictment under Rule 14.3(a). See
Gause v. State, 65 So.3d 295 (Miss. 2011).
Section (c) provides that a witness granted immunity may not refuse to
testify based on the privilege against self-incrimination; enforcement of the
witness's duty would be pursuant to the court's contempt powers under
Rule 33. While a target of an investigation may be invited to testify before
the grand jury, and may be offered immunity pursuant to section (b), sec-
tion (c) provides that a person under investigation may not be compelled to
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testify even if offered immunity. This is a departure from current practice.
See Wright v. McAdory, 536 So.2d 897, 903-904 (Miss. 1988) ("Because an
individual may not involuntarily be stripped of his privilege against self-
incrimination, he may be compelled to testify before the grand jury only
when the grant of immunity is coextensive with the protections he enjoys
under the Constitution. Any immunity grant which affords the individual
less protection than is otherwise available to him by law is by definition
inadequate. . . . If the immunity to this extent is granted in writing, the
witness enjoys an immunity coextensive with rights otherwise available to
him under our law. There is thus no longer any possibility of self-incrimina-
tion that leads to prosecution. Under such circumstances, the witness may
be called before the grand jury. He may be held in contempt if he refuses to
answer the same as any other witness.")
Rule 13.8 - Challenge to Grand Jury Proceedings.
(a) Grounds. The grand jury proceedings may be challenged
only by motion for a new finding of probable cause alleging
that the defendant was denied a substantial procedural
right, or that an insufficient number of qualified grand ju-
rors concurred in the finding of the indictment.
(b) Timeliness. A motion under section (a) may be filed
only after an indictment is returned and at or before ar-
raignment or by such later date as may be set by the court;
provided, however, that if counsel is appointed for the first
time at arraignment, the court shall give counsel a reasona-
ble time within which to file the motion.
Comment
Rule 13.8 governs challenges to the proceedings of the grand jury, and
is modeled after Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.9. The first ground for relief includes
failure to comply with Rules 13.1 - 13.7, where that failure can be charac-
terized as denying the defendant a substantial right. The second ground
recognizes that, since the votes of individual grand jurors are not recorded,
the presence of even one unqualified juror may constitute a ground for
challenging the indictment; for example, if only 12 jurors concurred in the
indictment, the state could not demonstrate that the unqualified juror was
not in that number. Challenges to the legal sufficiency of an indictment are
governed by Rule 14.5, which provides that an indictment may be dis-
missed based on challenges to the composition of the grand jury or venire,
but "[n]o charge shall be deemed invalid . . . for any defect or imperfection
in the charge that does not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the
defendant upon the merits."
Section (b) follows the procedure set forth in Ala. R. Crim. P. 12.9(b).
Objection to commencement of the proceedings, including a grand jury
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proceeding, must be made before trial. Thus the motion must be filed
before a plea is entered under Rule 15.3, unless the court permits a later
filing.
Rule 13.9 - Dismissal.
(a) By the Prosecutor. The prosecuting attorney may, with
leave of court having jurisdiction thereof, dismiss an indict-
ment or complaint, or any count thereof.
(b) Unnecessary Delay. The court may dismiss an indict-
ment or complaint, or any count thereof, if unnecessary de-
lay occurs in bringing a defendant to trial.
(c) Abandonment of Prosecution. If no indictment has
been returned by the grand jury within 6 months after the
filing of the complaint, or before the discharge of the 2nd
regularly scheduled grand jury in the County in which the
complaint has been filed, whichever occurs later, the prose-
cution shall be deemed abandoned and the clerk shall enter
a dismissal of the prosecution, unless the prosecuting attor-
ney shows the court good cause why the complaint should
not be dismissed.
(d) Effect of Dismissal. Dismissal of a prosecution shall be
without prejudice to the commencement of another prose-
cution, unless the court orders that the interests of justice
require that the dismissal be with prejudice. The former
practice of "nolle prosequi," remand, pass to the inactive
file, and all similar practices, however named, are hereby
abolished.
(e) Release of Defendant; Discharge of Bond. When a pros-
ecution is dismissed or abandoned, the defendant shall be
released from custody, unless the defendant is in custody on
some other charge, and any bond shall be discharged or
money deposited in lieu thereof shall be refunded.
Comment
Rule 13.9(a) and (b) parallel Fed. R. Crim. P. 48. Rule 13.9(a) requires
the prosecuting attorney to seek permission of the court to dismiss a prose-
cution, which is consistent with Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-53.Rule 13.9(b)
recognizes the court retains some discretion in determining what consti-
tutes unnecessary delay.
Section (c) addresses circumstances in which the grand jury has re-
turned neither "a true bill" nor "no bill," and instead has taken no action in
a case (the provisions of section (c) are, of course, moot if an indictment is
returned). Section (c) deems a prosecution abandoned in cases not
presented to the grand jury in a timely manner. The rule thus prevents a
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defendant from being bound over to the grand jury indefinitely. Instead,
the clerk is directed to enter a dismissal of the prosecution when no indict-
ment has been returned within the greater of 6 months or the discharge of
the second regularly scheduled grand jury. Section (c) assumes that
bindover documents will be delivered to the clerk, and presumes the prose-
cuting attorney will be keep apprised of the status of the case. If a dismis-
sal is not entered by the clerk as required by section (c), a motion to enter a
dismissal may be filed. "Good cause" for avoiding dismissal can include
waiting on pending reports of laboratory or other scientific testing.
Rule 13.9 (d) and (e) are taken from Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.6(d) and (e).
Rule 13.9(d) specifically abolishes all other formal and informal means by
which a prosecution is dismissed or abandoned, however named. While a
dismissal of a complaint is without prejudice unless the court so specifies,
the Rule does not contemplate that the complaint may simply be re-filed.
See Conwill v. State, 2010-CP-00670-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
RULE 14 - INDICTMENT
Rule 14.1 - Scope of Rules Applicable to Felony Cases.
Rule series 14 and 15 of these Rules are mandatory in felony proceedings
but apply at the discretion of the court in misdemeanor proceedings.
Rule 14.2 - Definition; Nature and Contents.
(a) Definition of Indictment. An indictment is a written
statement charging the defendant or defendants named
therein with the commission of an indictable offense,
presented to the court by a grand jury, endorsed "A True
Bill," and signed by the foreperson.
(b) Contents Generally.
(1) Elements and Notice. The indictment upon which
the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts consti-
tuting the offense charged and shall fully notify the de-
fendant of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Formal and technical words are not necessary in an in-
dictment, if the offense can be substantially described
without them.
(2) Other Matters. An indictment shall also include the
following:
(A) the name of the accused;
(B) the date on which the indictment was filed in
court;
(C) a statement that the prosecution is brought in




(D) the county and, in multi-district counties, the
judicial district in which the indictment is brought;
(E) the date and, if applicable, the time at which
the offense was alleged to have been committed.
Failure to state the correct date shall not render
the indictment insufficient;
(F) the signature of the foreperson of the grand
jury issuing it; and
(G) the words "against the peace and dignity of
the state."
(3) Surplussage. The court on motion of the defendant
may strike from the indictment any surplussage, includ-
ing unnecessary allegations or aliases.
(c) Enhanced Punishment for Subsequent Offenses and Al-
legations Required to be Found by the Jury.
(1) In cases involving enhanced punishment for subse-
quent offenses, the indictment must include both the
principal charge and a charge of previous convictions.
The indictment must allege with particularity the na-
ture or description of the offenses constituting the pre-
vious convictions, the state or federal jurisdiction of
any previous conviction, and the date of judgment.
(2) The indictment must include all allegations required
to be found by a jury.
(d) Charging the Offense. The indictment shall state for
each count the official or customary citation of the statute,
rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defen-
dant is alleged to have violated.
(e) Incorporation by Reference. A count may incorporate
by reference facts alleged in another count.
(f) Notice of Necessarily Included Offenses. Specification of
an offense in an indictment shall constitute a charge of that
offense and of all offenses necessarily included therein.
(g) Motion for a Bill of Particulars. A motion for a Bill of
Particulars may be made at any reasonable time before trial,
which motion shall be granted for good cause shown.
Comment
Rule 14.2(b) continues former URCCC 7.06. The remaining sections
of Rule 14.2 track Ala. R. Crim. P. 13.1(a) and 13.2, and are consistent with
federal practice under Fed. R. Crim. P. 7. Generally speaking, the Rule is
designed to simplify pleading in criminal cases, similar to the simplification
of pleading in civil actions; for example, section (e) permits incorporation
of facts by reference, as is routinely done in civil matters.
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Section (c) builds on practice under former URCCC 11.03. As before,
section (c)(1) requires the indictment to give notice that the defendant is
charged as an habitual offender. Section (c)(2) covers all other facts that
may be used to enhance sentence, which the Constitution requires to be
found by a jury. See Apprendi v. U.S., 530 U.S. 466 (2000) ("[A]ny fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.")
Section (d) requires the citation to any applicable statute, regulation,
or the like, so the accused and counsel may know precisely what offense is
charged. Section (f) provides that allegation of facts constituting an offense
will encompass all lesser offenses necessarily included therein, without the
need for an explicit statement to that effect. See Downs v. State, 962 So.2d
1255 (Miss. 2007); Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899 (Miss. 1993).
Section (g) provides a necessary safeguard for the defendant. As in
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f), and similar to a motion for a more definite statement
in civil practice, a defendant can compel the government to submit addi-
tional details of the offense through the familiar vehicle of a "Bill of Partic-
ulars," details not required to be set out in the body of the indictment. The
"good cause" requirement ensures that such motions will not routinely be
made or granted; rather, a defendant must identify what particular infor-
mation is sought and why.
Rule 14.3 - Joinder and Consolidation for Trial.
(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment may charge a de-
fendant in separate counts with two or more offenses triable
in the same court if the offenses charged - whether felonies
or misdemeanors or both - are:
(1) of the same or similar character;
(2) based on the same act or transaction; or
(3) connected with or constitute parts of a common
scheme or plan.
(b) Joinder of Defendants. The indictment may charge two
or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated
in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts
or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The de-
fendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately. All defendants need not be charged in each
count.
(c) Trial of Joined Offenses.
(1) Where 2 or more offenses are properly charged in
separate counts of a single indictment, all such charges
may be tried in a single proceeding.
(2) The trier of fact shall return a separate verdict for




(d) Sentencing. When a defendant is convicted of 2 or more
offenses charged in separate counts of an indictment, the
court shall impose separate sentences for each such convic-
tion. Nothing contained in this Rule, however, shall be con-
strued to prohibit the court from exercising its authority to
suspend either the imposition or execution of any sentence
or sentences imposed, nor to prohibit the court from exer-
cising its discretion to impose such sentences to run either
concurrently with or consecutively to each other or to any
other sentence or sentences previously imposed upon the
defendant.
(e) Consolidation. If offenses or defendants are charged in
separate indictments, the court on its own initiative or on
motion of any party may order that the charges be tried to-
gether or that the defendants be joined for the purposes of
trial if the offenses or the defendants, as the case may be,
could have been joined in a single indictment. Proceedings
thereafter shall be the same as if initially under a single in-
dictment. However, the court shall not order that the of-
fenses or the defendants, as the case may be, be tried
together without first providing the defendant or defendants
and the prosecutor an opportunity to be heard. Any such
order shall be made sufficiently before trial.
Comment
Rule 14.3 (a) through (d) largely continues prior practice under former
URCCC 7.07.
Section (a)(1), based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a), expands prior practice
and now allows offenses of the "same or similar character" to be joined in a
single indictment. Compare Corely v. State, 584 So.2d 769 (Miss. 1991).
Section (a)(1) is inapplicable, however, if an indictment charges multiple
defendants under section (b); section (a)(1) applies only to indictments
charging a single defendant.
Section (e) allows consolidation of offenses where joinder would have
been proper in the initial instance, taking into consideration the factors
that would require severance under Rule 14.4. Section (e) enlarges prior
practice by now permitting involuntary consolidation of trials. See Ala. R.
Crim. P. 13.3(c).
Rule 14.4 - Severance.
(a) Relief From Prejudicial Joinder. If it appears that a de-
fendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of of-
fenses or of defendants, the court may order an election or
separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or
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provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a
motion by a defendant for severance, the court may order
the prosecuting attorney to deliver to the court for inspec-
tion, in camera, any statements or confessions made by the
defendants that the prosecution intends to introduce in evi-
dence at the trial. However, without a finding of prejudice,
the court may, with the agreement of all the parties, order a
severance of defendants or an election of separate trials of
counts or charges.
(b) Timeliness and Waiver. A defendant's motion to sever
offenses or defendants must be made not more than 7 days
after arraignment or filing of a written plea of not guilty
before trial, or, in the event the court has ordered charges
or defendants to be tried jointly, pursuant to Rule 14.2, then
within 7 days of the court's order, in any event, before trial.
If, after the expiration of these time periods, a ground not
previously known arises, or becomes known, either before
or during trial, and that ground could not have been discov-
ered previously through the exercise of due diligence, the
defendant may move for severance of any or all counts, but
must do so at the earliest opportunity. The right to move for
severance is waived if a proper motion is not timely made.
(c) Severance during Trial. No severance of offenses or de-
fendants may be ordered after trial has commenced unless
the defendant consents or a mistrial has properly been de-
clared as to such offense or defendant. Severance of of-
fenses during trial, upon motion of the defendant or with
the defendant's consent, shall not bar a subsequent trial of
that defendant on the offenses severed.
Comment
Rule 14.4 tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 13.4 and the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, Joinder and Severance § 13-3.1 and 13-3.2 (2d ed. 1986).
Generally speaking, joinder is not prejudicial when: (1) "the evidence of
each crime would be admissible in a separate trial for the other," even if a
severance is granted, or (2) "the evidence of each crime is simple and dis-
tinct, even though such evidence might not be admissible in separate tri-
als." Drew v. U.S., 331 F.3d 85, 90-91 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See Corley v. State,
584 So.2d 769 (Miss. 1991); Stribling v. State, 2009-KA-10420-COA (Miss.
Ct. App. 2011).
It is unnecessary under these Rules to renew a motion for severance at
trial, or after the time at which the purported prejudice actually occurred,
to preserve a claim of error from denial of such a motion.
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Rule 14.5 - Amendment of Indictments; Defects in Indictments.
(a) Amendment of Indictments. All indictments may be
amended as to form but not as to the substance of the of-
fense charged. Indictments may also be amended to charge
the defendant as an habitual offender or otherwise subject
the defendant to enhanced punishment for prior convic-
tions. Amendment shall be allowed only if the defendant is
afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense and is not
unfairly surprised.
(b) Raising Defect in Charge. Defects in the charging doc-
ument shall be raised by proper motion.
(c) Effect of Defect in Charge.
(1) A motion to dismiss the indictment may be based
upon objections to the composition of the grand jury,
venire, the legal insufficiency of or defect in the indict-
ment, or the failure of the indictment to charge an
offense.
(2) No charge shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the
trial, judgment, or other proceedings thereon be stayed,
arrested, or in any manner affected, for any defect or
imperfection in the charge that does not tend to
prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant upon
the merits.
Comment
Rule 14.5(a) is consistent with practice under former URCCC 7.09.
Sections (b) and (c) make clear that the proper means of challenging the
legality or sufficiency of the indictment is by a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16, replacing such prior practice as filing a demurrer. Rule Section
(c)(2) provides a requirement that the defect be prejudicial to the defen-
dant before it will be fatal to a conviction. Indictments may not be
amended to charge the defendant as an habitual offender after the jury
returns its verdict. See Gowdy v. State, 56 So.3d 540 (Miss. 2010); Newberry
v. State, 2010-KA-01729-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Hariston v. State,
2010-KA-00422-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
RULE 15 - ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEAS
Rule 15.1 - Necessity of Arraignment.
(a) Service of Indictment. Arraignment shall be held within
30 days after the filing of an indictment. When arraignment
cannot be held within the time specified because the defen-
dant has not yet been arrested or served, or is in custody
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elsewhere, it shall be held as soon as possible. Before ar-
raignment, a copy of the indictment must be served on the
defendant.
(b) In General. An arraignment must be conducted in open
court and must consist of:
(1) ensuring that the defendant has a copy of the
indictment;
(2) reading the indictment to the defendant or stating
to the defendant the substance of the charge; and then
(3) asking the defendant to plead to the indictment;
(4) determining whether the defendant is represented
by counsel and, if not, appoint counsel if appropriate
under Rule 7;
(5) reviewing the bond previously set, if appropriate;
(6) advising the defendant of the right to a jury trial, if
applicable; and
(7) advising the parties in attendance of any dates set
for further proceedings and other important deadlines.
At arraignment or thereafter, the court may set reason-
able deadlines for pretrial motions.
(c) Waiving Reading of Indictment. Reading of the indict-
ment may be waived if the defendant is represented by
counsel.
(d) Waiving Appearance. A defendant need not be present
for the arraignment if the defendant, in a written waiver
signed by both the defendant and the defendant's attorney,
has waived appearance and has affirmed that the defendant
received a copy of the indictment and that the plea is not
guilty.
(e) Video Conferencing. Video conferencing may be used
to arraign a defendant.
(f) Codefendants. Defendants who are jointly charged may
be arraigned separately or jointly in the discretion of the
court. If codefendants are arraigned jointly and charged
with the same offense, the indictments need be read only
once, with stated identification of each defendant.
(g) Waiving Arraignment. Arraignment is deemed waived
where the defendant proceeds to trial without objection.
Comment
Rule 15.1 is consistent with former URCCC 8.01 and 8.03, and similar
to Ala. R. Crim. P. 14.1 and 14.2, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 14.2 and 14.3, and Fed.
R. Crim. P. 10. Section (a) requires that, whenever possible, arraignment
be held within 30 days after filing of the indictment. The date of the ar-
raignment is an important point of reference for setting the date of trial
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under Rule 9(a) which, as under former URCCC 8.01, provides that
"[w]ithin 60 days after arraignment (or waiver thereof), the case shall be
set for trial. Trial shall be set for no later than 270 days after arraignment
(or waiver thereof)." The date of arraignment is also an important point of
reference for the disclosures required by Rule 17. See Rule 17.2(b) and
17.3(d).
Section (b) is basically a checklist for court and counsel in conducting
an arraignment. Many of the items traditionally covered at the arraignment
are included in the initial appearance, Rule 5.2. They need not be repeated.
Section (d) permits the defendant to waive the right to appear at ar-
raignment. It appears that the formal in-court taking of a plea of not guilty
should not be required so long as the rights of the defendant are protected
and an adequate record is made. Thus, the rule permits formal arraignment
to be bypassed if the defendant is assisted by counsel and files a written
waiver of arraignment and a plea of not guilty that also acknowledges re-
ceipt of a copy of the charge against the defendant. If the trial court has
reason to believe that in a particular case the defendant should not be per-
mitted to waive the right, the court may reject the waiver and require that
the defendant actually appear in court. That might be particularly appropri-
ate when the court wishes to discuss substantive or procedural matters in
conjunction with the arraignment and the court believes that the defen-
dant's presence is important in resolving those matters. It might also be
appropriate to reject a requested waiver where the prosecuting attorney
presents reasons for requiring the defendant to appear personally. It is im-
portant to note that the amendment does not permit the defendant to
waive the arraignment itself, which may be a triggering mechanism for
other rules.
Section (d) does not permit a waiver of appearance when the defen-
dant is entering a conditional plea under Rule 15.3(d), a no contest plea
under Rule 15.3(c), or a guilty plea under Rule 15.3(a). Nor does the Rule
permit waiver when the defendant is not represented by counsel. See Rule
10.1(b)(2)(B)(iii). In each of those instances, it is more appropriate for the
defendant to appear personally before the court.
Section (e) permits the court to hold arraignment by video teleconfer-
encing when the defendant is at a different location. Many courts face a
high volume of criminal proceedings, and in some instances substantial de-
lay and expense may be avoided by eliminating travel from one location to
another. Unlike federal practice, the defendant need not consent to the use
of video conferencing.
Failure to comply with arraignment requirements has been held not to
be jurisdictional, but a mere technical irregularity not warranting a reversal
of a conviction, if not raised before trial. See Garland v. Washington, 232
U.S. 642 (1914).
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Rule 15.2 - Proceedings at Arraignment.
(a) Pleas. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or (with
the permission of the court) no contest.
(b) Failure or Refusal to Plead. If a defendant fails or ref-
uses to plead, or if a guilty plea is not accepted, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty and set the case for trial.
(c) Absence of Defendant. If a defendant is not present at
arraignment and has not waived appearance, the court may,
in addition to forfeiture of bail, direct the clerk to issue a
bench warrant to bring the defendant before the court.
Comment
Rule 15.2 tracks former URCCC 8.01(A) (1) and 8.03, Ala. R. Crim.
P. 14.2, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a).
Rule 15.3 - Entry of Plea of Guilty or No Contest.
(a) Defendant's Presence at Plea.
(1) Defendants Generally. A defendant charged with
the commission of a felony, who wishes to plead guilty,
is required to plead personally. The court may require
the personal appearance of a defendant charged with a
misdemeanor.
(2) Organizational Defendants. An organizational de-
fendant need not be present if represented by counsel
who is present.
(b) Entry of Plea. A person charged with a criminal of-
fense in county or circuit court, who is represented by coun-
sel, may appear before the court at any time the judge may
fix, be arraigned, enter a plea of guilty (or, with the court's
consent, no contest) to the offense charged, and be sen-
tenced at that time or some future time set by the court.
(c) No Contest Plea. Before accepting a plea of no contest,
the court must consider the parties' views and the public in-
terest in the effective administration of justice.
(d) Conditional Plea. With the consent of the court and the
prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional
plea of guilty or no contest, reserving in writing the right to
have an appellate court review an adverse determination of
a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on ap-
peal may then withdraw the plea.
(e) Colloquy with Defendant. When the defendant wishes
to plead guilty or no contest, it is the duty of the trial court
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to address the defendant to inquire and determine the fol-
lowing on the record:
(1) That the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made
and that there is a factual basis for the plea. A plea is
not voluntary if induced by force, threats, or promises
(other than promises in a plea agreement disclosed to
the court).
(2) That the defendant understands:
(A) the nature of the charge and the material ele-
ments of the offense to which the plea is offered;
(B) the mandatory minimum penalty, if any, and
the maximum possible penalty provided by law, in-
cluding any enhanced sentencing provisions;
(C) if applicable, the fact that the sentence may
run consecutively to or concurrently with another
sentence or sentences;
(D) the fact that the defendant has the right to
plead not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity,
and to persist in such a plea if it has already been
made, or to plead guilty;
(E) the fact that the defendant has the right to re-
main silent and may not be compelled to testify or
give evidence against the defendant, but has the
right, if the defendant wishes to do so, to testify on
the defendant's own behalf;
(F) the fact that, by entering a plea of guilty or no
contest, the defendant waives the constitutional
rights:
(i) of trial by jury;
(ii) to confront witnesses against the
defendant;
(iii) to cross-examine witnesses or have them
cross-examined in the defendant's presence;
(iv) to testify and present evidence and wit-
nesses on the defendant's own behalf; and
(v) to have the aid of compulsory process in
securing the attendance of witnesses;
(G) the fact that, if the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel, the defendant has the right to
an attorney at every stage of the proceedings and
that one will be appointed to represent the defen-
dant if the defendant is indigent;
(H) the fact that, if the plea of guilty is accepted by
the court, there will not be a further trial on the
issue of the defendant's guilt;
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(I) the fact that, except as provided in section (d)
above, by pleading guilty or no contest the defen-
dant waives the right to have the appellate courts
review the proceedings by way of direct appeal,
and may seek review only by filing a motion for
post-conviction relief;
(J) the government's right, in a prosecution for
perjury or false statement, to use against the de-
fendant any statement that the defendant gives
under oath; and
(K) that if the defendant is not a citizen of the
United States, the plea may have immigration con-
sequences. Specifically, the court shall state, "If
you are not a citizen of the United States, pleading
guilty or no contest to a crime may affect your im-
migration status. Admitting guilt may result in de-
portation even if the charge is later dismissed.
Your plea or admission of guilt could result in your
deportation or removal, could prevent you from
ever being able to get legal status in the United
States, or could prevent you from becoming a
United States citizen." The court shall also give the
advisement in this section before any admission of
facts sufficient to warrant finding of guilt, or
before any submission on the record. The defen-
dant shall not be required to disclose the defen-
dant's legal status in the United States to the court.
(3) That the defendant has an opportunity to state any
objections to defense counsel or to the manner in which
defense counsel has conducted or is conducting the
defense.
Comment
Rule 15.3(a) and (b) continue former URCCC 8.03 and 8.04. They
adopt the requirement that the court address an individual defendant per-
sonally in open court in the presence of counsel (unless counsel has been
waived pursuant to Rule 7.1) and applies in all felony cases. See McCarthy
v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). The Rule allows an organizational defen-
dant to plead guilty through counsel who is present in court, as in Fed. R.
Crim. P. 43(b)(1). Section (c) embodies the requirements of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(a)(3). The procedures embodies in Rule 15.3 embrace the use of
"best interest" or Alford plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970); Reynolds v. State, 521 So.2d 914 (Miss. 1988); Elliott v. State, 41
So.3d 701 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (Roberts, J., specially concurring).
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Section (d) is new to Mississippi Practice, and is drawn from Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(a)(2). There are many defenses, objections, and requests which
a defendant must ordinarily raise by pretrial motion under Rule 16(b).
Should that motion be denied, interlocutory appeal of the ruling by the
defendant is seldom permitted. See Beckwith v. State, 615 So.2d 1134 (Miss.
1992). Moreover, should the defendant thereafter plead guilty or no con-
test, this will usually foreclose later appeal with respect to denial of the
pretrial motion. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-101; Thompson v. State, 23
So.3d 1100 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Though a no contest plea differs from a
guilty plea in other respects, it is clear that it also constitutes a waiver of all
non-jurisdictional defects in a manner equivalent to a guilty plea. See Lott
v. U.S., 367 U.S. 421 (1961).
As a consequence, a defendant who has lost one or more pretrial mo-
tions will often go through an entire trial simply to preserve the pretrial
issues for later appellate review. The conditional plea procedure provided
for in section (d) will serve to conserve prosecutorial and judicial resources
and advance speedy trial objectives. Procedures which avoid the need for
trials which are undertaken for the sole purpose of preserving pretrial ob-
jections has been consistently favored by the commentators. Experience
has shown that the number of appeals has not increased substantially. See
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Appeals § 21-1.3(c) (2d ed.
1986); Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 290.1(4)(b) (1975);
Unif. R. Crim. P. 444(d); 1A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure -
Criminal §175; W. LaFave, 6 Search and Seizure §11.1 (4th ed.). The mini-
mal added burden at the appellate level is certainly a small price to pay for
avoiding otherwise unnecessary trials. Moreover, conditional guilty pleas
serve a state interest in finality, by establishing admission of the defen-
dant's factual guilt; the defendant stands guilty and the proceedings come
to an end if the reserved issue is ultimately decided in the state's favor.
Importantly, section (d) allows a defendant to enter a conditional plea
only "with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting
attorney." The requirement of approval by the court ensures, for example,
that the defendant is not allowed to take an appeal on a matter which can
only be fully developed by proceeding to trial. As for consent by the prose-
cuting attorney, it will ensure that conditional pleas will be allowed only
when the decision of an appellate court will dispose of the case either by
allowing the plea to stand or by such action as compelling dismissal of the
indictment or suppressing essential evidence. Absent such circumstances,
the conditional plea might only serve to postpone the trial and require the
prosecution to try the case after substantial delay, during which time wit-
nesses may be lost, memories dimmed, and the offense grown so stale as to
lose jury appeal. The prosecuting attorney is in a unique position to deter-
mine whether the matter at issue would be case-dispositive, and, as a party
to the litigation, should have an absolute right to refuse to consent to po-
tentially prejudicial delay. The requirement that the conditional plea be
made by the defendant "reserving in writing the right to appeal from the
2013] 101
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion," will ensure careful
attention to any conditional plea. It will document that a particular plea
was in fact conditional, and will identify precisely what pretrial issues have
been preserved for appellate review.
The Supreme Court has held that certain kinds of constitutional objec-
tions may be raised after a plea of guilty. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61
(1975) (double jeopardy violation); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)
(due process violation by charge enhancement following defendant's exer-
cise of right to trial de novo). Section (d) has no application to such situa-
tions, and should not be interpreted as either broadening or narrowing the
Menna-Blackledge doctrine or as establishing procedures for its
application.
Section (e) incorporates Ala. R. Crim. P. 14.4, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and
URCCC 8.04(3) and (4). Sections (e)(1) and (e)(2) make clear that before
accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the court must determine that the
plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge;
that is, that the defendant understands what the "plea connotes and . .. its
consequence" as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). See
Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123 (1995),
reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179 (1995); ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice,
Pleas of Guilty, Comments to § 14-1.4(a) (2d ed. 1986). The court must also
satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea before entering judg-
ment. The court should satisfy itself, by inquiry of the defendant or the
prosecuting attorney, or some other means, that the conduct that the de-
fendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or an of-
fense included therein, to which the defendant has pleaded guilty. Such
inquiry should, thereby, protect a defendant who is in the position of plead-
ing voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but with-
out realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge. See In
re Valle, 110 N.W.2d 673 (1961); Stinson v. U.S., 316 F.2d 554 (5th Cir.
1963). The normal consequence of a determination that there is not a fac-
tual basis for the plea would be for the court to set aside the plea and enter
a plea of not guilty. The record should affirmatively reflect the questions
asked and the defendant's responses, thereby providing an adequate basis
for review.
Section (e)(2) prescribes the advice that the court must give to the
defendant as a prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea. The Rule
requires the court to determine that the defendant understands the sen-
tencing implications of pleading guilty or no contest to the crime charged.
Section (e)(2) also identifies the copstitutional rights that the defendant
waives by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. These sections are designed
to satisfy the requirements of understanding waiver set forth in Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (defendant must be apprised that a person
relinquishes certain constitutional rights by pleading guilty). Sections
(e)(2)(D) and (E) are intended to require that the judge inform the defen-
dant and determine that he understands that he waives his fifth amendment
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rights. The rule takes the position that the defendant's right not to self-
incriminate is best explained in terms of the right to plead not guilty and to
persist in that plea if it has already been made.
Generally speaking, it is within the court's discretion as to whether and
to what extent to advise the defendant of other or collateral consequences
of a plea of guilty or no contest. Immigration consequences stand as an
exception; under Rule 15.3(e)(2)(K), which follows Ariz. R. Crim. P.
17.2(f), disclosure of certain potential immigration consequences is
mandatory. See Padilla v. Kentucky, - U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010).
Because a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in
plea negotiations, the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Frye suggested that the
colloquy with the defendant required by section (e) could include measures
to help moot untimely or false claims that ineffective assistance of counsel
led to entry of a guilty plea:
The prosecution and the trial courts may adopt some mea-
sures to help ensure against late, frivolous, or fabricated
claims after a later, less advantageous plea offer has been
accepted or after a trial leading to conviction with resulting
harsh consequences. First, the fact of a formal offer means
that its terms and its processing can be documented so that
what took place in the negotiation process becomes more
clear if some later inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier
pretrial negotiations. Second, States may elect to follow
rules that all offers must be in writing, again to ensure
against later misunderstandings or fabricated charges. (cita-
tions omitted). Third, formal offers can be made part of the
record at any subsequent plea proceeding or before a trial
on the merits, all to ensure that a defendant has been fully
advised before those further proceedings commence.
Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, _ U.S. _, slip op. at 8 (2012) (citing Arizona
practice with approval) (Noting that to show prejudice from ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability
that the offer would have been accepted and that the plea would have been
entered and accepted by the court). See also Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209,
- U.S. - (2012) (defense counsel's incompetent advice allegedly caused
defendant to reject more favorable plea offer and go to trial).
Rule 15.4 - Plea Negotiations and Agreements.
(a) Entering into Plea Agreements. The prosecutor and de-
fendant's attorney, or defendant acting pro se, may engage
in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement
that, upon the entry of a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the prose-
cutor either will move for dismissal of other charges or will
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recommend (or will not oppose) the imposition or suspen-
sion of a particular sentence, or will do both.
(b) Disclosure of Plea Agreement. If a plea agreement has
been reached by the parties, the court shall require the dis-
closure of the agreement in open court at or before the time
a plea is offered. The court may accept or reject the agree-
ment or may defer its decision as to acceptance or rejection
until receipt of a presentence report.
(c) Acceptance or Rejection of Plea Agreements.
(1) If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court
shall inform the parties that it will embody in the judg-
ment and sentence the disposition provided for in the
plea agreement.
(2) If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court
shall:
(A) so inform the parties;
(B) advise the defendant and the prosecutor per-
sonally in open court that the court is not bound by
the plea agreement;
(C) advise the defendant that if the defendant
pleads guilty or no contest, the disposition of the
case may be either more or less favorable to the
defendant than that contemplated by the plea
agreement;
(D) afford the defendant the opportunity to with-
draw the defendant's offer to plead guilty or no
contest;
(E) afford the prosecutor the opportunity to
change the prosecutor's recommendations; and
(F) afford the parties the opportunity to submit
further plea agreements.
(d) Withdrawing a Guilty or No contest Plea. A defendant
may withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest:
(1) before the court accepts the plea, for any reason or
no reason;
(2) after the court accepts the plea, but before it im-
poses sentence:
(A) if the court rejects a plea agreement made pur-
suant to section (a); or
(B) on a showing of manifest injustice.
(e) Finality of Guilty or No Contest Plea. After the court
imposes sentence, the defendant may not withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest, and the plea may be set aside only on





Rule 15.4 replaces former URCCC 8.04(B), and embraces the proce-
dures embodied in Ala. R. Crim. P. 14.3. Rule 15.4 only applies in cases in
which a defendant is to plead guilty or no contest pursuant to a plea agree-
ment. See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-26 (governing guilty pleas involv-
ing non-adjudication).
Sections (a) through (c) provides a plea agreement procedure, and as
such recognizes the propriety of plea discussions and agreements, provided
they are disclosed in open court and subject to acceptance or rejection by
the trial judge. An oft-cited estimate indicated that guilty pleas account for
the disposition of as many as 95% of all criminal cases. ABA, Standards
for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty at pp. 1-2 (Approved Draft, 1968). See
also Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, - U.S. - (2012) (noting 97% of federal
convictions and 94% of State convictions are the result of guilty pleas).
Rule 15.4 provides transparency, accountability, and fairness in this pro-
cess. Properly implemented, a plea agreement procedure is consistent with
both effective and just administration of the criminal law. Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). "Related" offenses under Rule 15.4(a)
means those offenses that could be joined in the same indictment under
Rule 14.3(a).
A defendant enjoys the right to effective assistance of counsel in plea
negotiations. See Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, - U.S. _ (2012) (defendant
entered an open plea of guilty after a more favorable plea offer expired
without being communicated by defense counsel); Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-
209, - U.S. - (2012) (defense counsel's incompetent advice allegedly
caused defendant to reject more favorable plea offer and go to trial). As
the Court explained in Missouri v. Frye:
The prosecution and the trial courts may adopt some mea-
sures to help ensure against late, frivolous, or fabricated
claims after a later, less advantageous plea offer has been
accepted or after a trial leading to conviction with resulting
harsh consequences. First, the fact of a formal offer means
that its terms and its processing can be documented so that
what took place in the negotiation process becomes more
clear if some later inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier
pretrial negotiations. Second, States may elect to follow
rules that all offers must be in writing, again to ensure
against later misunderstandings or fabricated charges. (cita-
tions omitted). Third, formal offers can be made part of the
record at any subsequent plea proceeding or before a trial
on the merits, all to ensure that a defendant has been fully
advised before those further proceedings commence.
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Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, _ U.S. -, slip op. at 8 (2012) (citing
Arizona practice with approval) (Noting that to show prejudice from inef-
fective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the offer would have been accepted and that the plea
would have been entered and accepted by the court).
Section (c)(2) requires the court, if it rejects the plea agreement
(whether at the time the plea is offered or after receipt of a presentence
report), to inform the defendant of this fact and to advise the defendant
personally, in open court, that the court is not bound by the plea agree-
ment. The defendant must be afforded an opportunity to withdraw the
plea and must be advised that if the defendant persists in entering a plea of
guilty or no contest, the disposition of the case may be less favorable than
that contemplated by the plea agreement. That the defendant should have
the opportunity to withdraw a plea if the court rejects the plea agreement is
the position taken in ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty
§2.1(a)(ii)(5) (2d ed. 1986), and is consistent with the law in many jurisdic-
tions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.4(e). This rule,
taken together with Rule 15.3 regarding acceptance of guilty pleas, should
reduce the number of collateral attacks by defendants who have pleaded
guilty.
Sections (d) and (e) track Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d) and (e). Under sec-
tion (d), a defendant is permitted to withdraw entirely from a guilty plea,
either before acceptance of the plea for any reason, or after acceptance of a
plea but before imposition of sentence if the court rejects a plea agreement.
As a result, the rule contemplates that a judge can and should accept a plea
- but defer adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence - until after
receipt of an anticipated pre-sentence report under Rule 26.3. Section (d)
does not generally apply when a court imposes conditions pursuant to an
offered but unaccepted or unadjudicated guilty plea under Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-15-26. See Brown v. State, 533 So.2d 1118 (Miss. 1988).
RULE 16 - PLEADINGS AND PRETRIAL MOTIONS
Rule 16.1 - Generally.
(a) Pleadings. The pleadings in a criminal proceeding are
the indictment, the information in lieu thereof, the com-
plaint, and the pleas of not guilty, guilty, and no contest.
(b) Form of Pretrial Motions. Rule 35.1 applies to a pretrial
motion.
Comment
Rule 16.1 is modeled after Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(a), and is designed to
simplify the procedure and avoid the technical distinctions that serve as
traps for the unwary. In that way, it parallels the familiar simplification
embodied in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Under this rule, the styling of the motion is not important, and sub-
stance governs over form. A motion need only "contain a concise state-
ment of the precise relief requested and shall state the specific factual
grounds and specific legal authority in support thereof," as prescribed in
Rule 35.1.
In a felony case, a complaint serves as a pleading, for example at a
preliminary hearing under Rule 6, only until superseded by an indictment
or information. Otherwise, a complaint is a pleading only in a misde-
meanor case.
Rule 16.2 - Time for Making Motions.
(a) Motions That May Be Made Before Trial. A party may
raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request
that the court can determine without a trial of the general
issue.
(b) Motions That Must Be Made Before Trial. Absent good
cause shown, the following must be raised before trial:
(1) a motion alleging a defect in instituting the
prosecution;
(2) a motion alleging a defect in the indictment-but at
any time while the case is pending, the court may hear a
claim that the indictment fails to invoke the court's ju-
risdiction or to state an offense;
(3) a motion to suppress evidence;
(4) a motion to sever charges or defendants;
(5) a motion for discovery; and
(6) a motion for a change of venue.
(c) Admissibility of Evidence.
(1) Generally. On motion of either party or on its own
motion, the court may order that the question of the
admissibility of any specified evidence be submitted for
pre-trial determination as if a motion to suppress had
been filed by the party opposed to the introduction of
the evidence.
(2) Orders in Limine. For good cause shown, the court
may order that any party, witness, or attorney refrain
from asking certain questions, giving certain answers,
or in any manner directly or indirectly referring to or
alluding to any otherwise inadmissible fact, matter, or
circumstance during the course of trial in the presence
of jurors or the venire.
(d) Notice of the Prosecution's Intent to Use Evidence.
(1) At the Discretion of the Prosecuting Attorney. At
the arraignment or upon the cause being set for trial, or
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as soon thereafter as practicable, the prosecuting attor-
ney may notify the defendant of its intent to use speci-
fied evidence at trial in order to afford the defendant
an opportunity to object before trial under Rule
16.2(b) (3).
(2) At the Defendant's Request. At the arraignment or
upon the cause being set for trial, whichever occurs
first, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the defendant
may, in order to have an opportunity to move to sup-
press evidence under Rule 16.2(b)(3), request notice of
the prosecuting attorney's intent to use (in its evidence-
in-chief at trial) any evidence that the defendant may
be entitled to discover under Rule 17.2.
Comment
Rule 16.2 follows the practice under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) and Ala. R.
Crim. P. 15.6(b) and (e).
Sections (a) and (b) classify into two groups all objections and de-
fenses to be interposed by motion prescribed by Rule 16.2. Rule 16.2(a)
governs defenses and objections that may be raised by pretrial motion, fail-
ure to do so, however, does not constitute a waiver. Rule 16.2(b) identifies
defenses and objections that must be raised by pretrial motion; failure
timely to do so does constitute a waiver under Rule 16.3, unless excused by
the court on a showing of good cause for making the motion at a later time.
A claim that the indictment fails to state a crime, or falls outside the court's
jurisdiction, may be raised at any time during the pendency of the case.
Section (a) includes all defenses and objections which are capable of
determination without a trial of the general issue, such as former jeopardy,
former conviction, former acquittal, statute of limitations, immunity, lack
of jurisdiction, failure of indictment or information to state an offense, de-
nial of a speedy trial, defect in instituting the prosecution, defect in the
charge, and the like. Rule 16.2(b) includes all defenses and objections that
are based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indict-
ment, other than lack of jurisdiction or failure to charge an offense. Any or
all such defenses and objections may be included in a single motion.
Section (b)(3) makes clear that objections to evidence on the ground
that it was illegally obtained must be raised prior to trial. This includes
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search, the use of unconstitu-
tional means to obtain a confession, and other instances in which the exclu-
sionary rule may apply. See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Criminal § 686 (4th ed.).
Section (c)(1) provides a method for dealing with the admissibility of
evidence such as confessions and line-up identifications before trial. Sec-
tion (c)(1) allows, but does not require, the court to order a question of
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admissibility to be submitted for pretrial determination. In making its de-
termination, the court shall proceed as if a motion to suppress the evidence
had been filed by the party opposed to the introduction of the evidence.
Therefore, section (c)(1) allows a party to ask the court to require the other
party to challenge evidence before trial, or else waive the right to have the
evidence excluded at trial. Thus, for example, the prosecuting attorney can
move the court for an order submitting the question of the admissibility of
a line-up identification for pre-trial determination; if the court in its discre-
tion grants the order and defense counsel fails to challenge the line-up
identification, the defendant cannot later make such a challenge at trial.
This rule should thereby increase efficiency in the conduct of criminal tri-
als, by providing the parties a means of determining, at a pre-trial hearing,
the admissibility of evidence.
Section (c)(2) preserves the court's power on motions in limine to pre-
vent parties, witnesses, or attorneys from bringing before the jury, by indi-
rection or otherwise, any inadmissible fact, matter, or circumstance.
Although such motions generally are preferably made before trial, this rule
in no way precludes, when appropriate, a motion in limine made after com-
mencement of the trial. Thus, Rule 16.2 leaves with the court discretion
either to determine such issues in advance of trial, or to defer them for
determination at trial.
Section (d) provides a mechanism for insuring that a defendant knows
of the prosecuting attorney's intention to use a particular item of evidence
to which the defendant may want to object. On some occasions the resolu-
tion of the admissibility issue prior to trial may be advantageous to the
prosecution. In these situations, the prosecuting attorney can make effec-
tive the defendant's obligation to make a motion to suppress prior to trial
by giving the defendant notice of the prosecuting attorney's intention to
use a particular item evidence. In cases in which the defendant wishes to
know whether the prosecuting attorney intends to use a particular item of
evidence, so that a motion to suppress may be made prior to trial, the de-
fendant can request the prosecuting attorney give notice of the intention to
use that particular item of evidence. Although the defendant is already en-
titled to discovery of such evidence prior to trial under rule 17, Rule
16.2(d) makes it possible to avoid the necessity of moving to suppress evi-
dence that the prosecuting attorney does not intend to use.
Rule 16.3 - Motion Deadline; Hearings and Rulings on Motions.
(a) Motion Deadline. The court may, at the arraignment or
upon the cause being set for trial, or as soon thereafter as
practicable, set a deadline for the parties to make pretrial
motions and may also schedule a motion hearing.
(b) Ruling on a Motion Generally. The court must decide
every pretrial motion before trial unless it finds good cause
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to defer a ruling. The court must not defer ruling on a pre-
trial motion if the deferral will adversely affect a party's
right to appeal. When factual issues are involved in deciding
a motion, the court must state its essential findings on the
record.
(c) Waiver of a Defense, Objection, or Request. A party
waives any Rule 16.2(b) defense, objection, or request not
raised by the deadline the court sets under Rule 16.3(a) or
by any extension the court provides. For good cause, the
court may grant relief from the waiver.
Comment
Rule 16.3 tracks Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c) through (e). Section (a) pro-
vides that a time for the making of motions shall be fixed at the time of the
arraignment or when the cause is set for trial, or as soon thereafter as prac-
ticable at the direction of the court. Rule 16 encourages the making of
motions prior to trial, whenever possible, and Rule 16.3 facilitates resolu-
tion in a single hearing rather than in a series of hearings. This is the rec-
ommendation of the American Bar Association's Committee on Standards
Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial (Approved Draft, 1970);
see especially §§5.2 and 5.3. It also is the procedure followed for an "omni-
bus hearing," as under former URCCC 9.08. While discretionary, a single
pretrial hearing is to be encouraged and is made possible by Rule 16.
Section (a) provides that the motion date be set at "the arraignment or
upon the cause being set for trial, or as soon thereafter as practicable." In
order to obtain the advantage of an omnibus hearing, counsel may rou-
tinely plead not guilty at the initial arraignment on the indictment and then
may indicate a desire to change the plea to guilty following the hearing.
This practice builds a more adequate record in guilty plea cases.
Section (b) provides that the court shall rule on a pretrial motion
before trial unless the court orders, on a showing of good cause, that it be
decided at the trial of the general issue or after verdict. The court cannot
defer its ruling if to do so will adversely affect a party's right to appeal.
While section (b) confers general authority to defer the determination of
any pretrial motion until after verdict, Rule 16.3 is designed to discourage
the tendency to reserve rulings on pretrial motions until after verdict in the
hope that the jury's verdict will make a ruling unnecessary.
Section (c) provides that a failure to raise the objections or make the
requests specified in Rule 16.2 constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court is
allowed to grant relief from the waiver if adequate cause is shown. See C.
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 192. The amendment
makes clear that the defendant and, where appropriate, the government
have an obligation to raise the issue at the motion date set by the court
pursuant to section (a).
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Rule 16.4 - Effects of Rulings.
(a) Effect of Granting Motion Based on Defective Charge.
If the court grants a motion to dismiss based on a defect in
instituting the prosecution or in the charge, the court shall
order the defendant released, or, on motion of the prosecut-
ing attorney, may, pending the filing of a new charge, order
the defendant's pre-trial release continued or may order the
defendant held in custody for a reasonable specified time
not to exceed 72 hours. This Rule does not affect any statu-
tory period of limitations.
(b) Motion to Suppress. If a motion to suppress is granted,
any suppressed property that was seized shall be restored to
its owner or last possessor, unless otherwise subject to law-
ful detention.
(c) Statutes of Limitations Tolled. The running of the time
prescribed by an applicable statute of limitations shall be
tolled by the issuance of the charging instrument until such
time as the court grants a motion to dismiss based on a de-
fect in the commencement of the proceedings or in the
charge, unless the court in granting the motion finds that the
state has not made a good faith effort to proceed properly
and that the defendant has been prejudiced by any resulting
delay.
Comment
Rule 16.4(a) is substantially similar to Ala. R. Crim. P. 15.5(a) and
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(g). If a motion to dismiss is granted due to some defect
in the charge or in the institution of the prosecution, section (a) allows the
court to ensure that the defendant will be available when the new charge is
filed. However, a defendant may be held only on order of the court, and
only for a specified time not to exceed 72 hours. A defendant should not
automatically be continued in custody when such a motion is granted. In
order to continue the defendant in custody, the court must not only deter-
mine that there is probable cause, but it must also determine, in effect, that
there is good cause to have the defendant arrested.
Section (b) follows Ala. R. Crim. P. 15.6(d). Section (b) recognizes
that property not lawfully seized must be returned, unless other basis for
detention exists. See Rule 4.6.
Section (c), as with Ala. R. Crim. P. 15.5(c), exists to avoid penalizing
the state for an inadvertent technical error which has not prejudiced the
defendant. Thus, if a motion to dismiss is granted due to a defect in the
charge or in the institution of the prosecution, the time period for which
the charging instrument was in effect is also tolled. Of course, section (c) is
just one aspect of the law governing the running and tolling of a statute of
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limitations. See Edmonson v. State, 17 So.3d 591 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)
(recognizing tolling where defendant absconds or is absent from the state);
U.S. v. Swartzendruber, No. 3:06-cr-136 (D. N. Dakota 2009) (tolling
order).
RULE 17 - DISCLOSURE
Rule 17.1 - Scope of Rule 17.
Rule series 17 applies in felony cases and in trials of misdemeanor cases in
circuit and county court.
Comment
Rule 17 substantially expands practice under former URCCC 9.04 in
two important aspects: disclosure is automatic, and is neither conditioned
on nor trigged by a request from the defendant; and the scope of the disclo-
sure required is significantly enlarged. Under prior practice, a defendant
could chose to initiate reciprocal discovery by submitting a written request
to the prosecuting attorney. Or the defendant could chose instead to opt
out, and receive only disclosure required of the prosecuting attorney by
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Hentz v. State, 489 So.2d 1386,
1388 (Miss. 1986) ("The Court now declares that as a matter of good prac-
tice and sound judgment in the trial of criminal cases, prosecuting attorneys
should make available to attorneys for defendants all such material [i.e.,
tape recordings of CI and others] in their files and let the defense attorneys
determine whether or not the material is useful in the defense of the
case.").
The federal government and an increasing number of states have pro-
vided for rather extensive discovery by those accused of criminal offenses.
The movement toward more extensive disclosure is attributable to several
factors: ever-increasing caseloads of the courts and the district attorneys'
offices; the practical necessity for negotiated pleas in a great majority of the
cases disposed of by official action; and the recognition by judges and pros-
ecuting attorneys that discovery has not served to free those accused of
crime, but instead often serves to provide a rational basis for negotiated
pleas. When the relevant evidence is before the court, the defense attorney,
the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant the opportunity exists for
reaching a settlement generally approved by all concerned.
The general purpose of discovery is to avoid trial by ambush, and Rule
17 places reciprocal obligations on the prosecuting attorney and defense.
See Standard 11, ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery and Pro-
cedure Before Trial (3d ed. 1996). Courts recognize that a defendant's right
to a fair trial is violated when the state knowingly allows false evidence to
be used against the defendant, Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Similarly, a defendant's rights are violated if
the state withholds favorable material evidence which the defendant has
requested. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
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667 (1985). In Brady, the Court held due process was violated where, after
the defendant's request, the state failed to reveal evidence that was mate-
rial either to guilt or punishment. At least some discovery, therefore, is
necessary to guarantee the accused a fair trial.
Under former URCCC 9.04, a defendant could chose to initiate recip-
rocal discovery by submitting a written request to the prosecuting attorney.
While many jurisdictions followed the commendable practice of "open file"
discovery (under which the prosecuting attorney allowed defense counsel
access to, or a copy of, the case file), the practice remained less than fully
uniform. See Dotson v. State, 593 So.2d 7, 11-12 (Miss. 1991).
Open file discovery is quite similar to the practice recommended by
Rules 421 and 422, Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, (National Con-
ference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (1987)). See also ABA,
Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial § 11
(3d ed. 1996); Expanded Discovery in Criminal Cases, The Justice Project,
Pew Trusts (2007) (discussing trends in criminal discovery and recom-
mending an expanded version of open file disclosure).
While reciprocal disclosure is mandated by Rule 17, the parties can
still agree to, or the court on motion can order, a different framework for
the timetable and content of disclosure. See Rule 17.2(b). The parties
could agree, for example, to follow the streamlined disclosure contem-
plated by the Uniform Rules.
Rule 17.1 makes clear that the disclosure rules apply to felony cases
generally, and misdemeanor cases only when tried in circuit or county
court.
Rule 17.2 - Disclosure by the Prosecution.
(a) Disclosure; Scope. The prosecuting attorney shall make
available to the defendant the following material and infor-
mation within the prosecution's possession or control:
(1) the names and addresses of all persons whom the
prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses in the
case-in-chief together with their written or recorded
statements;
(2) all statements of the defendant and of any person
who will be tried with the defendant;
(3) all original and supplemental reports prepared by a
law enforcement agency in connection with the particu-
lar crime with which the defendant is charged;
(4) the names and addresses of experts who have per-
sonally examined a defendant or any evidence in the
particular case, together with the results of physical ex-
aminations and of scientific tests, experiments, or com-
parisons that have been completed;
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(5) a list of all papers, documents, photographs, or tan-
gible objects (including electronic, magnetic, optical, or
other recording or data compilation) which the prose-
cuting attorney intends to use at trial or which were ob-
tained from or purportedly belong to the defendant;
(6) a list of all prior convictions of the defendant;
(7) a list of all prior acts of the defendant which the
prosecuting attorney intends to use at trial to prove
motive, intent, or knowledge, or otherwise use at trial;
(8) all material or information which tends to mitigate
or negate the defendant's guilt as to the offense
charged, or which would tend to reduce the defendant's
punishment therefore;
(9) whether there has been any electronic surveillance
of any conversations to which the defendant was a
party, or of the defendant's business or residence;
(10) whether a search warrant has been executed in
connection with the case;
(11) whether the case has involved an informant, and, if
so, the informant's identity, if the defendant is entitled
to know either or both of these facts under Rule
17.5(b)(2); and
(12) the time and place of the alleged offense, if not
alleged in the indictment.
(b) Time for Disclosure. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court, or agreed to by the parties, the prosecuting attorney
shall make available the materials and information listed in
Rule 17.2(a) not later than 30 days after arraignment or the
cause being set for trial, whichever occurs first.
(c) Prior Felony Convictions of Witnesses.
(1) In a felony case, at least 30 days before trial, or 30
days after a request from the defendant, whichever oc-
curs first, the prosecuting attorney shall make available
to the defendant a list of the prior felony convictions of
witnesses whom the prosecuting attorney then intends
to call at trial.
(2) In a misdemeanor case in circuit or county court, at
least 10 days before trial, the prosecuting attorney shall
make available to the defendant a list of the prior fel-
ony convictions of witnesses whom the prosecuting at-
torney intends to call at trial.
(3) In a felony case, at least 30 days before trial, or 30
days after a request from the defendant, whichever oc-
curs first, the prosecuting attorney shall make available
to the defendant a list of the prior felony convictions
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that the prosecuting attorney intends to use to impeach
a disclosed defense witness at trial.
(4) In a misdemeanor case in circuit or county court, at
least 10 days before trial the prosecuting attorney shall
make available to the defendant a list of the prior fel-
ony convictions that the prosecuting attorney intends to
use to impeach a disclosed defense witness at trial.
(d) Additional Disclosure upon Request and Specification.
The prosecuting attorney shall, within 30 days of a written
request, unless otherwise ordered by the court, make availa-
ble to the defendant for examination, testing, and reproduc-
tion the following:
(1) any specified items contained in the list submitted
under Rule 17.2(a)(5);
(2) any 911 calls existing at the time of the request that
can reasonably be ascertained by the custodian of the
record to be related to the case; and
(3) any written reports, statements, and examination
notes made by experts listed in subsections (a)(1) and
(a)(4) of this Rule in connection with the particular
case.
The prosecuting attorney may impose reasonable conditions (including an
appropriate stipulation concerning chain of custody) to protect physical ev-
idence produced under this section or to allow time to complete any exami-
nation or testing of such items.
(e) Extent of Duty. The prosecuting attorney's obligation
under this Rule extends to material and information in the
possession or control of any of the following:
(1) the prosecuting attorney, or members of the prose-
cuting attorney's staff; and
(2) any law enforcement agency or other agency or per-
son who has participated in the investigation of the
case, if the prosecuting attorney knew, or through rea-
sonable diligence should have known, of the existence
of the material or information.
(f) Disclosure by Order of the Court. Upon motion of the
defendant showing that the defendant has substantial need
in the preparation of the defendant's case for material or
information not otherwise covered by Rule 17.2, and that
the defendant is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent by other means, the court in its
discretion may order any person to make it available to the
defendant. The court may, upon the request of any person
affected by the order, vacate, or modify the order if compli-
ance would be unreasonable or oppressive.
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(g) Disclosure of Rebuttal Evidence. Upon receipt of the
notice of defenses required from the defendant under Rule
17.3(b), the prosecuting attorney shall timely disclose the
names and addresses of all persons whom the prosecuting
attorney intends to call as rebuttal witnesses together with
their written or recorded statements. If the notice of de-
fenses includes alibi, the disclosure shall also specify the
names and addresses of all persons on whom the prosecut-
ing attorney intends to rely to establish the defendant's
presence at the scene of the alleged offense.
Comment
Rule 17.2 is adapted from Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1. The list of material
and information covered by Rule 17.2(a) tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(b),
and is larger than that required by former URCCC 9.04 or Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(a). Sections (a)(1), (4), (5), (6), (8), (11), and (12) correspond to re-
quirements under former practice; sections (a)(2), (3), (7), (9), and (10) are
new. The "lists" of specified items under sections (5), (6), and (7), can be
satisfied by simply identifying the necessary information in any reasonably
clear and accessible way, as in section (a)(1); open file disclosure may well
suffice in most routine and less complex cases.
Section (a)(2), as it relates to statement of co-defendants, expands
Mississippi law. This section should be helpful in resolving questions of sev-
erance before trial. See Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Richardson v.
Marsh, 381 U.S. 200 (1987). As the purpose of this section is to avoid any
prejudice at trial by the introduction of such statements to the jury, only
such statements as the prosecuting attorney intends to introduce need be
disclosed.
The disclosure requirements of sections (a)(3) and (4) are limited to
material and information in existence at the time of disclosure pursuant to
Rule 17.2(b). It is not required that all aspects of an investigation, such as
forensic or laboratory analysis, be completed and disclosed within 30 days
after arraignment or the cause being set for trial. Supplemental disclosure
continues to be authorized and required in accordance with the provisions
of Rule 17.7. Mental examinations and reports are not covered by this sec-
tion. See Rule 12.4. The work product exception of Rule 17.5(b)(1) does
not apply to the opinions, theories and conclusions of experts contained in
reports to be disclosed under section (4).
Section (5) generally follows Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). The quali-
fier "purportedly" removes possible confusion concerning whether or not
items actually belong to the accused. In order to conserve the time and
resources, the prosecuting attorney is required only to prepare a list of all
evidence discoverable under this section. Upon specification under Rule
15.1(d), the actual items must be made available.
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Section (a)(6) follows Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(D). Section (a)(7) ac-
knowledges that, in order to prepare the case, the defendant needs to know
what prior acts, in addition to previous felony convictions, the prosecuting
attorney will use against the defendant.
Section (a)(8) clarifies the prosecuting attorney's constitutional obliga-
tions under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), making a change in law
only as to the timing of such disclosures, requiring that they be made well
before trial. The prosecuting attorney's duty to disclose prior felony con-
victions of its own witnesses is included as part of the Brady disclosure. See
Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding the prosecuting attorney obli-
gated to disclose information which lessens the credibility of prosecution
witnesses). See Dotson v. State, 593 So.2d 7 (Miss. 1991).
Sections (a)(9) and (10) follow Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(b)(9) and (10).
They are adapted from the ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery
and Procedure Before Trial § 11-2.1(c) and (d) (3d ed. 1996).
Section (b) insures that attention to disclosure begin promptly. Under
Rule 15.1(a), arraignment must generally be held within 30 days after filing
of the indictment. Under Rule 17.2(b), the parties can agree to, or the
court on motion can order, a different framework for the timetable and
content of disclosure.
Section (c) acknowledges the duty to make prior conviction informa-
tion available to the defense; however, it also recognizes that prior convic-
tion information may not be important to the resolution of many cases.
Therefore, the prosecuting attorney's obligation to disclose prior felony
conviction information does not arise until a case is set for trial unless re-
quested earlier by the defense. Section (c)(2) requires the prosecuting at-
torney to disclose any prior felony convictions of specified persons whom
the defense may call as witnesses at trial. The prosecuting attorney's obli-
gation is limited to prior convictions which are known and which are ex-
pected to be used at trial.
Section (d) requires, on written request and specification by the de-
fense and absent a contrary order of the court, that the prosecuting attor-
ney make items contained in the list submitted under Rule 17.2(a) (5)
available to the defense for examination, testing and reproduction. In most
cases, the prosecuting attorney will make the items available to the defense
for inspection while continuing to maintain custody of the materials. Not-
withstanding section (d), retention of evidence may sometimes be required
by law, and its duplication prohibited. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-29
(prohibiting copying or otherwise reproducing evidence that constitutes
child pornography as defined by statute, and providing that it "shall remain
in the care, custody, and control of either the prosecution or the court").
Section (d) provides a 30-day time frame for compliance by the prosecuting
attorney, and allows reasonable conditions to be imposed for the protec-
tion of evidence. Generally the Rule contemplates that the state will com-
plete its own examination or testing of any item before making it available
to the defense. The operational language "make available for examination,
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testing, and reproduction" is used for most of the discovery obligations.
This phrase incorporates the substance of ABA, Standards for Criminal
Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial § 2.2(b) (3d ed. 1996), im-
posing the same duties on both parties. The disclosing party must notify the
other parties that the material and information to be disclosed is ready for
their inspection and may be examined and reproduced by them at a desig-
nated place during specified reasonable times. The disclosing party must
make the material and information available at that location upon request
and provide suitable facilities for reproducing it. However, the disclosing
party is not required to make copies of documents at its expense, nor to
deliver the materials to the other parties. Nor is the disclosing party re-
quired to supply the facilities or materials required to carry out tests of
disclosed items. The parties may, by mutual consent, make any other or
additional arrangements.
Section (e) limits the extent of the disclosure duties to those persons
actually under the prosecuting attorney's control. The term "staff" is in-
tended to refer to his professional employees, not to secretaries, custodians
or other employees below the rank of investigators. Disclosure obligations
are limited to material and information within the prosecuting attorney's
possession or control to avoid being subjected to obligations and court or-
ders which the prosecuting attorney is unauthorized to carry out. Section
(e)(2) imposes an obligation to insure a flow of all discoverable informa-
tion to the prosecuting attorney's office from all local law enforcement
agencies. See ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery and Proce-
dure Before Trial § 2.2(c) (3d ed. 1996); Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
The prosecuting attorney is deemed responsible for obtaining and disclos-
ing material and information held by state, county, and municipal law en-
forcement agencies that have participated in the investigation of the case.
The prosecuting attorney is not generally deemed responsible for disclo-
sure of information and material held by federal law enforcement agencies,
crime victims, or other lay witnesses. These obligations are limited, how-
ever, to information and material known to the prosecuting attorney, or
discoverable through reasonable diligence. The court may, however, under
Rule 17.2(f) order the prosecuting attorney to obtain and disclose informa-
tion and material covered by Rule 17.2(a) that is not within the state's pos-
session and control if (1) the state has better access to the information; (2)
the defense shows that it has made a good faith effort to obtain the infor-
mation without success; and (3) the information has been specifically re-
quested by the defense.
Section (f) tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(g). It is substantially similar to
MRCP 26(b)(3). Rule 17.2(g) embraces Ariz. R. Crim. P 15.1(h) and con-
tinues the prosecuting attorney's obligations under former URCCC 9.05
regarding witnesses who will rebut an alibi defense.
118 [VOL. 31:1
MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 17.3 - Disclosure by Defendant.
(a) Physical Evidence. At any time after the filing of an in-
dictment, upon written request of the prosecuting attorney
and not less than 72 hours notice to defense counsel, the
defendant shall, in connection with the particular crime with
which the defendant is charged:
(1) appear in a line-up;
(2) speak for identification by witnesses;
(3) be fingerprinted, palm-printed, foot-printed, or
voice printed;
(4) pose for photographs not involving re-enactment of
an event;
(5) try on clothing;
(6) permit the taking of samples of the defendant's hair,
blood, saliva, urine, or other specified materials that in-
volves no unreasonable intrusions of the defendant's
body;
(7) provide specimens of the defendant's handwriting;
and
(8) submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspec-
tion of the defendant's body, provided such inspection
does not include psychiatric or psychological
examination.
The defendant shall be entitled to the presence of counsel at
the taking of such evidence. This Rule shall supplement and
not limit any other procedures established by law.
(b) Notice of Defenses. Within the time specified in Rule
17.3(d), the defendant shall provide a written notice to the
prosecuting attorney specifying all defenses as to which the
defendant intends to introduce evidence at trial, including,
but not limited to, alibi, insanity, self-defense, defense of
others, entrapment, impotency, marriage, insufficiency of a
prior conviction, mistaken identity, necessity and good char-
acter. The notice shall specify for each defense the persons,
other than the defendant, whom the defendant intends to
call as witnesses at trial in support thereof. If the notice of
defenses includes alibi, the notice shall also specify each
specific place the defendant claims to have been at the time
of the alleged offense. It may be signed by either the defen-
dant or defendant's counsel, and shall be filed with the
court. For good cause, the court may grant an exception to
any of the foregoing requirements. Evidence of an inten-
tion to rely on a defense, later withdrawn, or of a statement
made in connection with that intention, is not, in any civil or
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criminal proceeding, admissible against the person who gave
notice of the intention.
(c) Disclosure by Defendant; Scope. Simultaneously with
the notice of defenses submitted under Rule 17.3(b), the de-
fendant shall make available to the prosecuting attorney for
examination and reproduction the following material and
information known to the defendant to be in the possession
or control of the defendant:
(1) the names and addresses of all persons, other than
that of the defendant, whom the defendant intends to
call as witnesses at trial, together with their relevant
written or recorded statements;
(2) the names and addresses of experts whom the de-
fendant intends to call at trial, together with the results
of the defendant's physical examinations and of scien-
tific tests, experiments, or comparisons that have been
completed; and
(3) a list of all papers, documents, photographs, and
other tangible objects (including electronic, magnetic,
optical, or other recording or data compilation) that the
defendant intends to use at trial.
(d) Time for Disclosure. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court, the defendant shall disclose the materials and infor-
mation listed in Rules 17.3(b) and 17.3(c) not later than 20
days after the prosecuting attorney's disclosure pursuant to
Rule 17.2(b).
(e) Additional Disclosure upon Request and Specification.
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant,
within 10 days of a written request, shall make available to
the prosecuting attorney for examination, testing, and re-
production the following:
(1) any specified items contained in the list submitted
under Rule 17.3(c)(3); and
(2) any completed written reports, statements, and ex-
amination notes made by experts listed in Rule 17.3(c)
(1) and (2) of this Rule in connection with the particu-
lar case.
The defendant may impose reasonable conditions (including
an appropriate stipulation concerning chain of custody) to
protect the physical evidence produced under this section or
to allow time to complete any examination or testing of such
items.
(f) Scope of Disclosure. The defendant's obligation under
this Rule extends to material and information within the
possession or control of the defendant, the defendant's at-
torneys, staff, agents, investigators, or any other persons
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who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of
the case and who are under the defendant's direction or
control.
(g) Disclosure by Order of the Court. Upon motion of the
prosecuting attorney showing that the prosecuting attorney
has substantial need in the preparation of its case for mate-
rial or information not otherwise covered by Rule 17.3, that
the prosecuting attorney is unable without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means, and
that disclosure thereof will not violate the defendant's con-
stitutional rights, the court in its discretion may order any
person to make such material or information available to
the prosecuting attorney. The court may, upon request of
any person affected by the order, vacate or modify the order
if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.
Comment
Rule 17.3 tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.2. Section (a) serves to facilitate
obtaining non-testimonial evidence after indictment. See Davis v. Missis-
sippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985). It does
not limit obtaining non-testimonial evidence through other means. See,
e.g., U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)(subpoena to compel a person to
appear before a grand jury and provide a voice exemplar permissible). See
generally ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (1975). Other,
more intrusive procedures for obtaining specimens from the defendant re-
quire a court order. See ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery
and Procedure Before Trial § 11-2.3 (3d ed. 1996). Rule 17.3(a) is qualified
in two ways. The accused in entitled to the presence of counsel at any such
proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Nicholson
v. State, 523 So.2d 68 (Miss. 1988). And the prosecutor may use the pro-
ceeding only to obtain evidence related to the charge for which the defen-
dant already stands accused, not to investigate other crimes. The
defendant's obligations under section (a) are triggered by written request
of the prosecuting attorney and at least 72 hours notice to defense counsel.
Section (b) requires a notice of defenses which the defendant intends
to introduce into evidence at trial. This intent is that which exists at the
time of the notice, and is subject to the continuing duty to supplement dis-
closure under Rule 17.7. It is intended that the "notice of defenses" be a
broad disclosure of the defendant's case, including rebuttal of the state's
case as well as the defendant's own "case-in-chief." Section (b) is intended
to require a meaningful list of defenses and witnesses so that responsive
disclosure under Rule 17.2(g) may be made as early in the disclosure pro-
cess as possible. The disclosure requirement goes considerably beyond no-
tification of "affirmative defenses," yet is limited to matters as to which the
defendant will introduce evidence. The limitation is designed to allow the
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defendant to argue deficiencies in the state's case (not requiring the pres-
entation of defense evidence) without prior warning, and to make the de-
fendant's disclosure obligations sufficiently clear and predictable as to be
enforceable. As under Ariz. R. Crim. P 15.4(c), the defendant is not re-
quired to raise at trial all defenses noted in the "notice," and section (b)
flatly prohibits comment on the defendant's failure to do so. Indeed, sec-
tion (b) broadly provides that any evidence "of an intention to rely on a
defense, later withdrawn, or of a statement made in connection with that
intention, is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the
person who gave notice of the intention." The requirement of a detailed
notification of defenses follows ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Dis-
covery and Procedure Before Trial § 3.3 (3d ed. 1996). While the notice
required by section (b) includes matters which will be supported by the
defendant's own testimony, disclosure of the defendant's own testimony is
not required; rather, the defendant need disclose only the defense to be
asserted or the element of the offense to be attacked, in sufficient detail as
to notify the prosecutor of the essence of the defense's case. Rules requir-
ing advance notice of affirmative defenses - for example, alibi and insanity
- do not violate the privilege against self-incrimination, even when they
would be established by the defendant's own testimony (and even when
they require specification of the place at which the defendant claims to
have been, the time at which the defendant was there, and the witnesses
thereto). Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See former URCC 9.05
and 9.07.
Section (c) closely parallels the prosecutor's disclosure obligations
under Rules 17.2(a)(1), (a)(4) and (a)(5), except that it is limited to evi-
dence which the defendant will offer at trial. The extent of the defendant's
duty to make facilities available for review and copying of materials and
information is the same as that of the prosecuting attorney. See Comment
to Rule 17.2. The disclosure by the defendant pursuant to section (c) ap-
plies to then-existing statements and reports known to the defendant to be
in the possession or control of the defendant. Rule 17.2(c)(2) further clari-
fies that disclosure of physical examinations and of scientific tests relate
only to those that have been completed at the time of this required disclo-
sure. The duty to supplement is governed by Rule 17.7.
Section (d) ties the time for the defendant's disclosures under sections
(b) and (c) to 20 days after the disclosures of the prosecuting attorney un-
less otherwise ordered by the court (or agreed to by the parties pursuant to
Rule 17.2(b)).
Section (e) directly parallels the corresponding disclosure requirement
placed on the prosecuting attorney in Rule 17.2(d). The defendant's disclo-
sures are due within 10 days of a written request. The defendant may im-
pose the same reasonable conditions (including an appropriate stipulation
regarding chain of custody) on release of items of evidence that Rule
17.2(d) allows the prosecuting attorney to attach, either to protect physical
evidence or allow time to complete any examination or test.
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Section (f) sets forth the extent of the defendant's duty to obtain evi-
dence for disclosure. See Rule 17.2(e) for the prosecuting attorney's simi-
lar duty.
Section (g) gives the prosecuting attorney the same right to request
additional discovery given to the defendant in Rule 17.2(f), with the addi-
tional warning that discretionary discovery from the defendant must also
take account of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Rule 17.4 - Depositions.
(a) Availability. Upon motion of any party or a witness, the
court may in exceptional circumstances order the examina-
tion of any person, except the defendant, upon oral deposi-
tion under the following circumstances:
(1) a party shows that the person's testimony is mate-
rial to the case and that there is a substantial likelihood
that the person will not be available at the time of trial;
or
(2) a witness is incarcerated for failure to give satisfac-
tory security that the witness will appear to testify at a
trial or hearing.
(b) Motion for Taking Deposition; Notice; Service. A mo-
tion for deposition shall specify the time and place for tak-
ing the deposition and the name and address of each person
to be examined, together with designated papers, docu-
ments, photographs, or other tangible objects, not privi-
leged, to be produced at the same time and place. The court
may change such terms and specify any additional condi-
tions governing the conduct of the proceeding. The moving
party shall notice the deposition in the manner provided for
in civil actions and serve a subpoena upon the deponent,
specifying the terms and conditions set forth in the court's
order granting the deposition, and give notice of the deposi-
tion in writing to every other party to the action.
(c) Manner of Taking. Except as otherwise provided herein
or by order of the court, depositions shall be taken in the
manner provided in civil actions. With the consent of the
parties, the court may order that a deposition be taken on
written interrogatories in the manner provided in civil ac-
tions. Any statement of the witness being deposed which is
in the possession of any party shall be made available for
examination and use at the taking of the deposition to any
party who would be entitled thereto at trial. A deposition
may be recorded by other than a certified court reporter. If
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a deposition is recorded by other than a certified court re-
porter, the party taking the deposition shall provide the op-
posing party with a copy of the recording within 14 days
after the taking of the deposition or not less than 10 days
before trial, whichever is earlier. The parties may stipulate,
or the court may order, that a deposition be taken by tele-
phone or similar audio or visual means.
(d) Presence of Defendant. A defendant shall have the right
to be present at any examination. If a defendant is in cus-
tody, the officer having custody shall be notified by the
moving party of the time and place set for the examination
and shall, unless the defendant waives, in writing, the right
to be present, produce the defendant at the examination
and remain with the defendant during it.
(e) Use. Depositions may be used in the manner provided
by law.
Comment
Rule 17.4 is taken from Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.3, and is similar to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 15. See also ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery and
Procedure Before Trial § 4.1 (3d ed. 1996). As with federal practice, taking
a deposition requires a court order and a showing of "exceptional circum-
stances." Depositions may be ordered by the court only to preserve testi-
mony, or to take the statement of a witness in order that the witness may
be released from incarceration. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-7 (detention
of material witness).
The court is given broad discretion in section (b) to regulate deposi-
tions; this could include setting restrictions on the defendant's participation
if a witness fears intimidation or harassment. Under section (c), written
interrogatories may be substituted for an oral proceeding; the defendant's
consent is required because their use, in effect, eliminates the right of cross-
examination. Section (c) further sets forth a number of procedural require-
ments and refers to the civil rules for further guidance, and permits the
recording of a deposition by an audio recording device and, by stipulation
of the parties or order of the court, the taking of a deposition by telephone.
This language is similar to language found in MRCP 30(b). It is designed to
reduce expense on the part of the state and the defense, and to provide the
opportunity for reducing inconvenience to witnesses.
Section (d) gives the defendant a right to be present, as the purpose of
the deposition is perpetuation of testimony for use at trial. A deposition
cannot be used at trial without the defendant's consent if the defendant was
not present at its taking and did not waive the right to be present in writing.
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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Rule 17.5 - General Standards.
In all disclosure under this Rule the following shall apply:
(a) Statements.
(1) Definition. Whenever it appears in Rule 17 the term
"statement" shall mean:
(A) a writing signed or otherwise adopted or ap-
proved by a person;
(B) a mechanical, electronic, or other recording of
a person's oral communications or a transcript
thereof; and
(C) a writing containing a verbatim record or a
summary of a person's oral communications.
(2) Superseded Notes. Handwritten notes that have
been substantially incorporated into a document or re-
port within 20 working days of the notes being created,
or that have been otherwise preserved electronically,
mechanically or by verbatim dictation, shall no longer
themselves be considered a statement.
(b) Materials Not Subject to Disclosure.
(1) Work Product. Disclosure shall not be required of
legal research or of records, correspondence, reports or
memoranda to the extent that they contain the opin-
ions, theories or conclusions of the prosecuting attor-
ney, members of the prosecuting attorney's legal or
investigative staff or law enforcement officers, or of de-
fense counsel or defense counsel's legal or investigative
staff.
(2) Informants. Disclosure of the existence of an in-
formant or of the identity of an informant who will not
be called to testify shall not be required where disclo-
sure would result in substantial risk to the informant or
to the informant's operational effectiveness, provided
the failure to disclose will not infringe the constitu-
tional rights of the accused.
(c) Use of Materials. Any materials furnished to an attorney
pursuant to this Rule shall not be disclosed to the public but
only to others to the extent necessary for the proper con-
duct of the case.
(d) Requests for Disclosure. All requests for disclosure re-
quired by Rule 17 shall be made to the opposing party.
Comment
Rule 17.5 follows Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.4. It is intended that an attor-
ney's actual trial notes, such as an outline of questions to ask a witness will
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be encompassed within the work product exception of section (b)(1), even
though they fall within the definition of statement. The exception for su-
perseded notes in section (a)(2) exists to alleviate the bookkeeping prob-
lem of retaining every scrap of notes taken in a case, and to prevent cross-
examination on "jottings" contained in a notebook. However, the rule
does require the timely preservation of information contained in handwrit-
ten notes. If the information is not substantially incorporated into a written
report within the time frame established in the rule, the information con-
tained in the handwritten notes must be saved entirely, so that parties may
have the opportunity to evaluate the information not otherwise preserved.
This balances the need for accurate, reliable, contemporaneously gathered
information, with the resource limits of witnesses and those required to
gather and maintain that information.
Following the suggestion ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Dis-
covery and Procedure Before Trial § 2.6 (3d ed. 1996), and rejecting Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16(a)(2) and (b)(2), section (b)(1) adopts a limited work product
standard. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (protecting docu-
ments only to the extent that they constitute legal research or the "theories,
opinions and conclusions" of the parties and their agents).
Section (b)(2) incorporates the constitutional dimensions of the in-
formant privilege, which requires disclosure only of a "material witness" to
the events from which the criminal charges arise. McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Section
(b)(2) will not affect the current requirement that where a defendant is
entitled to know the existence or identity of an informant, the prosecuting
attorney must dismiss the case if the required disclosure is not made. Sec-
tion (b)(2) differs from § 2.6(b) of the ABA, Standards, only in that the
prosecuting attorney need not notify the defendant of the existence of an
informant unless the defendant is constitutionally entitled to know of his
identity. This change was made to provide the prosecutor with more sub-
stantial protection for police informants, whose actual identity may be dis-
closed in some cases by mere notice of their existence.
Section (c) merely reminds counsel that discovery materials are to be
considered confidential records provided for the limited use of conducting
a particular criminal case.
Rule 17.6 - Excision and Protective Orders.
(a) Discretion of the Court to Deny, Defer, or Regulate
Disclosure. Upon motion of any party showing good cause,
the court may at any time order that disclosure of the iden-
tity of any witness be deferred for any reasonable period of
time not to extend beyond 5 days before the date set for
trial, or that any other disclosures required by this Rule be
denied, deferred, or regulated when it finds:
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(1) that the disclosure would result in a risk or harm
outweighing any usefulness of the disclosure to any
party; and
(2) that the risk cannot be eliminated by a less substan-
tial restriction of discovery rights.
(b) Discretion of the Court to Authorize Excision. When-
ever the court finds, on motion of any party, that only a por-
tion of a document, material, or other information is subject
to disclosure under these Rules, it may authorize the party
disclosing it to excise that portion of the material that is not
subject to disclosure and to disclose the remainder.
(c) Protective and Excision Order Proceedings. On motion
of the party seeking a protective or excision order, or sub-
mitting to the court for a determination as to whether any
document, material, or other information is subject to dis-
closure, the court may permit the party to present the mate-
rial or information for inspection by the judge in camera.
Counsel for all other parties shall be entitled to be present
when such presentation is made.
(d) Preservation of Record. If the court enters an order that
any material, or any portion thereof, is not subject to disclo-
sure under this Rule, the entire text of the material shall be
sealed and preserved in the record to be made available to
the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
Comment
Rule 17.6 is substantially identical to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.5. Section
(a) gives the court broad discretion to limit discovery required by this rule
whenever it is shown a risk of harm resulting from a specific disclosure.
Such risks could include the potential for physical harm, intimidation, brib-
ery, economic reprisals, harassment of a witness, extreme prejudice to a
witness or party, or interference with or disruption of ongoing police
investigations.
Section (c), as under ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery
and Procedure Before Trial § 4.6 (3d ed. 1996), and Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(d)(1), provides broad authority for in camera pretrial determinations of
disclosure issues. For the constitutional dimensions of in camera discovery
orders, see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
Section (d) preserves the right of the parties to appeal excision and
protective orders.
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Rule 17.7 - Continuing Duty to Disclose; Final Disclosure Deadline;
Extension.
(a) Continuing Duties. The duties prescribed in this Rule
shall be continuing duties and each party shall make addi-
tional timely disclosure whenever new or different informa-
tion subject to disclosure is discovered.
(b) Additional Disclosure. Any party that determines addi-
tional disclosure may be forthcoming within 30 days of trial
shall immediately notify the other parties of the circum-
stances and when the disclosure will be available.
(c) Final Deadline for Disclosure. Unless otherwise permit-
ted, all disclosure required by this Rule shall be completed
at least 7 days before trial.
(d) Disclosure After the Final Deadline. Absent agreement
by the parties, a party seeking to use material or informa-
tion not disclosed at least 7 days before trial shall obtain
leave of court by motion, supported by affidavit or testi-
mony under oath, to extend the time for disclosure and use
the material or information. If the court finds that the mate-
rial or information could not have been discovered or dis-
closed earlier even with due diligence and the material or
information was disclosed immediately upon its discovery,
the court shall grant a reasonable extension to complete the
disclosure and grant leave to use the material or informa-
tion. Absent such a finding, the court may either deny leave
or grant a reasonable extension to complete the disclosure
and leave to use the material or information, and if granted
the court may impose any sanction listed in Rule 17.8 other
than preclusion or dismissal.
(e) Extension of Time for Scientific Evidence. Upon a mo-
tion filed before the final deadline for disclosure in Rule
17.7(c), supported by affidavit from a crime laboratory rep-
resentative or other scientific expert that additional time is
needed to complete scientific or other testing, or reports
based thereon, and specifying the additional time necessary,
the Court shall, unless it finds that the request for extension
resulted from dilatory conduct, neglect, or other improper
reason on the part of the moving party or person listed in
Rule 17.2(e) or 17.3(c), grant a reasonable extension in
which to complete the disclosure. The period of time of the
extension shall be excluded by the court from all time peri-





Rule 17.7 is modeled after Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.6. Under section (a),
the parties have a duty to make continuing disclosures without specific re-
quest from any other party. The court should consider the imposition of
appropriate sanctions for untimely disclosure as well as nondisclosure, for
the entire structure of pretrial proceedings embodied in these rules de-
pends on early and complete evidentiary disclosures.
Section (d) defines the standards that will govern a party seeking leave
of court to offer evidence that had not previously been disclosed. The mov-
ing party must make certain threshold showings before seeking to admit
certain evidence. The failure of the moving party to meet the burden set
forth in this section will not result in automatic preclusion of the evidence
whose admission is being sought. Instead, the court retains discretion to
impose at least one of the Rule 17.8 sanctions, which include preclusion of
the evidence. If, upon the failure of the moving party to meet its burden,
the court grants an extension of time to complete the disclosure, the court
may impose any Rule 17.8 sanction except preclusion or dismissal. A court
determination that the newly disclosed evidence may be used at trial does
not foreclose evidentiary objections against the use of the evidence at trial.
Section (e) provides standards for extending the date of disclosure in
order to complete scientific testing and excluding that time from the time
periods prescribed in Rule 17. In most cases, scientific evidence is antici-
pated to be ready for examination and disclosure within the time periods of
Rule 17. However, there are circumstances in which the analysis and exam-
ination of scientific evidence cannot be completed within the prescribed
time limits. These circumstances may arise due to the volume of cases han-
dled by a forensic crime laboratory, the large number of pieces of evidence
that must be analyzed by the laboratory in the individual case, and the
large number of pieces of evidence that must be analyzed by the laboratory
in total.
For example, a party or crime laboratory might reasonably find it nec-
essary to triage cases and not immediately request or commence the exami-
nation of scientific evidence. This triage of cases, considering all of the
circumstances, may be deemed appropriate and not dilatory conduct or
neglect. Section (e) recognizes that forensic crime laboratories are con-
strained by external circumstances, such as budget, personnel and space
limitations. The rule provides a mechanism to obtain a reasonable exten-
sion to complete scientific testing and disclosure.
Rule 17.8 - Sanctions.
(a) Failure to Make Disclosure. If a party fails to make a
disclosure required by Rule 17, any other party may move
to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The
court shall order disclosure and shall impose any sanction it
finds appropriate, unless the court finds that the failure to
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comply was harmless or that the information could not have
been disclosed earlier even with due diligence and the infor-
mation was disclosed timely upon its discovery. All orders
imposing sanctions shall take into account the significance
of the information not timely disclosed, the impact of the
sanction on the parties, the culpability of the party failing to
make the disclosure, and the stage of the proceedings at
which the disclosure is ultimately made. Available sanctions
include, but are not limited to:
(1) granting a continuance or declaring a mistrial when
necessary in the interests of justice;
(2) holding a witness, party, person acting under the di-
rection or control of a party, or counsel in contempt;
(3) imposing costs of continuing the proceedings;
(4) in extraordinary circumstances, precluding or limit-
ing the calling of a witness, use of evidence, or argu-
ment in support of or in opposition to a charge or
defense;
(5) in extraordinary circumstances, dismissing the case
with or without prejudice; or
(6) any other appropriate sanction.
(b) Motion for Sanctions. No motion brought under Rule
17.8(a) will be considered or scheduled unless a separate
statement of moving counsel is attached certifying that, af-
ter personal consultation or good faith efforts to do so,
counsel have been unable to satisfactorily resolve the
matter.
Comment
Rule 17.8 is modeled after Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7. Section (a) provides
that, upon motion, the court shall order disclosure and may impose any
sanction it finds appropriate; ordering disclosure is not a prerequisite to the
imposition of sanctions. Section (a) specifies factors that the court should
consider in determining whether a sanction should be imposed, and, if so,
which sanction is appropriate. The court may decline to impose a sanction
if the failure to comply was harmless or the non-disclosing party has acted
diligently and in good faith. In essence, the non-disclosing party must
demonstrate that the evidence was either not in existence prior to the dis-
covery deadline, or could not have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence prior to the deadline. The court's contempt power and au-
thority to impose sanctions extend not just to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel, but also extend to include all those governed by the duties
prescribed by Rules 17.2(e) and 17.3(c).
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Section (b) provides that the moving party must certify that the party
has made a good faith attempt to resolve the matter without intervention of
the court.
RULE 18 - TRIAL BY JURY; WAIVER; SELECTION AND
PREPARATION OF PETIT JURY.
Rule 18.1 - Trial by Jury.
(a) Generally.
(1) Number of Jurors; Qualifications. The number of ju-
rors required to try a case and render a verdict shall be
as provided by law. Jurors shall have the qualifications
required by law.
(2) Misdemeanor Cases. Misdemeanor cases may be
tried before either a 6 or 12 person jury, in the discre-
tion of the court. In cases where the maximum possible
sentence is 6 months or less, the case may be tried with-
out a jury, in the discretion of the court.
(3) Alternate Jurors. The court may in its discretion
qualify such alternate jurors as it deems necessary.
(b) Waiver. The defendant may waive the right to trial by
jury with consent of the prosecution and the court. In a
death penalty case, the defendant may also waive the right
to have a jury determine the penalty if the prosecution and
the court concur.
(1) Voluntariness. Before accepting a waiver the court
shall address the defendant personally, advise the de-
fendant of the right to a jury trial, and ascertain that the
waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
(2) Form of Waiver. A waiver of jury trial under this
Rule shall be made in writing or in open court on the
record.
(3) Withdrawal of Waiver. With the permission of the
court, the defendant may withdraw the waiver of jury
trial or sentencing but no withdrawal shall be permitted
after the court begins taking evidence.
Comment
Rule 18.1 parallels Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1 and 18.2. Article 3, § 31 of
the Mississippi Constitution provides that the "right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate." In felony cases, conviction requires the unanimous con-
sent of twelve impartial jurors. See Markham v. State, 209 Miss. 135 (Miss.
1950). Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 sets forth the qualifications of competent
jurors.
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Because all felonies must be prosecuted on indictment by the grand
jury, it is clear that the trial of all felonies must be by jury unless waived.
Art. 3, § 27, of the Mississippi Constitution. See Robinson v. State, 345 So.
2d 1044 (Miss. 1977). Section (a)(2) continues the practice of former
URCCC 10.01, in permitting misdemeanor cases to be tried before a 6 per-
son jury.
The constitutional right to trial by jury does not apply unless the maxi-
mum possible sentence exceeds 6 months. See Hinton v. State, 222 So. 2d
690 (Miss. 1969). See also former URCCC 12.02(C). Accordingly, section
(a)(2) provides that a jury trial is discretionary if a defendant's maximum
possible sentence is 6 months or less.
The operation of section (a) is complicated by the second sentence of
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-33-9, which provides that "there shall be no jury
trial" in justice court when the "potential for incarceration is less than six
(6) months." Thus, when a misdemeanor statute provides (as many do) for
punishment of "not more than 6 months," § 99-33-9 is inapplicable, and a
defendant in justice court may seek a jury trial in the discretion of the court
as authorized by section (a)(2).
Section (b) follows common practice. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a), and
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury §§ 15-1.2 and 15-1.3 (2d
ed. 1986). Section (b)(3) provides that the court can allow a withdrawal of
waiver for good cause, but not after taking evidence begins. When consid-
ering a waiver on the eve of trial, the court should consider the conve-
nience of witnesses, parties, and potential jurors.
Rule 18.2 - Jury Information.
Before the voir dire examination, each party shall be furnished with a list of
the names and addresses of the prospective jurors present and qualified to
serve. Each party shall also be furnished with the employment status, occu-
pation, employer, residency status, education level, prior jury duty experi-
ence, felony conviction status, and such other information as the court may
require.
Comment
Rule 18.2 tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.3. Basic biographical information
furnished to the parties will assist them in making a more intelligent exer-
cise of challenges for cause or peremptory challenges. The basic informa-
tion must include at least: names, addresses, occupation, residency status,
extent of education, and previous service as a juror. See Miss. CODE ANN.
13-5-1 (jury questionnaires). Further information may be required by the
court, at the request of parties or otherwise. See also Rule 18.4(c) (supple-
mental questions on jury questionnaires).
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Rule 18.3 - Challenges.
(a) Challenge to the Jury Panel. Any party may challenge
the panel on the ground that in its selection there has been a
material departure from the requirements of law. Chal-
lenges to the panel shall be in writing or on the record, spec-
ifying the facts on which the challenge is based. They shall
be made and decided before any individual juror is
examined.
(b) Challenge for Cause. When there is reasonable ground
to believe that a juror cannot render a fair and impartial
verdict, the court, on its own initiative, or on motion of any
party, shall excuse the juror from service in the case. A chal-
lenge for cause may be made at any time, but may be denied
for failure of the party making it to exercise due diligence.
(c) Peremptory Challenges.
(1) In General. Both parties shall be allowed the fol-
lowing number of peremptory challenges for the selec-
tion of jurors:
(A) if the offense charged is punishable by death
or life imprisonment:
(i) 12, if no alternate jurors are to be
impaneled,
(ii) 13, if 1 or 2 alternate jurors are to be
impaneled,
(iii) 14, if 3 or 4 alternate jurors are to be im-
paneled, or
(iv) 15, if 5 or 6 alternate jurors are to be
impaneled;
(B) in all cases tried before a 12 person jury:
(i) 6, if no alternate jurors are to be
impaneled,
(ii) 7, if 1 or 2 alternate jurors are to be
impaneled,
(iii) 8, if 3 or 4 alternate jurors are to be im-
paneled, or
(iv) 9, if 5 or 6 alternate jurors are to be im-
paneled; and
(C) in all cases tried before a 6 person jury:
(i) 3, if no alternate jurors are to be impan-
eled, or
(ii) 4, if 1 or 2 alternate jurors are to be
impaneled.
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(2) Joint Trial of Several Defendants. When two or
more defendants are jointly tried, two additional chal-
lenges shall be allowed to the defense and to the prose-
cuting attorney for each additional defendant. When
two or more defendants are jointly tried and cannot
agree by whom the peremptory challenges shall be ex-
ercised, they shall be exercised in the manner pre-
scribed by the court.
(3) Agreement Among the Parties. The parties may
agree to exercise fewer than the allowable number of
peremptory challenges.
Comment
Rule 18.3(a) and (b) tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4 (a) and (b). The
requirement in section (a) that the challenger allege and prove a "material
departure" from legal requirements is intended to require a showing of
prejudice, and may be made by written motion or on the record.
Under section (b), "a juror who may be removed on challenge for
cause is one against whom a cause for challenge exists that would likely
[affect the juror's competency or] impartiality at trial." Evans v. State, 725
So.2d 613, 653 (Miss.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1133 (1999) (quoting Bil-
liot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 457 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230
(1985), reh'g denied, 470 U.S. 1089 (1985)); Armstrong v. State, 214 So.2d
589, 593 (Miss.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965 (1969) ("Those [jurors] who
say that they could follow the evidence and the instructions of the court
should be retained, and those who cannot follow the instructions of the
court should be released"). Section (b) permits a challenge for cause to be
made whenever the cause appears. The trial court may deny the challenge
if not seasonably made, but there is no absolute time limitation imposed by
rule. Once the trial has commenced the prosecutor may be unable, because
of double jeopardy, to invoke the right to challenge, unless there are suffi-
cient alternate jurors to enable the trial to continue with one less juror.
Section (c)(1) largely follows former URCCC 10.01. As under former
URCCC 10.01, the rule language "implies the trial court has no discretion
in the number of peremptory strikes given to each side." Jones v. State, 951
So.2d 568 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). It departs from prior practice in the num-
ber of additional challenges granted when alternate jurors are impaneled,
and removes the prior practice of allocating a certain and separate number
of challenges for regular jurors and a certain and separate number of chal-
lenges for alternate jurors. This change facilitates the practice in Rule
18.4(g) of not designating which jurors will serve as alternates until deliber-
ations begin. Section (c)(2) expands on prior practice by providing 2 addi-
tional challenges to the defense collectively, and the prosecuting attorney,
for each co-defendant. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(4). Co-defendants
who cannot agree on the allocation of preemptory challenges will exercise
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them as directed by the court. Section (c)(3) allows the parties to agree to
exercise a lesser number of peremptory challenges than provided by sec-
tion (c)(1).
Rule 18.4 - Procedure for Selecting a Jury.
(a) Oath. All members of the panel shall swear or affirm
that they will answer truthfully all questions concerning
their qualifications.
(b) Inquiry by the Court; Brief Opening Statements. The
court shall initiate the examination of jurors by identifying
the parties and their counsel, briefly outlining the nature of
the case, and explaining the purposes of the examination.
The court shall ask any questions which it thinks necessary
relating to the prospective jurors' qualifications to serve in
the case on trial. The parties may, before voir dire and with
the court's consent, present brief opening statements to the
entire jury panel. On its own motion the court may require
counsel to do so.
(c) Voir dire Examination. The court may permit the par-
ties to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or
may itself conduct the examination. If the court conducts
the examination, the parties shall be permitted to supple-
ment the court's examination with further questions. The
court may impose reasonable limitations with respect to
questions allowed during a party's examination of the pro-
spective jurors, giving due regard to the purpose of such ex-
amination. In addition, the court may terminate or limit voir
dire for good cause. Nothing in this Rule shall preclude the
use of written questionnaires to be completed by the pro-
spective jurors, in addition to oral examination.
(d) Scope of Examination. The examination of prospective
jurors shall be limited to inquiries directed to bases for chal-
lenge for cause or to information to enable the parties to
exercise intelligently their peremptory challenges.
(e) Challenge for Cause. At any time that cause for disquali-
fying a juror appears, the court shall excuse the juror before
the parties are called upon to exercise their peremptory
challenges. Challenges for cause shall be made out of the
hearing of the jurors, but shall be of record.
(f) Exercise of Peremptory Challenges. Following examina-
tion of the jurors, the parties shall exercise their peremptory
challenges as follows:
(1) the court shall consider all challenges for cause
before the parties are required to exercise peremptory
challenges;
2013] 135
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
(2) next, the prosecuting attorney shall tender a full
panel of accepted jurors (including a sufficient number
of alternates as deemed necessary by the court) having
considered the jury in the order in which they appear,
having exercised any peremptory challenges desired;
(3) next, the defendants shall go down the juror list ac-
cepted by the prosecuting attorney and exercise any
peremptory challenges to that panel;
(4) once the defendants exercise peremptory challenges
to the panel tendered, the prosecuting attorney shall
then be required to tender sufficient additional jurors
to constitute a full panel of accepted jurors (including a
sufficient number of alternates as deemed necessary by
the court);
(5) next, the defendants shall go down the list of the
additional jurors tendered to create a full panel and ex-
ercise any additional peremptory challenges; then
(6) the above procedure shall be repeated until a full
panel of jurors has been accepted by all parties (includ-
ing a sufficient number of alternates as deemed neces-
sary by the court).
Constitutional challenges to the use of peremptory chal-
lenges shall be made at the time each panel is tendered.
Peremptory challenges shall be made out of the hearing of
the jurors, but shall be of record.
(g) Selection of Jury. Just before the jury retires to begin
deliberations, the clerk shall, by lot, determine the juror or
jurors to be designated as alternates. Alternates, upon being
physically excused by the court, shall be instructed to con-
tinue to observe the admonitions to jurors until they are in-
formed that a verdict has been returned or the jury
discharged. If a deliberating juror is excused due to inabil-
ity or disqualification to perform required duties, the court
may substitute an alternate juror, choosing from among the
alternates in the order previously designated, unless disqual-
ified, to join in the deliberations. If an alternate joins the
deliberations, the jury shall be instructed to begin delibera-
tions anew.
Comment
Rule 18.4 largely follows Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5. The rule allows the
court to assume the primary responsibility for conducting the jury examina-
tion, or confer primary responsibility on the parties. While section (b)
gives the court the authority to permit or require the parties to give brief
opening statements to the entire jury panel before voir dire, such brief
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opening statements are in addition to those provided by right to the parties
under Rule 19.1. If the court primarily conducts the voir dire examination,
section (c) gives the parties the right to supplement the court's examination
with additional questions.
The rule is broad enough to permit the court to examine individual
jurors privately in appropriate cases (e.g., ones which concern unusually
sensitive subjects or which are surrounded by a great deal of publicity),
when the prospective juror might be embarrassed to confess a true opinion
before an audience or when one juror's statements concerning the case
might color the entire jury's outlook. The use of this procedure in contro-
versial cases is recommended by ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Fair
Trial and Free Press § 3.4 (Approved Draft, 1968).
Section (d), and the court's ability to conduct voir dire, are intended to
remove entirely the practice of some attorneys of "conditioning" the jury
by means of questions and argument which amount to preliminary instruc-
tions on the law and facts of the case. Under section (d), the judge can
control the length and content of the parties' voir dire. The court should
instruct counsel that voir dire is permitted to enable counsel to propound
questions seeking relevant information from and about the jurors, but not
to ask questions intended to impart information or arguments to the jurors.
Cf Ross v. State, 954 So.2d 968, 990 (Miss. 2007) (collecting cases on use of
hypothetical facts during voir dire). The court should be particularly sensi-
tive to the prejudice which can arise from voir dire by an unrepresented
defendant.
Under section (e), the jurors will not be removed from the courtroom
each time counsel wishes to make a challenge for cause. Better practice
will be for the parties to raise such challenges for cause at the end of voir
dire but prior to exercising peremptory challenges. If raised during voir
dire, the challenge will be out of the jury's hearing, to minimize any resent-
ment which might be caused by the challenge or argument upon it. All
challenges and rulings must be on the record.
Sections (e) and (f) contemplate that all of the jury panel members will
participate in voir dire examination by the judge and counsel. Although the
judge may excuse jurors for cause in the presence of the panel, challenges
for cause are best handled, as described above, after examination of the
panel has been completed and a recess taken. Following disposition of the
for cause challenges, the prosecuting attorney tenders a full panel of jurors
(including alternates), taking the jurors in the order in which they appear
and exercising any desired peremptory challenges. The defendants then
exercise peremptory challenges to the panel, and the process continues in
like fashion. All issues under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) must
be raised each time a panel is tendered. Regarding constitutional chal-
lenges to the use of peremptory strikes see Johnson v. State, 875 So.2d 208
(Miss. 2004); Berry v. State, 802 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 2001).
Section (g) establishes a new procedure for seating, substituting, and
discharging alternates. No distinction between jurors and alternates is
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made until the deliberations are to begin; then a drawing of lots determines
which are jurors and which are alternates. This method provides maximum
assurance that alternates will follow the proceedings with the attention of
potential jurors. Compare Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-67 (superseded by
these Rules) (Alternate jurors are designated as such throughout the trial.
Alternates are discharged at the time the jury retires, and may not be sub-
stituted for regular jurors after deliberations begin).
Rule 18.5 - Oath and Preliminary Instruction.
(a) Oath. The court shall, on the record of each trial, give
the jurors the following oath, or remind the jurors that they
are still under the following oath:
Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will well and
truly try all issues that may be submitted to you, or left to
your decision by the court, during the present term, and true
verdicts give according to the evidence and the law. So help
you God.
(b) Preliminary Instructions. Immediately after the jury is
sworn, the court may instruct the jury concerning its duties,
its conduct, the order of proceedings, and the elementary
legal principles that will govern the proceeding.
Comment
Rule 18.5 largely follows Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.6. The oath in section
(a) is taken from Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-71. Section (b) is based on
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury § 15-3.6(e) (2d ed.
1986), which reads: "Before the taking of evidence, the court may give pre-
liminary instructions to the jury deemed appropriate for their guidance in
hearing the case."
Rule 18.6 - Note Taking by Jurors.
(a) Note Taking Permitted in the Discretion of the Court.
The court may, in its discretion, permit jurors to take writ-
ten notes concerning testimony and other evidence. If the
court permits jurors to take written notes, jurors shall have
access to their notes during deliberations. Immediately after
the jury has rendered its verdict, all notes shall be collected
by the bailiff or clerk and destroyed. In a death penalty
case, jurors shall have access to their notes from the trial
and all phases of the sentencing proceedings until the jury
renders a penalty verdict or is dismissed.
(b) Instructions. The court shall instruct the jury as to
whether note taking will be permitted. If the court permits
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jurors to take written notes, the trial judge shall give both a
preliminary instruction and an instruction at the close of all
the evidence on the appropriate use of juror notes. These
instructions shall be given in the following manner:
(1) Preliminary Instruction: Note Taking Forbidden.
You may not take notes during the course of the trial.
There are several reasons for this. It is difficult to take
notes and, at the same time, pay attention to what a
witness is saying. Further, in a group the size of yours,
certain persons will take better notes than others will,
and there is a risk that jurors who do not take good
notes will depend on jurors who do. The jury system
depends upon all jurors paying close attention and ar-
riving at a decision. I believe that the jury system works
better when the jurors do not take notes.
You will notice that we do have an official court re-
porter making a record of the trial; however, we will
not have typewritten transcripts of this record available
for your use in reaching a decision in this case.
(2) Preliminary Instruction: Note Taking Permitted.
If you would like to do so, you may take notes during
the course of the trial. On the other hand, you are not
required to take notes if you prefer not to do so. Each
of you should make your own decision about this. If
you decide to take notes, be careful not to get so in-
volved in note taking that you become distracted from
the ongoing proceedings.
Notes are only a memory aid and a juror's notes may
be used only as an aid to refresh that particular juror's
memory and assist that juror in recalling the actual tes-
timony. Each of you must rely on your own indepen-
dent recollection of the proceedings. Whether you take
notes or not, each of you must form and express your
own opinion as to the facts of this case. An individual
juror's notes may be used by that juror only and may
not be shown to or shared with other jurors.
You will notice that we do have an official court re-
porter making a record of the trial; however, we will
not have typewritten transcripts of this record available
for your use in reaching a decision in this case.
(3) Use of Notes During Deliberations.
Jury Instruction:
Members of the Jury, shortly after you were selected I
informed you that you could take notes and I instructed
you as to the appropriate use of any notes that you
might take. Most importantly, an individual juror's
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notes may be used by that juror only and may not be
shown to or shared with other jurors. Notes are only a
memory aid and a juror's notes may be used only as an
aid to refresh that particular juror's memory and assist
that juror in recalling the actual testimony. Each of you
must rely on your own independent recollection of the
proceedings. Whether you took notes or not, each of
you must form and express your own opinion as to the
facts of this case. Be aware that during the course of
your deliberations there might be the temptation to al-
low notes to cause certain portions of the evidence to
receive undue emphasis and receive attention out of
proportion to the entire evidence. But a juror's mem-
ory or impression is entitled to no greater weight just
because he or she took notes, and you should not be
influenced by the notes of other jurors.
Thus, during your deliberations, do not assume simply
because something appears in your notes that it neces-
sarily took place in court.
Comment
Rule 18.6 continues practice under URCCC 3.14. Cf Vardaman v.
State, 966 So. 2d 885, 893 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Rule 18.7 - Jury Sequestration.
(a) Death Penalty Cases. In a death penalty case, the jury
shall be sequestered during the entire trial.
(b) Other Cases. In all other cases, the jury may be seques-
tered on request of either the defendant or the prosecuting
attorney made at least 48 hours in advance of the trial. The
court may, in its discretion, either grant or refuse the re-
quest to sequester the jury. The court may, on its own initia-
tive, sequester a jury at any stage of a trial.
(c) Admonitions to Jurors. In all cases, the court, among
other matters it deems proper, shall admonish the jurors
that they are not to:
(1) discuss among themselves any subject connected
with the trial until the case is submitted to them for
deliberation;
(2) converse with anyone else on any subject connected




(3) permit themselves to be exposed to outside com-
ments or news accounts of the proceedings, until they
are discharged as jurors in the case; or
(4) form or express any opinion on the case until it is
submitted to them for deliberation.
If the jurors are permitted to separate, they may also be ad-
monished not to view the place where the offense was alleg-
edly committed.
Comment
Rule 18.7(a) and (b) preserves practice under former URCCC 10.02.
Sequestration is mandatory in death penalty cases, see Simmons v. State,
805 So.2d 452 (Miss. 2001), and discretionary in other cases, see Baldwin v.
State, 732 So.2d 236 (Miss. 1999). Section (c) essentially incorporates
URCCC 3.11. The court is free to supplement the admonitions in section
(c) in any manner it deems proper.
RULE 19 - TRIAL
Rule 19.1 - Proceedings at Trial.
(a) Order of Proceedings. The trial shall proceed in the fol-
lowing order unless otherwise directed by the court:
(1) The indictment or complaint shall be read or sum-
marized, and the plea of the defendant stated.
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening
statement.
(3) The defendant may then make an opening state-
ment or may defer such opening statement until the
close of the prosecution's evidence. If there are 2 or
more defendants, they shall proceed in the order of the
filing of their respective charges or, if they are charged
in the same instrument, they shall proceed in the order
they appear therein, unless they have agreed to a differ-
ent order.
(4) The prosecuting attorney shall offer the evidence in
support of the charge.
(5) The defendant may then make an opening state-
ment if it was deferred, and offer evidence in defense.
(6) The prosecuting attorney shall then be allowed to
offer evidence in rebuttal.
(7) If the court on a showing of good cause allows a
case-in-chief to be reopened, and if either party is al-
lowed to present further evidence, the other party may
present evidence in response thereto.
(8) The judge shall then charge the jury.
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(9) The prosecuting attorney may then make a closing
argument to the jury. The defendant may then make a
closing argument to the jury. Failure of the prosecuting
attorney to make a closing argument shall not deprive
the defendant of the right to argue. The prosecuting
attorney may then make a rebuttal argument, but not
to exceed 1/2 of the prosecuting attorney's allotted
time. If after the prosecuting attorney's initial closing
argument a defendant declines to make a closing argu-
ment, the prosecuting attorney shall make no further
argument.
With the permission of court, the parties may agree to any
other method of proceeding.
(b) Enhanced Punishment for Subsequent Offenses, etc. In
cases involving enhanced punishment for subsequent of-
fenses, or involving non-capital sentencing allegations re-
quired to be found by a jury, the trial shall proceed as
follows.
(1) Reading of the Charges. When the indictment or
complaint is read or summarized, all references to prior
convictions or sentencing allegations shall be omitted.
(2) Separate Trials Required. The trial shall proceed in-
itially as though the prior convictions were not alleged
or the sentencing allegations made. In the trial on the
principal charge, neither the previous convictions nor
the sentencing allegations shall be mentioned by the
prosecution or the court except as provided by the Mis-
sissippi Rules of Evidence.
(3) Trial of Sentencing Allegations. The trial court
without a jury shall determine allegations of previous
convictions. Any issue of non-capital sentencing allega-
tions required to be found by the jury shall be tried,
unless the defendant has admitted to the allegations.
Comment
Rule 19.1(a) follows Ariz. R. Crim. P. 19.1. Section (a) provides a pre-
sumptive method of proceeding at trial. The court will generally give final
instructions to the jury before closing arguments of counsel instead of after,
in order to enhance jurors' ability to apply the applicable law to the facts;
the court may wish, however, to withhold giving the necessary procedural
and housekeeping instructions until after closing arguments. See Rules
21(f), 22.1(a), and 22.3(a). The last sentence of section (a) permits the par-
ties, with the permission of the court, to stipulate to any other convenient
method of proceeding. This should be construed broadly to permit the par-
ties to have the case determined by the court on the basis of stipulated
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facts; it thus legitimizes a practice which preserves the defendant's right, for
example, to appeal a previously denied suppression motion without wast-
ing the time of the court and counsel in a full trial of an otherwise simple
case. Compare Rule 15.3(d) (appeal from a guilty plea for a similar
purpose).
Section (b) continues the practice under former URCCC 11.03 of bi-
furcated trial when enhanced punishment for subsequent offenses is
sought. A jury resolves the underlying charge, and the court determines
whether the defendant satisfies the requirements for enhanced sentencing
as an habitual offender. See Frazier v. State, 907 So.2d 985 (Miss. 2005).
Sentencing allegations other than prior convictions must be tried to a jury.
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Rule 19.2 - Bifurcated Trials.
(a) Death Penalty Cases. In a death penalty case, the trial
shall be conducted in accordance with H§ 99-19-101 and 99-
19-103 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, and ap-
plicable court decisions.
(b) Cases Where the Jury May Impose Life.
(1) In all cases not involving the death penalty, where
the jury may impose a life sentence, the court may con-
duct a bifurcated trial. If the defendant is found guilty,
a sentencing trial shall be held before the same jury, if
possible; if the defendant pleads guilty, a sentencing
trial shall be held before a jury.
(2) At the sentencing hearing:
(A) the prosecution may introduce evidence of ag-
gravation of the offense of which the defendant
has been adjudged guilty;
(B) the defendant may introduce any evidence of
extenuation or mitigation;
(B) the prosecution may introduce evidence in re-
buttal of the evidence of the defendant; and
(C) a record shall be made of the above proceed-
ing and shall be maintained in the office of the
clerk of the trial court as a part of the record.
Comment
Rule 19.2 continues former URCCC 10.04(A) and (B). See Taggart v.
State, 957 So.2d 981 (Miss. 2007) (discussing procedure in non-death pen-
alty cases).
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Rule 19.3 - Additional Duties of Court Reporters.
(a) Felony Cases. In all felony cases, the court reporter
shall fully record the voir dire and selection of the jury,
opening statements, and closing arguments, whether or not
such is ordered by the judge or requested by a party. This
duty may not be abrogated by the judge or waived by the
defendant, and is in addition to all other duties.
(b) Other Cases. In all other cases in courts of record, the
court reporter shall fully record the voir dire and selection
of the jury, opening statements, and closing arguments, if
directed to do so by the judge.
Comment
Rule 19.3 tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 19.4. Section (a) places duties on
court reporters that may not be abrogated by the judge or waived by the
defendant, and which are in addition to all other duties imposed by law or
the court. See Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643,651 (Miss. 1996); Walker v.
State, 671 So.2d 581 (Miss. 1995). The duties of section (b) apply only if the
judge so orders.
RULE 20 - MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF AcQuitrAL
(a) Before Submission to the Jury. After the prosecution
closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the
court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of
acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insuffi-
cient to sustain a conviction. The court may on its own mo-
tion consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a conviction. If the court denies a motion for a judgment of
acquittal at the close of the prosecution's evidence, the de-
fendant may offer evidence without waiving opposition
thereto.
(b) Reserving Decision. The court may reserve a decision
on the motion, proceed with the trial (when the motion is
made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case
to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury
returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is
discharged without having returned a verdict. If the court
reserves decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of
the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.
(c) After Jury Verdict or Discharge.
(1) Time for a Motion. A defendant may move for a
judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within
10 days after entry of judgment of conviction. When
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the jury is discharged without returning a verdict, the
motion shall be made within 10 days after discharge; if
a new trial is scheduled to begin within the 10 days, the
motion shall be made at a time set by the court before
the new trial begins.
(2) Ruling on the Motion. If the jury has returned a
guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict, dis-
pose of a motion for a new trial, and enter a judgment
of acquittal. If the jury has failed to return a verdict, the
court may enter a judgment of acquittal. The state may
appeal when the court sets aside a verdict of guilty and
enters a judgment of acquittal.
(3) No Prior Motion Required. A defendant is not re-
quired to move for a judgment of acquittal before the
court submits the case to the jury as a prerequisite for
making such a motion after jury discharge.
(d) Conditional Ruling on a Motion for a New Trial.
(1) Motion for a New Trial. If the court enters a judg-
ment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, the court must
also conditionally determine whether any motion for a
new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal
is later vacated or reversed. The court must specify the
reasons for that determination.
(2) Finality. The court's order conditionally granting a
motion for a new trial does not affect the finality of the
judgment of acquittal.
(3) Appeal.
(A) Grant of a Motion for a New Trial. If the court
conditionally grants a motion for a new trial and
an appellate court later reverses the judgment of
acquittal, the trial court must proceed with the new
trial unless the appellate court orders otherwise.
(B) Denial of a Motion for a New Trial. If the
court conditionally denies a motion for a new trial,
an appellee may assert that the denial was errone-
ous. If the appellate court later reverses the judg-
ment of acquittal, the trial court must proceed as
the appellate court directs.
(e) Denial by Operation of Law. A motion for a judgment
of acquittal pending 30 days after entry of judgment of con-
viction shall be deemed denied as of the 30th day. How-
ever, the parties may agree in writing, or the court may
order, that the motion be continued past the 30th day to a
date certain within 90 days; any motion still pending on the
date to which it is continued shall be deemed denied as of
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that date. The motion may be continued from time to time
as provided in this Rule.
Comment
Rule 20 is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. In Mississippi, it replaces the
practice of seeking directed verdict or JNOV for the single practice of judg-
ment of acquittal. See State v. Russell, 358 So.2d 409 (Miss. 1978) (observ-
ing that a motion for a JNOV is simply a renewal of a motion for directed
verdict made at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence at trial).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 has likewise abolished the motion for directed verdict
in criminal cases and substituted for it the motion for judgment of acquittal.
A motion for judgment of acquittal tests the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction. For the double jeopardy implications of a judgment of
acquittal, see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), and Hudson v. Loui-
siana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981). The language "any offense" in section (a) per-
mits the court to enter a judgment of acquittal for the charged offense and
any lesser included or attempt offense. See Rule 23.2(d). For example,
assume a defendant is indicted for burglarizing a home and stealing jew-
elry, but at the close of the prosecution's evidence the court determines
that the highest offense the prosecution has proved is willful trespass; the
judge may enter a judgment of acquittal as to burglary and larceny. After
such a judgment, the jury can decide only the question of guilt of willful
trespass. Lesser and attempt offenses are also governed by Rule
14.3(a)(indictments) and Rule 23.2(d) (instructing the jury).
The last sentence of section (a) provides that, on denial of a motion for
a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case, "the defen-
dant may offer evidence without waiving opposition thereto." This is a
change in Mississippi practice. See Kelly v. State, 778 So.2d 149 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that, after denial of a motion for a directed verdict,
when the defendant "proceeded to put on his own witnesses, the denial of
that specific motion was waived as an appellate issue"). Under section (a),
therefore, the defendant may offer evidence without waiving appellate re-
view of an erroneous denial of a motion for acquittal made at the close of
the prosecution's case; instead, an appellate court would consider the issue,
based solely on the prosecution's evidence submitted at the time of the
motion.
Section (b) permits the reservation of a ruling on a motion for a judg-
ment of acquittal made at the close of the prosecution's case in the same
manner as motions made at the close of all of the evidence. Rule 20 per-
mits the trial court to balance the defendant's interest in an immediate res-
olution of the motion against the interest of the prosecution in proceeding
to a verdict. Reserving a ruling on a motion made at the end of the prose-
cution's case does pose problems, however, where the defense decides to
present evidence and run the risk that such evidence will support the prose-
cution's case. To address that problem, section (b) provides that the trial
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court is to consider only the evidence submitted at the time of the motion
in making its ruling, whenever made. And in reviewing a trial court's rul-
ing, the appellate court would be similarly limited. This is a departure from
current practice. See Smith v. State, 646 So.2d 538 (Miss. 1994).
Section (c) allows the motion to be made at any time within 10 days
after the date a judgment of conviction is entered. In a jury trial, if the jury
is discharged without having returned a verdict, the defendant has 10 days
in which to file the motion, or a shorter time if a new trial is to begin within
the 10 days. Under section (c)(3), a motion for judgment of acquittal may
be made after discharge of the jury, whether or not a motion was made
before submission to the jury. No legitimate interest of the prosecution is
intended to be prejudiced by permitting the court to direct an acquittal on
a post-verdict motion. Under MRAP 4(e), a defendant must file a notice
of appeal within 30 days after the later of the date of the denial of any
motion for a judgment of acquittal or the date of imposition of sentence.
Section (c)(2) recognizes the state's right to appeal in the event a ver-
dict of guilty is returned, but is then set aside by the granting of a judgment
of acquittal. Under the double jeopardy clause, the prosecution may appeal
the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal only if there would be no
necessity for another trial; namely, only where the jury has returned a ver-
dict of guilty. See U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
Thus, the prosecution's right to appeal a Rule 20 motion exists only when
judgment of acquittal is entered after a verdict of guilty is returned. See
also Miss. Code Ann § 99-35-103 (permitting the state to appeal "a judg-
ment actually acquitting the defendant where a question of law has been
decided adversely to the state or municipality; but in such case the appeal
shall not subject the defendant to further prosecution, nor shall the judg-
ment of acquittal be reversed.").
Motions for new trial are covered in Rule 24. Under section (d), a
motion for judgment of acquittal does not give the court power to order a
new trial if the defendant does not wish a new trial and has not asked for
one.
Section (e) is new to Mississippi practice and is based on Ala. R. Crim.
P. 20(f), and tracks Rule 24.3 regarding denial of motions for a new trial by
operation of law. Section (e) promotes finality by providing that a motion
for a judgment of acquittal shall not remain pending in the trial court for
more than 30 days. This Rule thereby addresses the problem of when a
timely post-trial motion is filed but is not decided or is not even noticed for
a hearing. Such a case is then essentially in limbo, as the pending post-trial
motion indefinitely postpones the running of the period for filing a notice
of appeal and indefinitely delays finality in the case. This deadline may be
extended by written agreement of the parties, or court order, to a date
certain within 90 days. Multiple extensions of the deadline, which should
be rare, are nevertheless permitted by section (e).
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RULE 21 - JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Rule 21 - Jury Instructions.
(a) Procedural Instructions. At the commencement of and
during the course of a trial, the court may orally give the
jury cautionary and other instructions of law relating to trial
procedure and the duty and function of the jury, and may
acquaint the jury generally with the nature of the case.
Every oral instruction shall be recorded by the court re-
porter as it is delivered to the jury. All other instructions
shall be in writing.
(b) Substantive Instructions.
(1) By the Parties. At least 24 hours before trial, or at
such other time during the trial as the court directs,
each party must file with the clerk and deliver to all
counsel jury instructions on the forms of verdict and
the substantive law of the case. Except for good cause
shown, the court shall not entertain a request for in-
structions which have not been pre-filed. At the conclu-
sion of testimony, each party must present to the judge
up to 6 pre-filed substantive instructions. The court, for
good cause shown, may allow more than 6 instructions
to be presented.
(2) By the Court. The court may also instruct the jury.
The court's instructions must be in writing and must be
submitted to the parties, who, in accordance with sec-
tion (e) below, must make their specific objections on
the record. The court shall not express an opinion on
the evidence.
(c) Identification.
(1) Caption. All instructions shall be captioned at the
top of the page "Jury Instruction #" in order to allow
the court to number the instructions given in such se-
quence as it deems proper.
(2) Identifying Submitted Instructions. All instructions
submitted shall be identified with letters and numerals
placed in the bottom right corner of each page. The
state's instructions shall be numbered and prefixed with
the letter S. A defendant's instructions shall be num-
bered and prefixed with the letter D. In actions with
multiple defendants, Roman numerals shall be used to
identify the proposed instructions of each defendant;
the Roman numerals shall be placed after the alphabet-
ical designation D, and shall conform to the sequential
listing of defendants as stated in the indictment or com-
plaint. Instructions shall not otherwise be identified
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with a party. The court's written instructions shall be
numbered and prefixed with the letter C. All letters
and numerals identifying an instruction with a party or
the court, as required by this section (c)(2), shall be re-
dacted from the copy of given instructions carried by
the jury into the jury room.
(d) Objections. A party who objects to any portion of the
instructions or to a failure to give a requested instruction
must inform the court on the record of the specific objection
and the grounds for the objection before the instructions are
presented to the jury. An opportunity must be given to ob-
ject out of the jury's hearing. Failure to object in accor-
dance with this Rule precludes appellate review.
(e) Rulings on Instructions. The court shall confer with the
parties and inform them before closing arguments how it in-
tends to rule on the requested instructions. The court shall
mark each request "given" or "refused," and the request
shall thereby become a part of the record.
(f) When Read. Instructions shall be read by the court to
the jury before closing arguments. Instructions will not be
given after closing arguments have begun, except when jus-
tice so requires, in which case all parties shall have an op-
portunity to submit other instructions. All given
instructions shall be available to the parties for use during
closing arguments, and will be carried by the jury into the
jury room when the jury retires to consider its verdict.
Comment
Rule 21 follows the practice established by prior URCCC 3.07 and
Miss. R. Civ. P. 51.
Section (a) incorporates MRCP 51(a) regarding procedural instruc-
tions. It further provides that oral procedural instructions shall be re-
corded by the court reporter as delivered to the jury, and that all other
instructions must be in writing.
Section (b) is based on former URCCC 3.07 and Ariz. R. Crim. P.
21.2. Presumptively, section (b)(1) requires that all substantive instructions
be pre-filed with the court at least 24 hours prior to the commencement of
trial, unless the court directs that instructions be filed at a specified time
during the trial. At the conclusion of testimony, each party must present 6
or fewer pre-filed instructions on the substantive law of the case; for good
cause, the court may enlarge the number of substantive instructions to be
presented. Under section (b)(2), the court retains the authority to issue
written substantive instructions, but may not comment on the evidence.
Section (c) tracks prior URCCC 3.07 and MRCP 51(b)(2). Section (c)
adds to former URCCC 3.07 the requirement that all letters and numerals
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identifying an instruction with a party or the court be redacted from the
copy of the instructions carried to the jury room, to ensure that all of the
court's substantive instructions enjoy equal status with the jury.
Section (d) tracks Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) and clarifies what, if any-
thing, counsel must do to preserve a claim of error regarding an instruction
or failure to instruct. The rule requires a contemporaneous and specific
objection on the record (before the instructions are presented to the jury).
While, read literally, section (d) could be construed to bar any appellate
review absent a timely objection, Rule 21 does not disturb an appellate
court's authority to conduct a limited review under a plain error standard.
Mapp v. State, 162 So.2d 642 (Miss. 1964); Pollard v. State, 932 So.2d 82
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006). See also Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999)
(interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 30). Section (e) facilitates appellate review
of the court's rulings, as well as preparation of closing arguments by
counsel.
Section (f) requires the court to instruct the jury before arguments of
counsel, in order to give the parties an opportunity to argue to the jury in
light of the exact language used by the court. Section (f) does permit the
court, when justice so requires, to instruct the jury both before and after
arguments, which assures that the court retains power to remedy omissions
in pre-argument instructions or to add instructions necessitated by the ar-
guments; in this regard, section (f) gives the court more latitude than for-
mer URCCC 3.07, which permitted post-argument instructions only to
correct "extreme cases of injustice." Section (f) continues the practice
under former URCCC 3.07 in making instructions available to the parties
for use during closing arguments and to the jury in the jury room for use
during deliberations.
RULE 22 - DELIBERATIONS
Rule 22.1 - Retirement of Jurors.
(a) Retirement. After closing arguments, the court may in-
struct the jury on the selection of a foreperson. The jurors
shall then retire in the custody of a court officer and con-
sider their verdict.
(b) Permitting the Jury to Disperse. Except in cases in
which the jury has been sequestered, the court may permit
the jurors to disperse after their deliberations have com-
menced, instructing them when to reassemble, and giving
the admonitions of Rule 18.7.
Comment
Rule 22.1 substantially incorporates Ariz. R. Crim. P. 22.1. Jury se-
questration is governed by Rule 18.7. Section (a) protects jury privacy, as
the judge neither appoints a foreperson nor suggests who the foreperson
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should be. Nothing in these Rules requires automatic sequestration of a
jury during deliberation, but leaves that decision to the discretion of the
court.
Rule 22.2 - Materials used During Deliberation.
Upon retiring for deliberation the jurors shall take with them:
(a) forms of verdict approved by the court, which shall not
indicate in any manner whether the offense described
therein is a felony or misdemeanor unless the statute upon
which the charge is based directs that the jury make this
determination;
(b) a copy of the written instructions;
(c) their notes (if any); and
(d) such tangible evidence and equipment as the court in its
discretion shall direct.
Comment
Rule 22.2 tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 22.2 and incorporates portions of
URCCC 3.10. Section (a) is broad enough to permit the court to provide
either a separate "form of verdict" document or an instruction on the form
of the verdict, or both. Either way, section (a) prohibits any indication on
the verdict form or instruction of the class of the offense. Sections (a)
through (c) are mandatory, and require that all verdict forms, written in-
structions, and any juror notes be taken to the jury room. Only section (d),
regarding tangible evidence and equipment, is discretionary; discretion is
vested in the court to determine whether to permit a jury to take back to
the jury room exhibits which are, for example, contraband, dangerous,
prone to destruction or theft, or excessively voluminous. See Holloway v.
State, 809 So.2d 598 (Miss. 2000); Pettit v. State, 569 So.2d 678 (Miss. 1990).
See also Wood v. State, 275 So.2d 87 (Miss. 1973) (reading Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-17-37 to permit jury to take a copy of the indictment to the jury
room as a "papers read in evidence").
Rule 22.3 - Additional Instructions and Further Review of Evidence.
(a) Additional Instructions. After the jurors have retired to
consider their verdict, if they request additional instructions,
the court may recall them to the courtroom and give appro-
priate additional instructions. The court may also give other
instructions, so as not to give undue prominence to the in-
structions requested. Such instructions may be given only
after the parties have been given notice and an opportunity
to state any objections thereto on the record.
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(b) Further Review of Evidence. After the jurors have re-
tired to consider their verdict, if they desire to have any tes-
timony repeated, the court may recall them to the
courtroom and order the testimony read or played back.
The court may also order other testimony read or played
back, so as not to give undue prominence to the particular
testimony. Such testimony may be read or played back only
after the parties have been given notice and an opportunity
to state any objections thereto on the record.
Comment
Rule 22.3 largely follows Ariz. R. Crim. P. 22.3 and ABA, Standards
for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury § 15-4.3 (2d ed. 1986). This rule covers
the right of the jury to request (usually by way of a note to the judge)
additional instructions or a review of the evidence after deliberations have
begun. Section (a) allows the court to give additional instruction to provide
for cases in which a fundamental error has previously escaped detection.
Additional instructions should not be given if the request concerns matters
not in evidence or questions of law not pertinent to the case, or calls on the
judge to express an opinion on a factual matter. The court may simply
review the original instructions unless they are inadequate. The court may
also go beyond the bare requested additional instruction and repeat other
instructions, if doing so avoids placing undue emphasis on a particular in-
struction. Of course, even without a request, the court may recall the jury
and give additional instructions if doing so is necessary to correct an erro-
neous instruction, to clarify an ambiguous instruction, or to inform the jury
on an overlooked point of law. Section (b) is designed to strike a balance
between the desire to have a jury reach a decision in a fair and prompt
manner and a desire to assist jurors who cannot recall evidence adduced at
trial.
Rule 22.4 - Assisting Jurors at Impasse.
If the court determines that the jury has reached an impasse in its delibera-
tions, the court may, in the presence of counsel, inquire of the jurors to
determine whether and how the court and counsel can assist them in their
deliberative process. After receiving the jurors' response, if any, the judge
may direct that further proceedings occur as appropriate.
Comment
Rule 22.4 largely follows Ariz. R. Crim. P. 22.4 and URCCC 3.10.
Many juries, after reporting to the judge that they have reached an impasse
in their deliberations, are needlessly discharged very soon thereafter and a
mistrial declared when it would be appropriate and might be helpful for the
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judge to offer some assistance in hopes of improving the chances of a ver-
dict. The judge's offer would be designed and intended to address the is-
sues that divide the jurors, if it is legally and practically possible to do so.
The invitation to dialogue should not be coercive, suggestive or unduly
intrusive.
The judge's response to the jurors' report of impasse could take the
following form:
I know that it is possible for honest men and women to have
honest different opinions about the facts of a case, but, if it
is possible to reconcile your differences of opinion and de-
cide this case, then you should do so.
Accordingly, I remind you that the court originally in-
structed you that the verdict of the jury must represent the
considered judgment of each juror. It is your duty as jurors
to consult with one another and to deliberate in view of
reaching agreement if you can do so without violence to
your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case
for yourself, but only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your de-
liberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views
and change your opinion if you are convinced it is errone-
ous, but do not surrender your honest convictions as to the
weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opin-
ion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of re-
turning a verdict. Please continue your deliberations.
Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591 (Miss. 1976) (rejecting the various forms of
the so-called Allen charge, per Allen v. U.S., 154 U.S. 492 (1896)). If the
jury identifies one or more issues that divide them, the court, with the help
of the attorneys, can decide whether and how the issues can be addressed.
Among the obvious options are the following: giving additional instruc-
tions; clarifying earlier instructions; directing the attorneys to make addi-
tional closing argument; reopening the evidence for limited purposes; or a
combination of these measures. Of course, the court might decide that it is
not legally or practically possible to respond to the jury's concerns.
Rule 22.5 - Discharge.
(a) Discharge. The court shall discharge the jurors:
(1) upon expiration of such time as the court deems
proper, if it appears that there is no reasonable
probability that the jurors can agree upon a verdict; or
(2) when a manifest necessity exists for their discharge.
(b) Mistrial Entered. In all cases in which the jury is dis-
charged without a verdict being returned, a mistrial shall be
ordered and the reason therefore given.
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Comment
Rule 22.5 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 22.3, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 22.5, and
is similar in practice to former provisions of URCCC 3.10 and 3.12. The
rule follows the policy established ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice,
Trial by Jury § 5.4(c) (2d ed. 1986). Under section (a)(3), manifest neces-
sity, which can permit retrial despite double jeopardy concerns, may prop-
erly be found to exist based on: the failure of a jury to reach a verdict;
biased jurors; an otherwise tainted jury; improper separation of the jury;
and when jurors demonstrate their unwillingness to abide by the instruc-
tions of the court. See Jenkins v. State, 759 So.2d 1229 (Miss. 2000).
Section (b) continues prior practice under URCCC 3.12 of directing
the court to enter a mistrial when the jury is discharged because there is no
reasonable probability that the jurors can reach a verdict.
RULE 23 - VERDICT
Rule 23.1 - Time and Form of Verdict.
The verdict of the jury shall be unanimous, shall be in writing, and shall be
returned in open court. The verdict need not be signed. The clerk or the
court shall then read the verdict in open court in the presence of the jury.
If neither any party nor the court desires to poll the jury, or when a poll of
the jury reveals the verdict is unanimous, and if the verdict is in the form
required by Rule 23.3, the court shall order the verdict filed and entered of
record. The court shall then discharge the jurors, unless a bifurcated hear-
ing is necessary.
Comment
Rule 23.1 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 23.1 and former provisions of
URCCC 3.10. The Rule requires the verdict be in writing and returned in
open court. Polling the jury is governed by Rule 23.5. See State v. Taylor,
544 So.2d 1387 (Miss. 1989) (suggesting that a trial court take these steps in
receiving a verdict: assemble the jurors in open court and inquire if a ver-
dict has been reached; inquire if the verdict is unanimous; receive the ver-
dict and examine it as to form; have the verdict read in open court; inquire
whether either party desires a poll of the jury; poll the jury, if required;
order the verdict filed.)
Rule 23.2 - Types of Verdict.
(a) General Verdicts. Except as otherwise specified by this
Rule, the jury shall in all cases render a verdict finding the
defendant either guilty or not guilty.
(b) Insanity Verdicts. When the jury determines that a de-




(c) Different Offenses. If the jury is instructed on different
counts, offenses, or degrees of offenses, the verdict shall
specify each count, offense, or degree of which the defen-
dant has been found guilty or not guilty.
(d) Lesser Offense or Attempt. The jury may be instructed
on any of the following:
(1) an offense necessarily included in the offense
charged; or
(2) an attempt to commit the offense charged or an of-
fense necessarily included therein, if such attempt is an
offense.
Comment
Rule 23.2 is generally based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 23.2 and Fed. R. Crim.
P. 31(c), and is consistent with prior provisions of URCCC 3.10. Rule 23.2
specifies the type of verdicts the jury may return. General verdicts are re-
quired by Rule 23.2(a). The general verdict gives the jury discretion over
the disposition of the case which it would not have if restricted to finding
particular facts in special verdicts.
Section (b) provides for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
which is an exception to the general verdict rule; this is a unique verdict
triggering complex post-trial proceedings under Rule 25. Under Rule
17.3(b), not guilty by reason of insanity must be specially raised as a de-
fense to a crime. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-13-7 (insanity) and 99-13-9
(intellectual disability).
Section (c) requires the jury to specify the particular counts and de-
grees of the offense or offenses of which it finds the defendant guilty. These
provisions insure that the verdict will be clear and unambiguous. The jury
shall find the defendant either guilty or not guilty on each count, as re-
quired by section (a).
Section (d) tracks Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c) and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 23.3,
and permits the jury to find the defendant guilty of any offense necessarily
included in the offense charged, including an attempt to commit the offense
if such an attempt is a crime. The rule places the responsibility for deciding
what verdicts the jury may return on the court, restricting the jury to re-
turning verdicts for which forms have been submitted to it under Rule 23.3.
Under Rule 14.2(f), the indictment gives notice to the defendant that the
trial will concern all necessarily included offenses as well as the offense
specified. See Thomas v. State, 48 So.3d 460 (Miss. 2010). Rules 14.2(f) and
23.2(d) make clear that the prosecuting attorney, as well as the defendant,
is entitled to an instruction on any offense set forth in section (d) for which
there is evidentiary support and for which a verdict form is submitted to
the jury.
Section (d) represents a substantial departure from prior Mississippi
law and practice under URCCC 3.10 (which permitted instructions "as to
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related or lesser offenses"). Specifically, a jury may no longer be instructed
on a so-called "lesser related" or "less non-included" offense (a lesser of-
fense which does not meet the criteria for a lesser included offense instruc-
tion). This is consistent with the majority of state jurisdictions and with
federal law. See Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) (federal practice);
State v. Corliss, 721 A.2d 438 (Vt. 1998) (noting majority rule). The Rule
thus returns to the practice that prevailed prior to Griffin v. State, 533 So.2d
444 (Miss. 1988), and its progeny. The inquiry under section (d), whether
all the elements of the lesser offense are also elements of the greater of-
fense, is a more precise and manageable inquiry than whether the lesser
offense arises out of a common nucleus of operative facts. Compare Porter
v. State, 616 So.2d 899 (Miss. 1993) (Hawkins, C.J., specially concurring)
(discussing elements test) with Gangl v. State, 539 So.2d 132 (Miss. 1989)
(deciding whether "lesser offense arises out of a nucleus of operative fact
common with the factual scenario giving rise to the charge laid in the in-
dictment"). See also McDonald v. State, 784 So.2d 261 (Miss. Ct. App.
2001) (Southwick, J., concurring). The approach of section (d) avoids the
difficulties inherent when a defendant seeks to place an uncharged, non-
included offense before the jury, thereby diminishing the prosecuting attor-
ney's traditional and exclusive discretion over charging decisions. Section
(d) also restores symmetry, as both the prosecution and the defense may
seek an instruction on a lesser included offense, while the Constitution for-
bids a prosecuting attorney from receiving an instruction on a lesser of-
fense whose elements are not included in the indictment. See Schmuck v.
U.S., 489 U.S. 705, 718 (1989).
Rule 23.3 - Necessity for Forms of Verdict.
Forms of verdicts shall be submitted to the jury for each offense charged
and, where warranted by the evidence, for all lesser included or attempt
offenses as provided in Rule 23.2(d). The defendant may not be found
guilty of any offense for which no form of verdict has been submitted to the
jury. If the verdict returned is not fully responsive, the court shall direct the
jury to retire for further deliberations. The court may correct or complete
the verdict, as to form merely, in open court in the presence of the parties
and the jury.
Comment
Rule 23.3 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 23.3 and is consistent with prior
provision of URCCC 3.10. This rule permits the jury to find the defendant
guilty of the offense charged; an offense necessarily included in each of-
fense charged; or of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an of-
fense necessarily included therein, if the attempt is an offense. The Rule
places on the court the responsibility of deciding what verdicts the jury may
return, restricting the jury to returning verdicts for which verdict forms
have been submitted to it. The last sentence of the Rule allows the judge
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to correct a verdict that is erroneous in form, in open court in the presence
of the jury.
Rule 23.4 - Partial Verdicts and Mistrial.
(a) Multiple Defendants. If there are multiple defendants,
the jury may return a verdict at any time during its delibera-
tions as to any defendant about whom it has agreed.
(b) Multiple Counts. If the jury cannot agree on all counts
as to any defendant, the jury may return a verdict on those
counts on which it has agreed.
(c) Mistrial. If the jury cannot agree on a verdict on one or
more defendants or counts, the court may declare a mistrial
as to those defendants or counts.
Comment
Rule 23.4 is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(b). The Rule provides that a
jury may return partial verdicts, either as to multiple defendants or multi-
ple counts, or both. Former provisions of URCCC 3.10 permitted partial
verdicts in cases of multiple defendants. Retrial following mistrial on some
counts and acquittal on others does not offend double jeopardy. See Rich-
ardson v. U.S., 468 U.S. 317 (1984). See Blueford v. Arkansas, 2011 Ark. 8
(Ark. 2011), cert. granted, No. 10-1320 (2011) (whether, after a jury dead-
locks on a lesser included offense, double jeopardy bars reprosecution of a
greater offense after a jury announces that it has voted against guilty on the
greater offense).
Rule 23.5 - Jury Poll.
After a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, the court shall
on a party's request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually. If the
poll reveals a lack of unanimity, the court shall direct the jury to retire and
deliberate further.
Comment
Rule 23.5 tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 23.5, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 23.4, Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(d), and former provisions of URCCC 3.10. Rule 23.5 recog-
nized the "undoubted right" of the parties and the court to have the jury
polled. A jury poll is mandatory on the request of either party. Its purpose
is to determine with certainty that "each of the jurors approves of the ver-
dict as returned; that no one has been coerced or induced to sign a verdict
to which he does not fully assent." Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174
U.S. 190, 194 (1899). Failure to poll the jury at the request of the defen-
dant is reversible error. McLarty v. State, 842 So.2d 590 (2003); State v.
Taylor, 544 So.2d 1387 (Miss. 1989) (poll must be conducted before verdict
is filed). The Rule follows ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by
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Jury § 15-4.5 (2d ed. 1986), in requiring the jurors to be polled individually;
the Rule thereby discourages post-trial efforts to challenge the verdict on
allegations of coercion on the part of some of the jurors.
RULE 24 - POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
Rule 24.1 - Motion for a New Trial.
(a) Motion by Defendant; Grounds. The court on written
motion of the defendant may vacate any judgment and
grant a new trial. If the case was tried without a jury, the
court may take additional testimony and enter a new
judgment.
(b) Grounds. The court may grant a new trial for any of the
following reasons:
(1) if required in the interests of justice;
(2) if the verdict is contrary to law or the weight of the
evidence;
(3) when new and material evidence is recently discov-
ered which would probably produce a different result at
a new trial, and such evidence could not have been dis-
covered sooner, by reasonable diligence;
(4) if the jury has received any evidence, papers or doc-
uments, not authorized by the court, or the court has
admitted illegal testimony, or excluded competent and
legal testimony;
(5) if the jurors, after retiring to deliberate on the ver-
dict, separated without leave of court;
(6) if the court has misdirected the jury in a material
matter of law, or has failed to instruct the jury on all
questions of law necessary for their guidance; or
(7) if for any other reason the defendant has not re-
ceived a fair and impartial trial.
(c) Timeliness. A motion for a new trial shall be made
within 10 days after entry of judgment and sentence.
(d) Court's Own Motion. The court may, on its own motion
and with the consent of the defendant and notice to the
prosecuting attorney, order a new trial before the entry of
judgment and sentence.
Comment
Rule 24.1 preserves practice under former URCCC 10.05, with a few
modifications and additions. Section (a) now confirms that the trial judge,
in a case tried without a jury, may take additional testimony and enter a
new judgment. Section (b) clarifies the former rule by explicitly adding
that a new trial may be granted for any reason if the defendant has not
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received a fair and impartial trial. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(2); Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 24.1(c)(5). Section (c) clarifies that the time to make a motion for
a new trial begins to rule after entry of judgment and sentence. Under
section (d), the court may order a new trial before the entry of judgment
and sentence, only with the consent of the defendant and notice to the
prosecuting attorney. Problems of double jeopardy arise when the court
acts on its own motion without the consent of the defendant. See U.S. v.
Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947). Under Miss. R. App. P. 4(e), a defendant must
file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the date of the denial of any
motion for a new trial or the date of imposition of sentence, whichever is
later.
Rule 24.2 - Motion in Arrest of Judgment.
(a) Power of the Court. The court, on written motion of the
defendant or on its own motion, shall arrest judgment if the
charging instrument does not charge an offense, or if the
court was without jurisdiction.
(b) Timeliness. A motion in arrest of judgment shall be filed
within 10 days after entry of judgment and sentence. The
court may act on its own motion in arresting judgment only
during the period in which a motion in arrest of judgment
would be timely.
Comment
Rule 24.2 is modeled on Ala. R. Crim. P. 24.2, is similar to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 34, and essentially continues practice under former URCCC 10.05.
Section (a) makes clear that the court may act either pursuant to a written
motion of the defendant or on its own initiative. The motion may be made
on one of two grounds that traditionally can be raised at any time: that the
charging instrument does not charge an offense, or that the court was with-
out jurisdiction. See Jefferson v. State, 556 So.2d 1016 (Miss. 1989). The
motion in arrest of judgment replaces the former motion to vacate and
dismiss under prior URCCC 10.05.
The deadline established by section (b) tracks the deadline for a mo-
tion for a new trial under Rule 24.1. However, a motion in arrest of judg-
ment (unlike a motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial) does not
toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under MRAP 4(e). Therefore,
when a motion under Rule 24.2 has been filed but not decided at the time
an appeal has been perfected, both trial and appellate courts will have ju-
risdiction of the case; if the trial court then grants the Rule 24.2 motion, the
appeal may be mooted. Cf. Gardner v. State, 547 So.2d 806 (Miss. 1989);
Wilson v. State, 461 So.2d 728 (Miss. 1984). For this reason, jurisdictions
typically provide that a motion in arrest of judgment, as with a motion for
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judgment of acquittal or a new trial, tolls the time for filing a notice of
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(3)(A)(iii); Ala. R. App. P. 4(b)(1).
Rule 24.3 - Denial by Operation of Law.
A motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment pending 30 days after
entry of judgment and sentence shall be deemed denied as of the 30th day.
However, the parties may agree in writing, or the court may order, that the
motion be continued past the 30th day to a date certain within 90 days; any
motion still pending after the date to which it is continued shall be deemed
denied as of that date. The motion may be continued from time to time as
provided in this Rule.
Comment
Rule 24.3, is new to Mississippi practice, and is based on Ala. R. Crim.
P. 24.4, and tracks Rule 20(e), regarding denial of motions for a judgment
of acquittal. The Rule promotes finality by providing that a motion for a
new trial or in arrest of judgment shall not remain pending in the trial court
for more than 30 days. This Rule thereby addresses the problem of when a
timely post-trial motion is filed but is not decided or is not even noticed for
a hearing. Such a case is then essentially in limbo, as the pending post-trial
motion indefinitely postpones the running of the period for filing a notice
of appeal and indefinitely delays finality in the case. This deadline may be
extended by written agreement of the parties, or court order, to a date
certain within 90 days. Multiple extensions of the deadline, which should
be rare, are nonetheless permitted by Rule 24.3.
Rule 24.4 - Clerical and Technical Errors.
After giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may correct a
clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an
error in the record arising from oversight or omission, or correct a sentence
that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.
Comment
Rule 24.4 is based on Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.4,
and is similar to MRCP 60(a). It provides an efficient method for cor-
recting clerical and technical errors appearing in judgments, orders,
sentences, or other parts of the record. See Shinn v. State, 74 So.3d 901
(Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (recognizing authority for correction of scrivener's or
clerical error at any time). A motion to correct simple clerical mistakes
may be made at any time.
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RULE 25 - PROCEDURE AFTER VERDICT OR FINDING OF
NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY
Rule 25 - Procedure after Verdict or Finding of Not Guilty by Reason
of Insanity.
When any person is indicted for an offense and acquitted on the ground of
insanity at the time of the offense charged, and the court certifies that the
person is still insane and dangerous, the court shall:
(a) immediately give notice of the case to the chancellor or
clerk of the chancery court;
(b) order institution of civil proceedings as provided in Miss.
Code Ann. § 41-21-61 to 41-21-107; and
(c) remand the person to custody to await the action of the
chancery court.
Comment
Rule 25 is adapted from Ariz. R. Crim. P. 25. Rule 25 sets forth the
procedures to be followed after a finding or verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity. When a defendant has been found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, the threshold question under Rule 25 is whether the person is still
insane and dangerous. If not, the person is to be released forthwith. If so,
the Rule requires the person to be remanded to custody to await the action
of the chancery court. At the same time, the Rule mandates that the court
give notice to the chancellor or clerk of chancery court, and order that civil
commitment proceedings be instituted. It has been held that it is not a
violation of equal protection to impose different release standards on per-
sons committed after being found not guilty of a criminal offense by reason
of insanity as compared to release standards for persons committed invol-
untarily in civil proceedings, as the prior criminal conduct can be a suffi-
cient legal basis for the different treatment. See U.S. v. Ecker, 479 F.2d
1206 (D.C.Cir.1973). See Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-13-7.
{Reporter's Note: After the committee drafted proposed Rule 25, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-13-7 was substantially amended, in both its procedural
and substantive aspects. The intent of proposed Rule 25 was to track ex-
isting law. Accordingly, the Court may wish to conform the Rule to the
newly amended statute.}
RULE 26 - JUDGMENT
Rule 26.1 - Definitions; Scope.
(a) Judgment. The term "judgment" means the adjudica-
tion of the court based on the verdict of the jury, on the plea
of the defendant, or on its own finding following a non-jury
trial, that the defendant is guilty or not guilty.
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(b) Sentence. The term "sentence" means the pronounce-
ment by the court of the penalty imposed upon the defen-
dant after a judgment of guilty.
(c) Determination of Guilt. The term "determination of
guilt" means a verdict of guilty by a jury, a finding of guilt
by a court following a non-jury trial, or the acceptance by
the court of a plea of guilty or no contest.
(d) Scope. Rule 26 shall not apply to misdemeanor offenses
and shall apply to death penalty cases only to the extent that
the procedure is not otherwise provided by law.
Comment
Rule 26.1 is based in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.1, and consistent with ABA,
Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Procedures and Alternatives (2d
ed. 1986). Rule 26 is intended to create a comprehensive procedure which
will provide the sentencing judge with the information and flexibility neces-
sary for making dispositional decisions which will promote the goals of sen-
tencing and protect the welfare of society. The term "sentence" as defined
in section (b) includes any form of punishment or required action by the
defendant that is ordered by the judge or required by law by virtue of the
conviction, including probation under Rule 27, even when imposition of
sentence must be suspended in order to place a person on probation. A
formal "determination of guilt" under section (c) provides a clear reference
point from which the time limits in this Rule run, and generally facilitates
the operation of Rule 26. Section (d) applies the full sentencing proce-
dures and safeguards to felony cases, but not to misdemeanor offenses and
non-record courts. Section (d) also recognizes that sentencing in death
penalty cases is generally governed by other provisions of law.
Rule 26.2 - Judgment; Time.
(a) On Acquittal. When a defendant is acquitted of any
charge, or of any count of any charge, judgment pertaining
to that count or to that charge shall be pronounced and en-
tered immediately.
(b) On Conviction.
(1) On a determination of guilt on any charge, or on
any count of any charge, judgment pertaining to that
count or to that charge shall be pronounced and en-
tered together with the sentence. Pronouncement of
judgment may be delayed if necessary until such time
as sentence can be pronounced.
(2) On a determination of guilt for any felony offense,
the court shall, after receipt of the presentence report,
unless a presentence report is not required, conduct a
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sentence hearing and pronounce sentence, or shall set a
date for a sentence hearing and pronouncement of
sentence.
(3) Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable
delay.
Comment
Rule 26.2 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.2 and replaces portions of
former URCCC 11.01. Section (a) specifies that judgment must be ren-
dered immediately upon a partial acquittal as well as a full acquittal, in
order to provide grounds for a motion by the defendant to set or reconsider
conditions for release.
When the defendant has been convicted, section (b) follows common
practice of pronouncing judgment at sentencing. Because often there will
be a period of delay between adjudication of guilt and determination of
sentence, pronouncement of judgment of conviction and sentence will be
delayed until sentencing procedures have been completed. As under for-
mer URCCC 11.01, section (b)(3) requires sentence be imposed "without
unreasonable delay."
Rule 26.3 - Presentence Report.
(a) When Available. On written motion of either party, or
on the court's own motion, the court may require a written
report of a presentence investigation in any case in which it
has either discretion over the penalty to be imposed or au-
thority to suspend execution of the sentence. Such report
must be presented to and considered by the court before
imposition of sentence or other disposition.
(b) Content. The presentence report may contain, but is not
limited to, the following information:
(1) a description of the offense and the circumstances
surrounding it, not limited to aspects developed for the
record as part of the determination of guilt;
(2) a statement of the defendant's criminal and juvenile
record, if any;
(3) a statement considering the economic, physical, and
psychological impact of the offense on the victim and
the victim's immediate family;
(4) the defendant's financial condition;
(5) the defendant's educational background;
(6) a description of the defendant's employment back-
ground, including any military record and present em-
ployment status and capabilities;
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(7) the social history of the defendant, including family
relationships, marital status, residence history, and al-
cohol or drug use;
(8) information about environments to which the de-
fendant might return or to which the defendant could
be sent should probation be granted;
(9) information about special resources which might be
available to assist the defendant, such as treatment cen-
ters, rehabilitative programs, or vocational training
centers;
(10) a physical and mental examination of the defen-
dant, if ordered by the court; and
(11) any other information required by the court.
(c) Excluded Content. The report shall not include:
(1) sources of information obtained on a promise of
confidentiality; or
(2) information which would disrupt an existing police
investigation.
(d) Notice of Objections. Before the day of the sentence
hearing, each party shall notify the court and all other par-
ties of any objection it has to the contents of any report.
(e) Special Duty of the Prosecuting Attorney. The prosecut-
ing attorney shall disclose to the defendant any information
within the prosecuting attorney's possession or control, not
already disclosed, which would tend to reduce the punish-
ment to be imposed.
(f) Corrections to Presentence Report. If the court sustains
any objections to the contents of a presentence report, the
court may take such action as it deems appropriate under
the circumstances, including, but not limited to:
(1) excision of objectionable language or sections of the
report;
(2) ordering a new presentence report with specific in-
structions and directions; and
(3) ordering the original (objectionable) presentence
report sealed.
Comment
Rule 26.3 largely follows Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.3 and Ariz. R. Crim. P.
26.8, and governs the availability, contents, and use of presentence investi-
gation reports. The Rule recognizes that a "rational and consistent sentenc-
ing decision cannot be achieved without a reliable information base that
provides the sentencing court with both an accurate and a relative uniform
volume of information." ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures § 18-5.1, Comment (2d ed. 1986). Section (a)
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authorizes, on the court's motion or the motion of any party, a presentence
report in all cases in which the court has discretion over the penalty to be
imposed. While preparation of a presentence report is in the discretion of
the trial court, if a report is prepared it must be presented to, and consid-
ered by, the court before sentencing. See Rule 26.6(a). Generally, a report
should be prepared only after the determination of guilt, so as to avoid,
insofar as possible, placing the defendant in a position of disclosing facts
and versions of the offense that the defendant does not intend to disclose at
trial. In the event that a new trial is ordered or a plea withdrawn after
preparation of the presentence report, neither the report nor any statement
made in connection with its preparation may be introduced at trial. See
Rule 26.5(c)(2); ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alterna-
tives and Procedures § 4.2(b)(ii) (2d ed. 1986).
Section (b) sets forth the information the presentence report should
ordinarily contain and embraces former URCCC 11.02, with two additions.
Section (b)(3) now provides for a statement about the impact of the offense
on the victim and the victim's immediate family. See Ala. R. Crim. P.
26.3(b)(7). Section (b)(7) now provides for the report to include informa-
tion about the defendant's alcohol or drug use.
Section (c) excludes certain content, namely sources of information
obtained on a promise of confidentiality, and information that would dis-
rupt an ongoing police investigation. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(3); Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 26.6(c).
Section (d) though (f) track Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.8. Section (d) re-
quires the parties to notify the court of any objections to the report, prior
to the day of the sentencing hearing. The prosecuting attorney is required
by section (e) to disclose any mitigating information within the prosecuting
attorney's possession or control, which is not already contained in the re-
port. Section (f) authorizes the court to take any necessary corrective mea-
sures, including ordering a new report and sealing an objectionable report.
Rule 26.4 - Diagnostic Evaluation and Mental Health Examination.
At any time before sentence is pronounced, the court may order the defen-
dant to undergo a physical or mental examination, including diagnostic
evaluation. Reports under this Rule shall be due at the same time as the
presentence report, unless the court orders otherwise. The cost of such ex-
amination or evaluation shall be assessed as part of the court costs.
Comment
Rule 26.4 tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.4 and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.5. Rule
26.4 provides the court with the discretion to order mental examinations
after trial in appropriate cases. The purpose of the Rule is to give the sen-
tencing judge as much information as possible about the defendant's
mental, emotional, and physical condition to aid the judge in determining
sentence. The sentencing decision is complex and much is at stake, both to
the defendant and to society. When there are alternatives to incarceration,
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the court should know how best to prescribe a sentence that will not only
punish but will also aid in rehabilitation of the defendant. See ABA, Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 18-5.6
(2d ed. 1986), and Comments thereto. The court is not required to use
resources that are not reasonably available. The court may rely on a com-
petent local physician, a local or regional mental health center, or whatever
other source is available. If the need for a mental health examination or
evaluation is not revealed until after the presentence report is prepared,
the court may delay sentencing after the determination of guilt.
Rule 26.5 - Disclosure of the Presentence, Diagnostic, and Mental
Health Reports.
(a) Disclosure to the Parties. A copy of all presentence, di-
agnostic, and mental health reports shall be furnished to the
prosecuting attorney and the defendant. A portion of any
report not made available to one party shall not be made
available to any other.
(b) Date of Disclosure. Reports ordered under Rules 26.3
and 26.4 shall be made available to the parties at least 2
days before the date set for sentencing.
(c) Disclosure After Sentencing.
(1) After sentencing, all diagnostic, mental health, and
presentence reports shall be furnished to persons hav-
ing direct responsibility for the custody, rehabilitation,
treatment, and release of the defendant.
(2) Neither a presentence report nor any statement
made in connection with its preparation shall be admis-
sible as evidence in any proceeding bearing on the issue
of guilt of the defendant.
(d) No Public Disclosure. Reports prepared under Rules
26.3, 26.4, and 26.5 are not matters of public record, but
shall be filed under seal.
Comment
Rule 26.5 is patterned after Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.5 and Ariz. R. Crim. P.
26.6. Section (a) is based upon ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sen-
tencing Alternatives and Procedures § 18-5.4 (2d ed. 1986). Section (a) not
only permits the parties to inspect the reports, but also provides the parties
copies of the presentence reports and any physical or mental health and
diagnostic reports. Section (b) requires disclosure at least 2 days before the
date set for sentencing. Disclosure to all parties at a reasonable time
before sentencing facilitates resolution of any factual questions raised
about the contents of the report.
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Section (c)(1) provides for disclosure of the presentence, physical or
mental health, and diagnostic reports to certain persons other than the par-
ties. While the basic purpose of these reports is to assist the court in mak-
ing the sentencing decision, the information contained therein will usually
be quite helpful to those persons who will thereafter have responsibility for
the defendant and therefore should be disclosed to them to avoid duplica-
tion of effort. The report should thus be furnished to the department of
corrections and to any public or private agency that is treating the defen-
dant for physical or emotional problems. In order to encourage the defen-
dant to be completely candid with the person preparing the report, section
(c)(2) ensures that, when a defendant is tried after a presentence report has
been prepared, the presentence, physical or mental health or diagnostic re-
ports, and any statement made in connection with their preparation, are
admissible only on the question of the sentence to be imposed.
Section (d) is based on ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentenc-
ing Alternatives and Procedures § 18-5.3 (2d ed. 1986). While there appears
to be no affirmative reason for making the reports public, as section (c)
provides for disclosure to all those who would require the information con-
tained therein, a very substantial possibility of detriment to the defendant
exists. There is no need to thus invade the defendant's privacy by exposing
such information to the public.
Rule 26.6 - Sentence Hearing.
(a) Generally. If the court has either discretion as to the
penalty to be imposed or power to suspend execution of the
sentence, the court shall conduct a sentence hearing in all
felony cases, unless waived by the parties with consent of
the court. The sentence hearing may commence immedi-
ately after a determination of guilt or may be continued to a
later date. If a presentence report is required, the sentence
hearing shall not be conducted until copies thereof have
been furnished or made available to the court and the par-
ties, as provided by Rule 26.5.
(b) Prior Convictions; Enhanced Punishment.
(1) If a hearing is necessary in order to establish an al-
leged prior conviction or convictions in the record, the
court, on its own motion or the motion of either party,
after a determination of guilt, shall hold a hearing.
(2) At a reasonable time before the hearing, the defen-
dant shall be given notice of the prior conviction or
convictions upon which the prosecution intends to
proceed.
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(3) The prosecution must establish the defendant's
prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. If the de-
fendant disputes any conviction presented by the prose-
cution, the court may allow the prosecution to present
additional evidence of the disputed conviction, either
by way of rebuttal or at a future time to be set by the
court. If the prosecution fails to meet its burden of
proof to establish one or more prior convictions, the
defendant shall not be sentenced as an habitual or en-
hanced offender.
(c) Evidence. Other disputed facts shall be determined by
the preponderance of evidence. Evidence may be presented
by both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant as to
any matter that the court deems probative on the issue of
sentence. Such matters may include, but are not limited to:
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's
character, background, mental and physical condition, and
history, the gain derived by the defendant or the loss suf-
fered by the victim as a result of defendant's commission of
the offense, and any other facts in aggravation or in mitiga-
tion of the penalty.
Comment
Rule 26.6 largely follows Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.6. Under section (a),
after conviction the judge holds a hearing (unless waived with consent of
the court) for the purpose of receiving evidence bearing on the length and
terms of the sentence and whether to grant probation, unless the statute
gives no discretion as to either term of sentence or probation. The hearing
may commence immediately after a determination of guilt, or sentencing
may be reserved for a later date; however, if a presentence report has been
ordered, the hearing must await receipt of the report. Under Rule 10.1, the
defendant has the right to be present at the sentencing hearing under Rule
26.6 and at the pronouncement of sentence under Rule 26.7.
When a hearing is necessary to establish a prior conviction in the re-
cord, section (b) provides that, after reasonable notice to the defendant,
the prosecution must prove any disputed prior conviction beyond a reason-
able doubt, or the defendant cannot be sentenced as an habitual or en-
hanced offender. Section (c) provides that disputed facts not governed by
section (b) are determined by the court by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Rule 26.7 - Pronouncement of Judgment and Sentence.
(a) Pronouncement of Judgment. Judgment shall be pro-
nounced in open court. A judgment of conviction shall set
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forth the plea, the verdict, the findings, if any, and the adju-
dication. If the defendant is found not guilty or for any
other reason is entitled to be discharged, judgment shall be
entered accordingly.
(b) Pronouncement of Sentence. In pronouncing sentence,
the court shall:
(1) afford the defendant an opportunity, personally or
through the defendant's attorney, to make a statement
in the defendant's behalf before imposing sentence;
(2) state that a credit will be allowed on the sentence,
as provided by law, for time during which the defen-
dant has been incarcerated on the present charge;
(3) explain to the defendant the terms of the sentence;
(4) inform the defendant as to the defendant's right to
appeal; provided, however, in cases in which the defen-
dant has entered a plea of guilty, the court shall advise
the defendant of the right to appeal only in those cases
in which the defendant:
(A) has entered a plea of guilty, but before enter-
ing the plea of guilty has expressly reserved the
right to appeal with respect to a particular issue or
issues; or
(B) has timely filed a motion to withdraw the plea
of guilty and the motion has been denied, either by
order of the court or by operation of law.
When informing the defendant of the right to appeal, the
court shall also advise the defendant that if the defendant is
indigent as provided in Rule 7.3, counsel will be appointed
to represent the defendant on appeal and that a copy of the
record and the reporter's transcript will be provided at no
cost to the defendant for purposes of appeal to the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court.
Comment
Rule 26.7 is taken from Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.9 (a) and (b) and is consis-
tent with the ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives
and Procedures (2d ed. 1986). Section (a) continues provisions in former
URCCC 11.01 (sentence pronounced in open court in the presence of the
defendant). Section (b)(1) preserves the defendant's right to be present at
sentencing, also recognized by Rule 10.1, unless waived under Rule 10.1(b).
Section (b)(2) follows the ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures § 18-6.6 (2d ed. 1986), and requires the court,
at the time of sentencing, to make sure the record accurately reflects the
time already spent in custody. See § Miss. CODE ANN. 99-19-23. The ex-
planation of the sentence under section (b)(3) should include the terms of
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probation, the length and order of sentences if there are more than one,
and whether the new sentence is to be served concurrently with or consecu-
tively to a sentence that the defendant is then serving. Section (a)(4) re-
quires the court to inform the defendant of the right to appeal. Under
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Appeals 21-2.1(b) (2d ed.
1986), the court imposing sentence assumes the burden of advising the de-
fendant of the right of appellate review and that the right must be exercised
within a specified time. Section (a)(4) also requires the court to advise the
defendant that, in case of indigency, appellate counsel will be appointed,
and that a copy of the record and reporter's transcript will be provided at
no cost for purposes of appeal.
Rule 26.8 - Fine, Restitution, or Other Monetary Obligation following
Adjudication of Guilt.
(a) Method of Payment; Installments. When the defendant
is sentenced to pay a fine, restitution, or other monetary ob-
ligation, the court may permit payment to be made within a
specified period of time or in specified installments. Resti-
tution shall be payable as promptly as possible in light of the
defendant's ability to pay.
(b) Method of Payment; To Whom. Unless the court ex-
pressly directs otherwise:
(1) the payment of a fine, restitution, or other mone-
tary obligation shall be made to the clerk of court; and
(2) monies received from the defendant shall be ap-
plied as follows:
(A) first, to pay any court costs assessed against
the defendant;
(B) second, to pay any restitution the defendant
has been ordered to make;
(C) third, to pay any fines imposed against the de-
fendant; and
(D) fourth, to pay any assignment of the sum made
by the defendant to the defendant's attorney.
The clerk shall, as promptly as practicable, forward restitu-
tion payments to the victim.
(c) Failure to Pay a Fine, Restitution, Other Monetary Obli-
gation, or to Comply with Court Orders; Notice; Time
Limits.
(1) For Defendants Not under the Supervision of the
Court or an Agency. If a defendant fails to pay a fine,
restitution, or other monetary obligation, or is known
by the court to have failed to comply with a term or
condition of sentence within the prescribed time, the
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court shall, within 5 days, notify the prosecuting
attorney.
(2) For Defendants under the Supervision of the Court
or an Agency. If a defendant under the supervision of
the court or an agency fails to pay a fine, restitution, or
other monetary obligation, or is known by the court to
have failed to comply with any other term or condition
of probation within the prescribed time, the court shall
give notice of such failure to the defendant's supervis-
ing officer within the time limits set under sections
(c)(1) and (3).
(3) Time Limits; Restitution and Non-Monetary Obliga-
tions. If the payment or performance of an obligation
does not involve the court, delinquency times shall run
from the date on which the court or the supervising
agency becomes aware of failure to pay or comply.
(d) Court Action upon Failure of Defendant to Pay Fine,
Restitution, or Other Monetary Obligation, or to Comply
with Court Orders. Upon the defendant's failure to pay a
fine, restitution, or other monetary obligation, or failure to
comply with court orders, the court may require the defen-
dant to show cause why said defendant should not be held
in contempt of court and may issue a summons or warrant
for the defendant's arrest, and may:
(1) inquire and cause an investigation to be made into
the reasons for nonpayment, including whether non-
payment was willful or due to indigency;
(2) reduce the obligation to an amount the defendant is
able to pay, or release the defendant from the
obligation;
(3) continue or modify the schedule of payments;
(4) direct the clerk to issue execution for any portion
remaining unpaid;
(5) if the order is a result of a traffic violation, suspend
the defendant's privilege to operate a motor vehicle;
and
(6) direct that the defendant be incarcerated until the
unpaid obligation is paid, subject, however, to section
(e) of this Rule.
(e) Incarceration for Nonpayment of Fine, Restitution, or
other Monetary Obligation.
(1) Incarceration shall not automatically follow the
nonpayment of a fine, restitution, or other monetary
obligation. Incarceration may be employed only after
the court has examined the reasons for nonpayment
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and finds, on the record, that the defendant could have
satisfied payment but refused to do so.
(2) After consideration of the defendant's situation,
means, and conduct with regard to the nonpayment, the
court shall determine the period of any incarceration,
subject to the limitations set forth in Miss. CODE ANN.
H§ 99-19-20 and 99-37-9.
(3) If, at the time the fine, restitution or other monetary
obligation was ordered, a sentence of incarceration was
also imposed, the aggregate of the period of incarcera-
tion imposed pursuant to this rule and the term of the
sentence originally imposed may not exceed the maxi-
mum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense.
Comment
Rule 26.8 is based on Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.12 and replaces former
URCCC 11.04. It is consistent with ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice,
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 12.7 (2d ed. 1986); Model Penal
Code § 301.1(1). Rule 26.8 applies only following an adjudication of guilt,
and therefore has no applicability to pretrial diversion, non-adjudication,
drug court, and the like.
Section (a) tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.12 and mirrors practice under
former URCCC 11.04 and Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-20(1), and recognizes
that not everyone assessed a fine or restitution will be able to make full
payment on the day of assessment.
Section (b) provides that, unless the court expressly orders otherwise,
payments shall be made to the clerk and allocated as provided in section
(b)(2). Section (b) also tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.12(b) in requiring resti-
tution payments be forwarded to the victim as promptly as practicable, as
opposed to accumulating payments before remitting them to the victim.
In the event of a defendant's default on a monetary obligation or non-
compliance with a condition of sentence, section (c) prescribes time limits
and requires notice be made to the prosecuting attorney or the supervising
officer, as the case may be. Section (c)(3) clarifies that, for matters outside
the involvement of the court, delinquency of any obligation is calculated as
beginning when the court or agency has actual notice. Section (d) outlines
the court's authority to inquire into and address non-payment or non-com-
pliance, through contempt and other means, and provides reasonable alter-
natives to automatic incarceration. Nothing in Rule 26.8 precludes, in an
appropriate case, proceeding pursuant to Rule 27.
Section (e) is taken from ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sen-
tencing Alternatives and Procedures 18-7.4(b) (2d ed. 1986). Section (e)
governs incarceration for non-payment, and limits incarceration to in-
stances in which the defendant could have satisfied payment but refused to
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do so. A defendant should not be automatically imprisoned when alterna-
tive methods are available. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (denial of
equal protection to limit punishment to payment of a fine for those who are
able to pay, but to convert the fine to imprisonment for those who are
unable to pay); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983). Section
(e)(3) follows Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), which forbids im-
prisonment of an indigent defendant for non-payment beyond the maxi-
mum sentence authorized for the offense. See Rule 27.6(f)(3) (revocation
of probation for non-payment).
Rule 26.9 - Consecutive or Concurrent Sentences.
Unless otherwise prohibited by law, the court may direct that the sentence
being imposed will be served concurrently with or consecutively to any
other sentence previously or simultaneously imposed upon the defendant
by any court of the State of Mississippi. When sentencing orders are silent,
sentences shall run concurrently. A court shall not, however, order a de-
fendant's sentence to run concurrently with a sentence imposed by a court
of any foreign jurisdiction until having first determined which court has
primary jurisdiction over the defendant and will accept custody of the de-
fendant for service of the defendant's sentence.
Comment
Rule 26.9 is based generally on Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.12, Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 26.13, and Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-21. The Rule is intended to encom-
pass multiple charges arising from the same criminal episode, unrelated of-
fenses for which sentence is imposed at one time, and a sentence imposed
while the defendant is serving a sentence in Mississippi or elsewhere for
another offense.
Unless the sentence order specifies otherwise, sentences shall run con-
currently. See Rule 26.11. However, Rule 26.9 provides that, before a sen-
tence may run concurrently with a sentence imposed by a federal court or a
court of another state, the court must first determine which court will exer-
cise primary jurisdiction and accept custody of the defendant. Cf Bell v.
State, 759 So.2d 1111 (Miss. 1999) (concurrent federal and Mississippi
sentences); Haynes v. State, 944 So.2d 121 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (Missis-
sippi sentence concurrent with sentence of another state).
Rule 26.10 - Re-Sentencing.
Where a judgment or sentence, or both, have been set aside by a post-trial
motion, an appeal, or by collateral attack, the court may not impose a sen-
tence for the same offense, or a different offense based on the same con-
duct, which is more severe than the prior sentence unless: (1) it concludes,
on the basis of evidence concerning conduct by the defendant occurring
after the original sentencing proceeding, that the prior sentence is inappro-
priate, or (2) the original sentence was unlawful and on remand it is cor-
rected and a lawful sentence imposed, or (3) other circumstances exist
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under which there is no reasonable likelihood that the increase in the sen-
tence is the product of actual vindictiveness by the sentencing judge.
Comment
Rule 26.10 is based on Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.14. The Rule reflects Con-
stitutional limits on re-sentencing following a successful appeal. See Ala-
bama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Whenever a judge imposes a more
severe sentence of a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for a more
severe sentence, such as an intervening conviction, must "affirmatively ap-
pear." Wasman v. U.S., 468 U.S. 559 (1984); North Carolina v. Pierce, 395
U.S. 711 (1969) (resentencing after successful appeal); Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21 (1974) (felony indictment after appeal de novo of misdemeanor
conviction).
Rule 26.11 - Entry of Judgment of Conviction and Sentence; Warrant of
Authority to Execute Sentence.
(a) Entry of Judgment and Sentence. The judgment of con-
viction and the sentence thereon are presumptively com-
plete and valid as of the time of their oral pronouncement in
open court.
(b) Warrant of Authority. The clerk shall forthwith enter the
exact terms of the judgment and sentence in the court's min-
utes. A certified copy, signed by the sentencing judge, shall
be furnished to the appropriate officer or agency and no
other authority shall be necessary to carry into execution
any sentence entered therein.
If the sentence is for death or imprisonment, the appropri-
ate officer or agency shall receive the defendant for execu-
tion of the sentence upon delivery of a signed, certified copy
of the judgment of conviction and sentence.
Comment
Rule 26.11 is based on Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.16. Rule 26.11 applies only
to a judgment of conviction; Rule 26.2(a) governs judgment of acquittal.
Section (a) provides that a judgment of conviction and sentence are
presumptively complete and valid on oral pronouncement. Rule 26.1(b)
defines sentence as "pronouncement by the court" of the penalty following
a judgment of conviction. Rule 26.7 requires pronouncement of judgment
and sentence both be made in open court, and Rule 26.2(b) provides that a
judgment of conviction shall be "pronounced and entered" together with
the sentence.
Generally, time for taking further action under these Rules is the entry
of judgment (Rule 20(c) for a motion for judgment of acquittal) or entry of
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judgment and sentence (Rule 24.1(c) for a motion for a new trial and rule
24.3(b) for a motion in arrest of judgment).
Difficulty can arise when the oral pronouncement and written sen-
tence differ. Section (a) embraces the majority rule that, presumptively, the
oral pronouncement governs. See U.S. v. De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d 594,
601 (5th Cir. 2000). This represents a change from existing practice. See
Temple v. State, 671 So.2d 58 (Miss. 1996). Ambiguity between the two
sentences, as opposed to true conflict, can be resolved by examination of
the entire record, to determine the sentencing court's true intent. See U.S.
v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61 (2d
Cir. 1999) (written judgment simply clarified meaning of true sentence);
Boutwell v. State, 847 So.2d 294 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Section (b) requires the clerk to enter "forthwith" the exact terms of
the judgment and sentence in the court's minutes. This is consistent with
former URCCC 11.01 (which speaks of recording the judgment and sen-
tence in the minutes of the court). This is a slightly different frame of ref-
erence from the Comment to MRAP 4(e), which speaks of entry of
judgment by reference to the general docket, rather than the minutes of the
court.
Section (b) further provides that a signed and certified copy be fur-
nished to the appropriate entity for execution of the sentence, and that on
receipt the appropriate officer or agency shall take custody of the defen-
dant for execution of a sentence of imprisonment or death.
RULE 27 - PROBATION
Rule 27.1 - Granting Probation.
To the extent the sentencing court is given authority to suspend execution
of sentence and to place an offender on probation, the court may impose
such conditions and regulations as will promote the offender's rehabilita-
tion and protect the public. Community service may be required. The su-
pervising officer shall issue instructions consistent with the conditions and
regulations imposed by the court and necessary for their implementation.
All conditions of probation must be incorporated into a court's written or-
der, and a copy thereof must be given to the offender. In addition, the
court or supervising officer shall explain to the offender the purpose and
scope of the imposed conditions and regulations and the consequence of
violating those conditions and regulations.
Comment
Rule 27.1 is patterned after Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.1. Section (a) is based
on ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Proce-
dures § 18-2.3(c) (2d ed. 1986). Rule series 27 governs probation and, by
the terms of Rule 27.7, termination of post-release supervision or imposi-
tion of a previously suspended sentence. Rule 27.1 is not intended to con-
fer upon the court the power to grant probation - that power is determined
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by statute - but only prescribes the procedure for granting probation in
those cases where the court has lawful authority to do so. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 47-7-33 (granting circuit and county courts the authority to suspend
sentence and impose probation in most cases). Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-35
gives the court broad authority initially to determine the conditions of pro-
bation to be imposed. Conditions of probation are not to be established by
the supervising officer. However, the officer is vested with the authority to
provide instructions consistent with court-imposed conditions in an effort
to clarify or to expand upon general conditions and to assist in the guidance
of the probationer. See ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures § 18-2.3, Comments (2d ed. 1986). Rule 27.1 is
designed to reinforce the probationer's understanding of this new status
and the expectations of the court. Conditions imposed on the probationer
should reflect the correctional as opposed to the punishment goals of pro-
bation. Providing the probationer with both a written copy of imposed
conditions and regulations, and an explanation thereof, should aid proba-
tioner's understanding and compliance. Rule 27.1 should alleviate super-
visory burdens by eliminating some unnecessary violations claimed to be
caused by the probationer's lack of understanding.
Rule 27.2 - Modification and Clarification of Conditions and
Regulations.
The sentencing court, with or without a hearing, may modify or clarify any
condition or regulation imposed by it and any instructions issued by a su-
pervising officer. A supervising officer may modify or clarify any instruc-
tions which the officer has issued. An offender or supervising officer, at any
time before absolute discharge, may request the sentencing court to modify
or to clarify any condition or regulation. The sentencing court may, where
appropriate, hold a hearing. A written copy of any order of modification or
clarification shall be given to the offender, following which the offender
shall have 10 days to request a hearing.
Comment
Rule 27.2 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.2. In providing a method for
the modification and clarification of probation conditions, the Rule pro-
tects the probationer from arbitrary or unsupported changes by giving the
probationer the right to request an explanation of standards which the
court expects the probationer to meet. This right, in effect, balances the
court's right to modify any condition of probation that it has legally im-
posed. Rule 27.2 also provides a formal means, short of violation and revo-
cation proceedings, for the probationer to have ambiguous conditions or
regulation clarified, and to provide a means for invoking the authority of
the court when the probationer seems to be slipping toward revocation
without risking the ultimate sanction. See ABA, Standards for Criminal
Justice, Probation §3.3 (Approved Draft, 1970); ABA, Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 18-7.3 (2d ed. 1986).
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Rule 27.3 - Extension of Term of Probation; Termination; Order of
Discharge.
(a) Extension of Term. At any time during a term of proba-
tion the court, for good cause shown, may extend the term
of probation up to the maximum period permitted by law.
(b) Early Termination. At any time during a term of proba-
tion and after notice to the prosecuting attorney, the sen-
tencing court may, on motion of the offender, the
supervising officer, or the court's own motion, terminate
probation and discharge the offender absolutely.
(c) Termination on Completion of Term. Probation termi-
nates automatically on successful completion of the term of
probation set by the court.
(d) Order of Discharge. On completion or early termination
of a term of probation, the court shall order the offender to
be discharged absolutely, and the clerk of the court, upon
request, shall furnish the offender with a certified copy of
the order of discharge.
Comment
Rule 27.3 tracks Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.3. Section (a) recognizes the au-
thority of the court, on a showing of good cause, to extend the term of
probation to the lawful maximum. See Miss. CODE ANN. 47-7-37 (proba-
tion may be extended up to 5 years). Section (b) allows for early termina-
tion, on notice to the prosecuting attorney. The probationer who completes
the full probation period under section (c) receives the benefits of an order
of discharge, as provided by section (d). Such an order serves as a formal
record of the probationer's freedom should any questions arise after
discharge.
Rule 27.4 - Initiation of Revocation Proceedings; Securing the Offender's
Presence; Arrest.
(a) Initiation of Revocation Proceedings.
(1) Petition by Supervising Officer or Prosecuting Attor-
ney. If there is reasonable cause to believe that the of-
fender has violated a condition or a regulation of
probation or has acted contrary to the instructions is-
sued by the supervising officer, the supervising officer
or the prosecuting attorney may petition the sentencing
court to revoke probation.
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(2) Initiation by the Court. The sentencing court, on its
own motion, may initiate proceedings to revoke proba-
tion by an order to show cause specifying the alleged
violation of conditions, regulations, or instructions.
(b) Securing the Offender's Presence. Pursuant to a petition
to revoke or an order to show cause, the sentencing court
may, when appropriate, issue a warrant for the offender's
arrest or issue a summons directing the offender to appear
on a specified date for a revocation hearing.
(c) Arrest by Supervising Officer. The offender may be ar-
rested without a warrant by the supervising officer responsi-
ble for the offender's supervision or by the officer's agent
for violation of a condition of probation or regulation im-
posed or instructions issued.
Comment
Rule 27.4 is taken from Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.4. Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-
7-37 provides that any supervising officer, police officer, or other officer
with the power of arrest may arrest the probationer without a warrant, if
such arresting officer has been provided with a written statement of the
supervising officer that probationer has violated the conditions of proba-
tion. Section (a) provides a mechanism for probation revocation that per-
mits initiation of the proceeding by the court or by the supervising officer
or by the prosecuting attorney. The court may issue an arrest warrant or a
summons to compel the probationer's appearance or, if necessary, the su-
pervising officer may take the probationer into custody. See Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Rule 27.5 - Initial Appearance After Arrest.
When an offender is arrested pursuant to Rule 27.4(b) or Rule 27.4(c), the
supervising officer shall be notified immediately (unless the officer made
the arrest), and the offender shall be taken without unnecessary delay
before a court or agency authorized by law, who shall:
(a) inform the offender of the alleged violation and furnish
the offender with a written copy thereof;
(b) inform the offender that any statement the offender
makes before the hearing may be used against the offender;
(c) advise the offender of the right to request counsel, and
to have counsel appointed if the offender is indigent and the
requirements of Rule 27.6(d) are met;
(d) set the date of the revocation hearing, if not set previ-
ously; and
(e) determine whether the offender is to be released pend-




Rule 27.5 is taken from Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.5(a). Rule 27.5 supple-
ments the release provisions of Rule 8, and grants the court discretion to
release an offender or order the offender held without bond. This Rule
embraces the requirements set forth in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973).
Rule 27.6 - Revocation of Probation.
(a) Hearing. A hearing to determine whether probation
should be revoked shall be held before the sentencing court
within a reasonable time after the offender's initial appear-
ance under Rule 27.5.
(b) Summary Disposition. The offender may waive the hear-
ing under Rule 27.6(a) and the sentencing court may make a
final disposition of the issue, if:
(1) the offender has been given sufficient prior notice
of the charges and sufficient notice of the evidence to
be relied upon; and
(2) the offender admits, under the requirements of
Rule 27.6(d), commission of the alleged violation.
(c) Presence. The offender is entitled to be present at the
hearing.
(d) Counsel.
(1) The offender may be represented by retained
counsel.
(2) Presumptively, counsel should be appointed to re-
present an indigent offender if the offender makes a
timely and colorable claim that:
(A) the offender has not committed the alleged vi-
olation of the conditions or regulations of proba-
tion or the instructions issued by the supervising
officer; or
(B) even when the violation is a matter of public
record or is uncontested, there are substantial rea-
sons that justify or mitigate the violation and make
revocation inappropriate, and those reasons are
complex or otherwise difficult to develop or
present.
(e) Admissions by the Offender. Before accepting an admis-
sion by an offender that the offender has violated a condi-
tion or regulation of probation or an instruction issued by
the supervising officer, the court shall determine that the
offender understands the following:
(1) the nature of the violation to which an admission is
offered;
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(2) the right to be represented by counsel as provided
by Rule 27.6(d);
(3) the right to testify and to present witnesses and
other evidence on the offender's own behalf and to
cross-examine adverse witnesses under subsection
(f)(1); and
(4) that, if the alleged violation involves a criminal of-
fense for which the offender has not yet been tried, the
offender may still be tried for that offense, and al-
though the offender may not be required to testify, that
any statement made by the offender at the present pro-
ceeding may be used against the offender at a subse-
quent proceeding or trial.
The court shall also determine that the offender waives
these rights, that the admission is voluntary and not the re-
sult of force, threats, coercion, or promises, and that there is
a factual basis for the admission.
(f) Nature of the Hearing.
(1) The judge must be reasonably satisfied from the evi-
dence that a violation of the conditions or regulations
of probation or the instructions occurred. Each party
shall have the right to present evidence and the right to
confront and to cross-examine adverse witnesses who
appear and testify in person. The court may receive any
reliable, relevant evidence not legally privileged, in-
cluding hearsay.
(2) If the alleged violation involves a criminal offense
for which the offender has not yet been tried, the of-
fender shall be advised at the beginning of the revoca-
tion hearing that, regardless of the outcome of the
revocation hearing, the offender may still be held for
that offense and that any statement made by the of-
fender at the hearing may be used against the offender
at a subsequent proceeding or trial.
(3) In cases involving breach of a condition of proba-
tion because of nonpayment of a fine, restitution, or
other monetary obligation, incarceration shall not auto-
matically follow nonpayment. Incarceration may be
employed only after the court has examined the rea-
sons for nonpayment and finds, on the record, that the
offender could have satisfied payment but refused to do
SO.
(g) Disposition. If the court finds that a violation of the con-
ditions or regulations of probation or instructions occurred,
it may revoke, modify, or continue probation.
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(h) Record. The judge shall make a written statement or
state for the record the evidence relied upon and the rea-
sons for revoking probation.
Comment
Rule 27.6 is adapted from Ala. R. Crim. P. 27.6. and is drafted to com-
ply with the Constitutional requirements articulated in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973). Rules 27.5 and 27.6 together set up a two-hearing
process specifically required by Gagnon. Rule 27.5 provides for an initial
appearance before the judge who issued the warrant for the probationer's
arrest, if the probationer is arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, or, if the
probationer is arrested without a warrant, before a court or agency author-
ized by law. Rule 27.6(a) then provides for the revocation hearing itself.
Section (c) provides the offender's unqualified right to be present at the
hearing.
Section (b) allows the probationer to waive a revocation hearing
within carefully defined limits. Two hearings are not necessary if at the first
hearing the probationer has received such sufficient notice of the charges
and of the evidence of probation violation, and if the offender admits com-
mission of the violation alleged consistent with section (e).
Section (d) provides a probationer may be represented by retained
counsel. The right to appointed counsel for indigents is restricted to a case-
by-case due process approach. Certain minimal guidelines were set forth,
and section (d) tracks the language of the Gagnon decision. See Riely v.
State, 562 So.2d 1206 (Miss. 1990). See also Edwards v. Booker, 796 So.2d
991 (2001).
The procedure for accepting an admission under section (e) applies at
either the initial appearance or the revocation hearing. If there is no ad-
mission, the hearing is conducted pursuant to section (f). Section (f) is de-
signed to prevent arbitrary actions by supervising officers seeking the aid of
the court in revoking probation and to ensure compliance by probationer
with regulations or conditions of probation or instructions pursuant to
Rules 27.1 and 27.2.
Section (f) recognizes that a formal trial is not required, and that the
court is not bound by the strict rules of evidence. Specific time limits are
not imposed under this Rule. The probationer may request either an accel-
eration or postponement of the hearing date, depending on the particular
circumstances. However, it is contemplated that a hearing will be held as
soon as feasible and that a probationer will not be subjected to lengthy or
unwarranted confinement prior to hearing. Section (f)(3) recognizes the
Constitutional limits on revocation of probation for non-payment. As the
Court explained in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983):
[I]n revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or resti-
tution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for
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the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay
or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to ac-
quire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation
and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the au-
thorized range of its sentencing authority. If the probationer
could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire
the resources to do so, the court must consider alternate
measures of punishment other than imprisonment.
Section (h) is included to give a reviewing court a basis for evaluating
the revocation hearing and decision. Gagnon requires that a written state-
ment be made as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking
probation. A written judgment entry would constitute a sufficient written
statement.
Rule 27.7 - Other Proceedings.
The following proceedings shall also be conducted in accordance with this
Rule 27:
(a) to terminate a period of post-release supervision and re-
commit the offender; and
(b) to impose any other previously suspended sentence.
Comment
Rule 27.7 extends the operation of Rule 27 to termination of post-
release supervision and imposition of any other previously suspended sen-
tence. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 47-7-34, 47-7-35, and 47-7-37 (post-release
supervision); Johnson v. State, 925 So.2d 86 (Miss. 2006) (discussing imposi-
tion of suspended sentences).
RULE 28 - RETENTION OF RECORDS AND EVIDENCE
The clerk of the court shall receive and maintain all papers, documents,
and records filed and all evidence admitted in criminal cases. All records
and evidence of the proceedings shall be retained according to law.
Comment
Rule 28 is based on Ariz. R. Crim. P. 28.1(a). The Rule defines the
basic duties of the clerk of court in criminal cases. On the retention of
records as required by law, see Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-7-128.
182 [VOL. 31:1
MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RULE 29 - APPEALS FROM JUSTICE OR MUNICIPAL COURT
Rule 29.1 - Notice of Appeal; Filing; Contents.
(a) Notice of Appeal. Any person convicted of an offense in
a justice or municipal court, including a person convicted
upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, may perfect an ap-
peal to county court or, if no county court has jurisdiction,
then to circuit court, by filing a written notice of appeal.
(b) Filing; Time. The notice of appeal shall be filed with the
clerk of the circuit court within 30 days from the entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(c) Contents. The notice of appeal shall specify:
(1) the party or parties taking the appeal;
(2) the current residence address and the current mail-
ing address, if different, of each party taking the appeal;
(3) the judgment or order from which the appeal is
taken; and
(4) that the appeal is taken for a trial de novo.
(d) Defects in the Notice of Appeal; Dismissal. If the de-
fendant fails to comply substantially with the requirements
of this Rule as to content of the notice of appeal, the county
or circuit court, on its own motion or on motion of a party,
may order the notice amended. If a defendant fails to
amend the notice as required by the court, the court may
dismiss the appeal with prejudice and with costs. The
county or circuit court shall promptly notify the lower court
of any such dismissal.
Comment
Rule 29.1 essentially carries forward practice under former URCCC
12.02, with a few modifications. Section (a) provides explicitly that an ap-
peal may be taken from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and, impor-
tantly, that an appeal is perfected by the timely filing of a notice of appeal.
Prior practice conditioned perfection on the additional requirement of
posting the necessary bonds. See former URCCC 12.02(A)(1) ("The clerk
of the court shall not accept, file and docket the written notice of appeal
without the accompanying cost bond and appearance bond or cash deposit,
unless the court has allowed the defendant to proceed in forma pauperis.")
While Rules 29.2 and 29.3 still mandate a cost deposit or bond and an ap-
pearance bond, neither is a condition for perfecting an appeal. Rule 29
therefore conforms to common practice and clarifies that, after the filing of
the notice of appeal, jurisdiction over the case is vested in the county or
circuit court. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-1 (right to appeal justice or
municipal court conviction to county or circuit court).
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Section (b) requires the notice of appeal to be filed with the clerk of
the circuit court within 30 days of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. See Murray v. State, 870 So.2d 1182 (Miss. 2004) (holding the 30 day
deadline governs over conflicting statute). Under section (b), and unlike
Miss. R. App. P. 4(e), pending post-trial motions do not extend the time for
taking an appeal; nor is the time for filing a notice of appeal extended if the
lower court judge stays execution of the judgment. Section (d) changes
prior practice by providing that a defendant whose notice of appeal fails to
comply substantially with the requirements of section (c) must first be
given an opportunity to amend the notice before the appeal is dismissed.
Section (d) further requires the lower court be promptly notified of any
such dismissal, so that execution of its judgment may proceed. Dismissal of
a defectively noticed appeal, while "with prejudice" as to that notice of
appeal, does not necessarily preclude the filing of a subsequent timely and
complete notice of appeal.
Rule 29.2 - Record; Costs.
(a) Record. Upon receiving the notice of appeal and upon
defendant's compliance with Rule 29.2(b), the clerk of the
circuit court shall promptly notify the lower court and the
appropriate prosecuting attorney. Within 10 days after re-
ceipt of such notice, the judge or clerk of the lower court
shall deliver to the clerk of the circuit court a certified copy
of the record and all original papers in the case. If, after
such notice to the lower court and appropriate prosecuting
attorney, the judge or clerk of the lower court fails to trans-
mit the records to the clerk of the circuit court within the
time prescribed, the prosecution thereof shall be deemed
abandoned and the defendant shall stand discharged, with
prejudice, and any bond shall be automatically terminated.
(b) Bonds.
(1) Cost Deposit or Bond. Simultaneously with the no-
tice of appeal, a defendant shall post with the circuit
clerk a cash deposit, or surety bond approved by the
circuit clerk, for all estimated court costs incurred both
in the appellate and lower courts (including but not
limited to unpaid fees, court costs, and amounts im-
posed pursuant to statute). The amount of such cash
deposit or bond shall be determined by the clerk of the
circuit court in an amount of not less than $100 nor
more than $2,500. Posting the cash deposit or bond
shall stay the imposition of the judgment imposed by
the lower court as it relates to fees, court costs, and
amounts imposed pursuant to statute. Upon forfeiture,
184 [VOL. 31:1
MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
the costs of lower court shall be recovered after the
costs of the appellate court.
(2) Appeals without Prepayment of Fees or Costs. A
defendant who desires to proceed without payment of a
cash deposit or cost bond shall:
(A) file in the county or circuit court a motion for
leave to so proceed; and
(B) if the defendant desires to proceed on appeal
in forma pauperis, complete under oath an affida-
vit concerning that defendant's financial resources,
on a form approved by the court. The defendant
may be examined under oath regarding the defen-
dant's financial resources by the county or circuit
judge; the defendant shall, before said questioning,
be advised of the penalties for perjury as provided
by law.
If the motion is granted, the defendant may so proceed
without prepayment of fees or costs in either court.
(3) Dismissal for Noncompliance. A defendant's fail-
ure to comply with this Rule 29.2(b) shall be grounds
for the county or circuit court, on its own motion or on
motion of a party, to dismiss the appeal with prejudice
and with costs. The county or circuit court shall
promptly notify the lower court of any such dismissal.
Comment
Rule 29.2 replaces and amends practice under former URCCC 12.02.
Section (a) governs transmission of the record. The judge or clerk of the
lower court is required to transmit a certified copy of the record and all
original papers, within 10 days after receipt of notice from the circuit court
clerk that the defendant has properly taken an appeal. Failure to transmit
the record within the prescribed time results in the prosecution being
"deemed abandoned and the defendant ... discharged." The notice by the
circuit court clerk that the defendant has properly taken an appeal is trig-
gered by the concurrence of two events: the filing of the notice of appeal,
and compliance with the cost bond or cash deposit required by section (b).
Importantly, the notice from the circuit court clerk is directed both to the
lower court and to the attorney who prosecuted the case in the lower court;
this guards against abandonment of the prosecution and discharge of the
defendant without adequate notice to the prosecuting attorney.
Section (b)(1), as did former URCCC 12.02, requires the defendant to
post a cost deposit or bond along with the notice of appeal, before the
record is prepared and transmitted and the appeal can proceed. See Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-35-1 (requiring cost bond). Unlike prior practice, the
clerk of the circuit court, not the judge of the lower court, sets the amount
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of the deposit or bond within the range provided by section (b)(1); this is
consistent with the provisions of section (a) that vest jurisdiction over the
case in the appellate court upon the filing of the notice of appeal. The
purpose of the cost bond is to cover all estimated court costs, broadly de-
fined, in both the trial and appellate court. As before, posting the deposit
or bond stays execution of the judgment imposed by the lower court as it
relates to fees, court costs, and amounts imposed pursuant to statute. Sec-
tion (b)(2) sets forth a procedure for defendants who desire to proceed
without prepayment of costs or fees (on the basis of hardship or otherwise),
including defendants who desire to proceed in forma pauperis. Section
(b)(3) provides that failure to comply with section (b) is grounds for dis-
missal of the appeal with prejudice and costs. Section (b)(3) further pro-
vides that the lower court be promptly notified of the dismissal, so that
execution of the judgment may proceed.
Rule 29.3 - Appearance Bonds.
(a) Appearance Bond. If the defendant has been ordered
incarcerated, the justice or municipal court may require the
defendant to post an appearance bond in accordance with
Rule 8 to assure the appearance of the defendant before the
county or circuit court. An appearance bond originally
posted with the justice or municipal court to assure the ap-
pearance of the defendant before that court shall serve to
assure the appearance of the defendant before the county or
circuit court on appeal. The approval and filing of the ap-
pearance bond shall stay the imposition of the judgment of
incarceration imposed by the justice or municipal court.
The clerk of the justice or municipal court shall transmit any
appearance bond to the circuit clerk.
(b) No Appearance Bond. The failure of the defendant to
post an appearance bond shall not prevent the county or
circuit court from acquiring jurisdiction of the appeal. After
acquiring jurisdiction of the appeal, the county or circuit
court may modify the appearance bond. If the defendant
remains in custody, the case shall be set for trial at the earli-
est practicable time.
(c) Failure to Appear. If the defendant fails to appear at the
time and place set by the court, the county or circuit court
may dismiss the appeal with prejudice and with costs, and
order forfeiture of the appearance bond. The county or cir-
cuit court shall promptly notify the lower court of any such
dismissal.
(d) Time in Custody Credited. All time the defendant has
been in custody on the present charge shall be credited




Rule 29.3 supplants former URCCC 12.02(B)(1). Section (a) permits
the lower court to require a defendant who has been sentenced to incarcer-
ation to post an appearance bond in accordance with Rule 8 to assure the
defendant's appearance before the county or circuit court. The filing and
approval of an appearance bond stays imposition of the sentence of incar-
ceration. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-3 (providing for appearance
bonds). Under section (a), if the defendant has previously posted a bond
to assure appearance before the lower court, that appearance bond is con-
tinued automatically and presumptively suffices to assure the defendant's
appearance in county or circuit court.
Section (b) confirms that failure to post an appearance bond does not
divest the county or circuit court of the jurisdiction it acquired upon the
filing of the notice of appeal under Rule 29.1(a), and grants the county or
circuit court the authority to modify a previously set appearance bond. If a
defendant remains in custody pending an appeal, section (b) requires trial
to be set at the earliest practicable time.
Sections (c) continues prior practice and adds that the lower court be
promptly notified of any dismissal, so that execution of the judgment may
proceed. Section (d), as before, states that a defendant's sentence include
credit for time already spent in custody on the present charge. See rule
26.7(b)(2) and Rule 30.2.
29.4 - Proceedings.
The appeal shall be a trial de novo. In appeals from justice or municipal
court when the maximum possible sentence is 6 months or less, the case
may be tried without a jury at the court's discretion.
Comment
Rule 29.4 provides for a trial de novo, consistent with former URCCC
12.02(C) and Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-1. As under Rule 18.1(a)(2), a jury
trial is discretionary if a defendant's maximum possible sentence is 6
months or less. See Hinton v. State, 222 So.2d 690 (Miss. 1969). Appeal of a
conviction in county court is governed by Rule 30. Appeal of a conviction
in circuit court is governed by Rule 31.
RULE 30 - APPEALS FROM COUNTY COURT
Rule 30.1 - Notice and Filing.
Any person adjudged guilty of a criminal offense by a county court, where
the case was not a felony action transferred to that court from circuit court,
may appeal to the circuit court having jurisdiction by filing written notice
with the clerk of the county court within 30 days of the entry of judgment
and sentence. The clerk, upon receiving written notice of appeal, shall im-
mediately send notice to the prosecuting attorney.
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Thereafter, appeals shall proceed as if in the Supreme Court and in accor-
dance with the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. If a new trial is
granted, the cause shall be remanded to the docket of the circuit court and
a new trial held therein de novo.
Comment
Rule 30.1 largely continues practice under former URCCC 12.03. Es-
sentially, a defendant may appeal a conviction in county court to the circuit
court that has jurisdiction by filing a written notice of appeal with the clerk
of the county court within 30 days after entry of judgment and sentence.
See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-79. This includes both cases that originated
in county court, and cases appealed to county court from justice or munici-
pal court under Rule 29.1(a). Once the notice of appeal is filed, the case
proceeds according to the MRAP. Appeal of a conviction in circuit court is
to the Mississippi Supreme Court or Court of Appeals of the State of Mis-
sissippi under Rule 31, whether the case originated in county court, or in
justice or municipal court. See Jones v. City of Ridgeland, 48 So.3d 530
(Miss. 2009) (interpreting Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-81).
Rule 30.1 does not apply to felony cases transferred by a circuit court
to a county court for disposition. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-9-27. Trans-
ferred cases may be appealed directly to the Mississippi Supreme Court
pursuant to Rule 31. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-79. Nor does Rule 30.1
apply to a case assigned to a county court judge pursuant to Miss. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-35, which remains throughout a circuit court case.
Rule 30.2 - Bond.
Defendants shall be entitled to release pursuant to Rule 8.3. All time that
the defendant has been in custody on the present charge shall be credited
against any sentence imposed.
Comment
Rule 30.2 directs that Rule 8.3 governs release of defendants who ap-
peal a conviction in county court to circuit court. As under prior URCCC
12.03(B), a defendant is entitled to credit for time in custody on the present
charge against any sentence imposed. See rule 26.7(b)(2) and Rule 29.3(d).
RULE 31 - APPEALS TO THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT
AND COURT OF APPEALS
Rule 31 - Appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals.
All appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals shall




Rule 31 simply notes the applicability of the Miss. R. App. P. to ap-
peals in criminal cases. See MRAP 1 (These rules govern procedure in
appeals to the Supreme Court of Mississippi and the Court of Appeals of
the State of Mississippi"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-101.
RULE 32 - POsT-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF
Applications for post-conviction collateral relief shall be governed by Miss.
CODE ANN. §99-39-1 et. seq.
Comment
Rule 32 confirms that applications for post-conviction relief are gov-
erned by a comprehensive statutory process. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-
39-2(1) ("The purpose of this article is to revise, streamline and clarify the
rules and statutes pertaining to post-conviction collateral relief law and
procedures.").
RULE 33 - CONTEMYT
Rule 33.1 - Applicability; Indirect and Direct Contempt Defined.
(a) Applicability. Rule 33 applies to both civil and criminal
contempt.
(b) Indirect Contempt. "Indirect contempt," also known as
"constructive contempt," means any contempt other than a
direct contempt.
(c) Direct Contempt. "Direct contempt" means contempt
committed:
(1) in the presence of the judge presiding in court; or
(2) so near to the judge as to interrupt the court's
proceedings.
(d) Criminal Contempt. "Criminal contempt" means either:
(1) misconduct of a person that obstructs the adminis-
tration of justice and that is committed either in the
presence of the judge presiding in court or so near
thereto as to interrupt its proceedings;
(2) willful disobedience or resistance of any person to a
court's lawful writ, subpoena, process, order, rule, or
command, where the primary purpose of the finding of
contempt is to punish the contemnor; or
(3) any other willfully contumacious conduct which ob-
structs the administration of justice, or which lessens
the dignity and authority of the court.
(e) Civil Contempt. "Civil contempt" means willful, contin-
uing failure or refusal of any person to comply with a court's
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lawful writ, subpoena, process, order, rule or command that
by its nature is still capable of being complied therewith.
Comment
Rule 33 replaces formerly applicable provisions of URCCC 1.03. Sec-
tion (a) provides that Rule 33 applies both to civil and criminal contempt
proceedings, so long as they arise out of a criminal case. See Rule 1.1. Of
course, Rule 33 could be made applicable to other proceedings, by appro-
priate provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellate Procedure, Uni-
form Rules of Circuit and County Court, or the Uniform Chancery Court
Rules.
Sections (b) and (c) track Md. R. Ct. 15-202. The distinction between
indirect (or constructive) contempt defined by section (b), and direct con-
tempt defined by section (c), is drawn as a basis for procedural differences
in applying a remedy. In those limited cases of direct contempt, where the
contempt is within the judge's actual sight or hearing so that further or
extrinsic evidence is not needed to show the judge what in fact occurred,
the judge may dispose of the rule summarily under Rule 33.2. In all other
instances the contempt is "indirect" and the procedure is different. See
Rules 33.3 through 33.5. See In re Smith, 926 So.2d 878 (Miss. 2006);
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McGill, 890 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2004).
Sections (d) and (e) follow the definitions set forth in Ala. R. Crim. P.
33.1. The general distinction between criminal contempt defined by section
(d) and civil contempt defined by section (e) is the purpose for which the
sanctions are imposed, although the ultimate sanction in either case is in-
carceration. Where the sanction operates prospectively to ensure compli-
ance with a lawful order of the court, the contempt is civil. The person
being punished holds the keys to the jail and can gain release at any time
by complying with the order. See Shillitani v. U.S., 384 U.S. 364 (1966);
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). On the other
hand, a criminal contempt proceeding is intended to punish for past, not
contemplated or ongoing, conduct. Its purpose is to vindicate the dignity of
the court. Criminal contempt is a criminal offense for which a specific pun-
ishment is meted out, over which the defendant has no control. See U.S. v.
Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); In re Smith, 926 So.2d 878 (Miss. 2006);
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McGill, 890 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2004). If the
conduct is extreme, contempt can be a serious crime entitling a defendant




Rule 33.2 - Direct Contempt.
(a) Summary Imposition of Sanctions. The court against
which a direct civil or criminal contempt has been commit-
ted may summarily impose sanctions on the person who
committed it if:
(1) the presiding judge has personally perceived the
conduct constituting the contempt and has personal
knowledge of the identity of the person committing it;
(2) the contempt has interrupted the order of the court
or interfered with the dignified conduct of the court's
business; and
(3) the punishment imposed does not exceed 30 days
incarceration or a fine of $100.
The court shall afford the alleged contemnor an opportu-
nity, consistent with the circumstances then existing, to pre-
sent exculpatory or mitigating information. If the court
summarily finds and announces on the record that direct
contempt has been committed, the court may defer imposi-
tion or execution of sanctions until the conclusion of the
proceeding during which the contempt was committed.
(b) Order of Contempt. Either before sanctions are im-
posed, or promptly thereafter, the court shall issue a written
order stating, or shall state on the record, that a direct con-
tempt has been committed and specifying:
(1) whether the contempt is civil or criminal;
(2) the evidentiary facts known to the court from the
judge's own personal knowledge as to the conduct con-
stituting the contempt, and as to any relevant eviden-
tiary facts not so known, the basis of the court's
findings;
(3) the sanction imposed for the contempt;
(4) in the case of civil contempt, how the contempt may
be purged; and
(5) in the case of criminal contempt:
(A) if the sanction is incarceration, a determinate
term; and
(B) any condition under which the sanction may be
suspended, modified, revoked, or terminated.
(c) Affidavits. In a summary proceeding, affidavits may be
offered for the record by the contemnor before or after
sanctions have been imposed.
(d) Review and Record.
(1) Review. The contemnor may seek review by writ of
habeas corpus or by appeal to the Mississippi Supreme
Court.
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(2) Record. The appellate record in cases of direct con-
tempt in which sanctions have been summarily imposed
shall consist of:
(A) the order of contempt;
(B) if the proceeding during which the contempt
occurred was recorded, a transcript of that part of
the proceeding; and
(C) any affidavits offered or evidence admitted in
the proceeding.
(e) No Summary Imposition of Sanctions. In any proceed-
ing involving a direct contempt for which the court deter-
mines not to impose sanctions summarily, the judge,
reasonably promptly after the conduct, shall issue a written
order specifying the evidentiary facts within the personal
knowledge of the judge as to the conduct constituting the
contempt and the identity of the contemnor. Thereafter, the
proceeding shall be conducted pursuant to Rule 33.3 or
Rule 33.4, whichever is applicable, and Rule 33.5 in the
same manner as a indirect contempt.
Comment
Rule 33.2 tracks Md. R. Ct. § 15-203. Under section (a), sanctions may
be imposed immediately upon a finding of direct contempt or, in the
court's discretion, may be deferred to a later time in the proceeding. A
delay between citation for contempt and the imposition of sanctions can
provide a cooling-off period in the relations between the judge and the
contemnor, and is particularly relevant in those circumstances when the
contemnor is a lawyer representing a client on trial. Delay gives all parties
a chance to reacquire their objectivity, and also allows the contemnor time
to discuss the matter with an attorney and prepare a statement. Deferral of
a sanction does not, however, affect its summary nature. See Cooke v. U.S.,
267 U.S. 517 (1925); Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11 (1954). The sanction re-
mains summary in nature in that no hearing is required; the court simply
announces and imposes the sanction, albeit at the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding. By limiting the use in section (a) of summary disposition to those
cases where the alleged contemptuous conduct was committed in the pres-
ence of the judge, section (a)(1) recognizes that the judge can determine
the facts surrounding an allegation of contempt without a hearing only
when the judge personally witnesses the contemptuous conduct. As to con-
stitutional limitations on summary imposition of sanctions, including the
right to jury trial and the right to counsel, see Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488
(1974); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); and
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Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). Because of these limits, sum-
mary procedures are available only when necessary to preserve order (sec-
tion (a)(2)), and only when the potential punishment does not exceed 30
days incarceration or a $100 fine (section (a)(3)). This is consistent with
Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-1-17 (summary punishment for direct contempt).
Section (a) does provide the contemnor with significant procedural
rights, as section (a) requires the court to "find and announce on the record
that direct contempt has been committed," and permits the contemnor
"consistent with the circumstances then existing, to present exculpatory or
mitigating information." Thus the contemnor must be given notice of the
charges and an opportunity to present information in mitigation of punish-
ment. It should be recognized that the power to punish summarily for con-
tempt is to be used cautiously, and is not an appropriate device to control
every act of courtroom disrespect. Section (a) is intended to authorize
summary punishment only for disruptive conduct that is willfully contemp-
tuous and that has been preceded by a prior warning in all but the most
flagrant violations. See ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Special Func-
tions of the Trial Judge § 7.2, Comment at 93 (2d ed. 1986); U.S. v. Wilson,
421 U.S. 309 (1975). As stated in the ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice,
Special Functions of the Trial Judge § 7.4, Comment at 95 (2d ed. 1986):
Although there is authority that in-court contempts can be
punished without notice of charges or an opportunity to be
heard, Ex parte Terry, 9 S.Ct. 77, 128 U.S. 289, 32 L.Ed. 405
(1888), such a procedure has little to commend it, is incon-
sistent with the basic notions of fairness, and is likely to
bring disrespect upon the court. Accordingly, notice and at
least a brief opportunity to be heard should be afforded as a
matter of course.
Section (b) outlines the procedures to be followed in a summary adju-
dication of contempt. The court must state in writing or on the record: the
nature of the contempt (whether civil or criminal); the evidentiary basis for
the finding of contempt including, if applicable, witnesses who confirm the
judge's findings; the sanction; and, where applicable, how the contempt
may be purged or otherwise mitigated. Section (c) allows the contemnor to
offer affidavits for the record, both before and after any sanctions are im-
posed. Section (d) establishes methods of review for direct contempts when
sanctions are imposed summarily. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-11.
Section (e) limits the applicability of Rule 33.2 to direct contempts
where sanctions are summarily imposed. Otherwise, the judge is required
to issue a written order specifying the facts known to the judge to consti-
tute the contempt, and the matter proceeds in the manner provided for
indirect contempts under rules 33.3 through 33.5.
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Rule 33.3 - Indirect Criminal Contempt; Commencement; Prosecution.
(a) Nature of the Proceedings. All criminal contempts not
adjudicated pursuant to Rule 33.2 shall be prosecuted by
means of complaint, unless the prosecuting attorney elects
to proceed by indictment. Except as otherwise provided by
these Rules, the case shall proceed as a criminal case in the
court in which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed.
(b) Disqualification of the Judge. The contempt charges
shall be heard by a judge other than the trial judge when-
ever the nature of the alleged contemptuous conduct is such
as is likely to affect the trial judge's impartiality.
Comment
Rule 33.3 tracks Md. R. Ct. § 15-204. Section (a) provides that crimi-
nal contempts that are not or cannot be tried summarily in accordance with
Rule 33.2 must be tried pursuant to the provisions of Rule 33.3. Section (a)
requires that all criminal contempts not disposed of summarily must pro-
ceed under the procedures established by these Rules for the trial of other
criminal offenses. See Dennis v. Dennis, 824 So.2d 604 (Miss. 2002) ("A
defendant in [indirect] contempt proceedings is entitled to notice and is
entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, of his
rights to be heard, to counsel, to call witnesses, to an unbiased judge, to a
jury trial, and against self-incrimination, and that he is presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt."). Under Mississippi law,
criminal contempt requires a showing of willful and deliberate conduct.
See Premeaux v. Smith, 569 So.2d 681 (Miss. 1990); Masonite Corp. v. Inter-
national Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 206 So.2d 171 (Miss. 1967).
Section (a) permits contempt proceedings to be prosecuted by complaint
(as in Rule 2), unless the prosecuting attorney chooses to seek an indict-
ment. Section (b) requires a new judge hold a hearing to determine the
guilt of the contemnor, as well as to impose punishment, whenever the na-
ture of the contemptuous conduct is a personal attack on the judge or is
otherwise "likely to affect the trial judge's impartiality." See Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). Thus, whenever the trial judge must be
disqualified under section (b), any adjudication of guilt made by that judge
is void and the matter must be redetermined.
Rule 33.4 - Indirect Civil Contempt.
(a) Commencement. A civil contempt proceeding may be
commenced by the filing of a complaint for contempt with
the clerk of the court whose injunction, stipulation, order or
judgment is claimed to have been violated. No filing fee
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shall be required in connection with the filing of the com-
plaint for civil contempt. The proceeding shall be consid-
ered part of the action out of which the contempt arose.
(b) Contents of the Complaint. The complaint for civil con-
tempt shall:
(1) contain a complete verbatim statement of the in-
junction, stipulation, order or judgment involved, or a
copy thereof if available, and the name of the issuing
judge where appropriate;
(2) identify the court that issued the injunction, order
or judgment, or in which the stipulation was filed;
(3) contain the case caption and the docket number of
the case in which the injunction, order or judgment was
issued, or the stipulation was filed;
(4) include a short, concise statement of the facts on
which the asserted contempt is based;
(5) include a request for the issuance of a summons as
specified below;
(6) be verified or supported by affidavits; and
(7) otherwise comply with applicable provisions of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(c) Summons. The summons shall issue only on a judge's
order and shall direct the parties to appear before the court
not later than 7 days after service thereof for the purpose or
purposes specifically stated therein of:
(1) scheduling a trial;
(2) considering whether and when the filing of an an-
swer is necessary;
(3) considering whether discovery is necessary;
(4) holding a hearing on the merits of the complaint; or
(5) considering such other matters or performing such
other acts as the court may deem appropriate.
(d) Trial. The complaint for contempt shall be tried to the
court in accordance with MRCP 52(a) and judgment shall
be entered pursuant to MRCP 58.
(e) Service of the Summons and Complaint. The following
shall be served upon the contemnor in accordance with the
provisions of Miss. R. Civ. P. 81, unless the court orders
some other method of service or notice:
(1) a copy of the summons;
(2) a copy of the complaint for contempt;
(3) a copy of any accompanying affidavits; and
(4) if incarceration to compel compliance is sought, no-
tice to the alleged contemnor in the following form:
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TO THE PERSON ALLEGED TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT:
1. It is alleged that you have disobeyed a court order, are in contempt of
court, and should go to jail until you obey the court's order.
2. You have the right to have a lawyer. If you already have a lawyer, you
should consult the lawyer at once. If you do not now have a lawyer, please
note:
(a) A lawyer can be helpful to you by:
(1) explaining the allegations against you;
(2) helping you determine and present any defense to
those allegations;
(3) explaining to you the possible outcomes; and
(4) helping you at the hearing.
(b) Even if you do not plan to contest that you are in con-
tempt of court, a lawyer can be helpful.
(c) If you want a lawyer but do not have the money to hire
one, you may ask the court to appoint one for you.
3. IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR FOR A SCHEDULED COURT HEAR-
ING BEFORE THE JUDGE, YOU WILL BE SUBJECT TO ARREST.
Comment
Rule 33.4 tracks Mass. R. Civ. P. 65.3. Rule 33.4 applies to all pro-
ceedings to enforce compliance with injunctions, orders, judgments, and
stipulations formalized by court order for the violation of which civil con-
tempt is an appropriate remedy. Section (a) provides that indirect civil
contempt proceeding are initiated by complaint (as in MRCP 3), and clari-
fies that they are treated as part of the action out of which the contempt
arose. Consequently, no filing fee is required.
Sections (b)(1)-(7) prescribe what must be included in an indirect civil
contempt complaint and, because of the serious nature of an allegation of
civil contempt, requires verification or accompanying appropriate
affidavits.
Section (c) endows the summons with unusual significance. Because of
the expedited and grave nature of a civil contempt proceeding, the sum-
mons: "issues only on a judge's order"; must "direct the parties to appear
before the court not later than 7 days" after issuance of the order; and must
specifically state what will happen when the parties appear. Section (c) is
constructed to meet two different goals. The first is to permit flexibility
with respect to what occurs when the parties first appear in answer to the
summons. Depending on the nature of the alleged contempt, a case may or
may not benefit from the filing of an answer, expedited discovery, or an
immediate hearing. Consequently, the rule gives wide discretion to the
judge to determine what should happen when the parties appear: a "hear-
ing on the merits," if it makes sense to have that quickly; scheduling a trial;
considering dispensing with an answer; expediting discovery, if discovery is
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necessary; requiring initial compliance by the defendant pending a hearing;
considering other appropriate matters or requiring other appropriate acts
to be performed. Under section (c)(3), a party must seek an order permit-
ting discovery, unlike normal discovery provisions which permit parties, on
their own, to initiate discovery. A party seeking discovery must particular-
ize the need for, type, and timing of the discovery sought. In an unusual
case, the court can order discovery in the initial summons or at the hearing
that occurs when the parties respond to the summons.
The second goal of section (c) is to eliminate surprise, to the extent
reasonably possible. The parties should know, for example, whether a trial
will take place when they appear in response to the summons. The word
"specifically" in "for the purpose or purposes specifically stated therein" is
to emphasize the importance of informing the parties what to expect. To
merely place in each summons a laundry list of everything which might
happen or "whatever the court may deem appropriate" complies neither
with the language nor with the spirit of this Rule.
Section (d) makes MRCP 52 (Findings by the Court) and 58 (Entry of
Judgment) applicable to indirect civil contempt proceedings. Under Missis-
sippi law, civil contempt requires a showing of willful and deliberate con-
duct. See Stevison v. Woods, 560 So. 2d 176, 180 (Miss. 1990); Matter of
Estate of Hollaway, 631 So. 2d 127, 132 (Miss. 1993); Cooper v. Keyes, 510
So.2d 518 (Miss. 1987).
Section (e). provides for service of the summons and complaint, as well
as any accompanying affidavits, in accordance with MRCP 81. If incarcera-
tion is sought, section (e) also requires service on the alleged contemnor of
the notice in the form prescribed in Rule 33. Because of the seriousness of
incarceration as a potential sanction, elevated notice, including notice of
the right to counsel, is indicated.
Rule 33.5 - Indirect Contempt; Further Proceedings.
(a) Consolidation of Criminal and Civil Contempts. If a per-
son has been charged with more than one contempt pursu-
ant to Rule 33.3, Rule 33.4, or both, the court may
consolidate the proceedings for hearing and disposition.
(b) When Judge Disqualified. A judge who enters an order
pursuant to 33.2(e) or who institutes an indirect contempt
proceeding on the court's own initiative pursuant to Rule
33.3 or Rule 33.4, and who reasonably expects to be called
as a witness at any hearing on the matter, is disqualified
from sitting at the hearing unless:
(1) the alleged contemnor consents; or
(2) the alleged contempt consists of a failure to obey a
prior order or judgment.
(c) Failure to Appear at Hearing.
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(1) Generally. If after proper notice the alleged con-
temnor fails to appear personally at the time and place
set by the court, the court may enter an order directing
the contemnor be taken into custody and brought
before the court or judge designated in the order.
(2) Civil Contempt. If, after proof of proper notice, the
alleged contemnor in a civil contempt proceeding fails
to appear in person or by counsel at the time and place
set by the court, the court may proceed ex parte.
(d) Disposition. When a court makes a finding of contempt,
the court shall issue a written order that specifies the sanc-
tion imposed for the contempt. In the case of a civil con-
tempt, the order shall specify how the contempt may be
purged. In the case of a criminal contempt, if the sanction is
incarceration, the order shall specify a determinate term
and any condition under which the sanction may be sus-
pended, modified, revoked, or terminated.
Comment
Rule 33.5 is based on Md. R. Ct. 15-207 (a) through (d). Section (a)
permits consolidation of indirect contempt proceedings, when multiple
charges have been made under Rule 33.3 or 33.4. Section (b) provides that
a judge who expects to be a witness is disqualified from conducting an indi-
rect contempt proceeding, unless the contemnor consents or the contempt
is the result of a failure to observe a prior order of the court. Under sec-
tion (c)(1), the judge may order the arrest of any contemnor who receives
notice but fails to appear personally as required. While section (c)(2) per-
mits the court to proceed ex parte to dispose of any civil contempt if the
contemnor receives notice but fails to appear personally or through coun-
sel, in a proceeding for criminal contempt the court may proceed in the
defendant's absence only if the requirements of Rule 10.1 are met. On a
finding of indirect contempt, the court must enter a written order under
section (d) specifying: the sanction imposed; how any civil contempt may
be purged; and how any conditional criminal contempt may be remedied or
mitigated. See Rule 33.2(b) (similar requirements).
Rule 33.6 - Bail.
A contemnor committed for contempt is entitled to the same consideration
with respect to bail pending appeal as a defendant convicted in a criminal
proceeding.
Comment
Rule 33.6 makes the provisions of Rule 8.3 applicable to appeals of
contempt proceedings when a contemnor has been incarcerated.
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RULE 34 - SUBPOENAS
(a) Generally. Except as set forth below, the procedures for subpoenas in
criminal proceedings shall conform to Rule 45 of the Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure. This Rule shall not apply to proceedings before a grand
jury.
(b) For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects at a Trial or
Hearing. In proceedings governed by these Rules, a subpoena may com-
mand the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, docu-
ments, photographs, or other objects designated therein. The subpoenaing
party shall forthwith provide a copy of the subpoena on issuance to all
attorneys of record for the parties, or to any party when not represented by
an attorney. The court on motion made promptly, and in any event made at
or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or op-
pressive. The court may direct that matters designated in the subpoena be
produced before the court at a time before the trial or before the time
when they are to be offered in evidence and upon their production may
permit the matters or portions thereof to be inspected, photographed, and
copied by the parties and their attorneys.
Comment
Rule 34(a) substantially modifies practice under formerly applicable
URCCC 2.01, and is based on Rules 731(c), Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure, (National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(1987)). Section (a) provides generally that subpoenas in criminal cases
conform to MRCP 45. Rule 34 is inapplicable to proceedings before the
grand jury, and therefore does not interfere with or limit the use of grand
jury subpoenas. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-63 and 13-7-21.
Rule 34(b), regarding subpoenas duces tecum, is based on Ala. R.
Crim. P. 17.3. Section (b) is not intended to be a discovery device, as Rule
17 provides comprehensively for disclosure. Rather, section (b) is to be
used to inspect evidence held by witnesses and to require its production at
or prior to a trial or hearing. If a party seeks to have the evidence pro-
duced other than at a trial or hearing, the party must first obtain an order
of the court; the subpoena is then returnable to the court. Section (b) re-
quires that a copy of all subpoenas for production of tangible items to be
provided forthwith to all attorneys of record and unrepresented parties.
See also Rule 1.7 (regarding service of all motions and applications made to
the court). The court may quash a subpoena if compliance would be unrea-
sonable or oppressive, on a motion made promptly and before the time set
for compliance with the subpoena. Section (b) further authorizes the court
to direct that matters designated in the subpoena be produced before the
court for inspection in camera.
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RULE 35 MOTIoNs
Rule 35.1 - Motions: Form, Content, Rights of Reply, and Length.
(a) In General. A party applying to the court for an order
must do so by motion.
(b) Form and Content of a Motion. A motion-except
when made during a trial or hearing-must be in writing,
unless the court permits the party to make the motion by
other means. A motion shall contain a concise statement of
the precise relief requested and shall state the specific fac-
tual grounds and specific legal authority in support thereof.
A motion may be supported by affidavit. The requirement
of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written no-
tice of the hearing of the motion or if the matter is
presented in an agreed order.
(c) Rights of Reply. Unless otherwise ordered by the court,
each party may file and serve a response, and the moving
party may file and serve a reply, which shall be directed only
to matters raised in a response. Responses and replies shall
be in the form required for motions. If no response is filed,
the motion shall be deemed submitted on the record before
the court.
Comment
Rule 35 is consistent with common practice as embodied in Fed. R.
Crim. P. 47, Ala. R. Crim. P. 34, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 35, and MRCP 7(b).
Rule 35.1 is intended to provide general standards governing the details of
motion practice in criminal cases; the general standards will, of course, be
inapplicable when a Rule specifies a different procedure. Sections (a) and
(b) of Rule 35.1 are intended to produce concise, but precise pleadings. To
this end, section (b) requires a statement of the specific factual grounds for
the relief requested. With the broad pretrial disclosure provided by Rule
17, parties can be expected to go beyond mere conclusory allegations (such
as, "the confession was involuntary," or "the search violated defendant's
constitutional rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments"). On
the other hand, the factual specificity is not intended to limit the scope of
an evidentiary hearing or the relief to be granted; the former is governed
by traditional standards of relevance, the latter by principles of equity.
Section (b) eliminates the requirement of writing for motions made
during a trial or hearing. The language "other means" in section (b)
broadly permits the court to entertain motions through electronic or other
reliable methods. The sentence in section (b) permitting a motion to be
supported by affidavit is not intended to permit "speaking motions" (e.g., a
motion to dismiss an indictment for insufficiency supported by affidavits),
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but to authorize the use of affidavits when they are appropriate to establish
a fact (e.g., authority to take a deposition or former jeopardy).
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, section (c) provides a right (but
not a duty) to respond to all motions. Absent a response, the motion is
submitted on the record before the court. Permitting a reply by the moving
party to the response to the motion allows the moving party an opportunity
to address new issues that the opposing party may have raised in the
response.
Rule 35.2 - Hearing; Oral Argument.
Upon request of any party, or on its own initiative, the court may set any
motion for hearing. The court may limit or deny oral argument on any
motion. It is the duty of the movant, when a motion or other pleading is
filed, including a motion for a new trial, to pursue the motion to hearing
and decision. Failure to pursue a pretrial motion to hearing and decision
before trial is deemed an abandonment of that motion; however, the mo-
tion may be heard after the commencement of trial in the discretion of the
court.
Comment
Rule 35.2 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 34.2, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 35.2, and
URCCC 2.04 (formerly applicable to criminal cases). The hearing and oral
argument requirements are intended to give the court maximum discretion
in deciding what procedures, in addition to the written motion and memo-
randa, will be most helpful to it in reaching a reasoned and expeditious
decision on each issue. No party has an absolute right to oral argument on
a motion. The last two sentences of Rule 35.2 incorporate formerly appli-
cable provisions of URCCC 2.04.
Rule 35.3 - Waiver of Formal Requirements.
Upon request of a party, or on its own initiative, the court may waive a
requirement specified in this Rule, or overlook a formal defect in a motion
or request.
Comment
Rule 35.3 is based on Ala. R. Crim. P. 34.3 and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 35.4.
This inherent power of the court is specifically included for purposes of
clarity, and to allow its exercise informally. Rule 35.3 should be used pri-
marily to allow handwritten documents to be submitted by indigents or
persons without counsel; it should not be used to sanction deviations which
effect an opposing party's substantial rights.
Rule 35.4 - Service and Filing.
Unless otherwise specified in these Rules, the manner and sufficiency of
service and filing of motions, requests, petitions, applications, and all other
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pleadings and documents shall be governed by Rule 5 of the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Comment
Rule 35.4 tracks Ariz. R. Crim. P. 35.5. The provisions of the civil rules
adequately provide standards concerning service and filing.
Rule 35.5 - Presentation of Orders to the Court.
With the exception of default or agreed orders and judgments, all proposed
orders and judgments to be signed by the court shall be submitted directly
to the court by an attorney and not through the clerk or through correspon-
dence, unless otherwise permitted by the court. All orders or judgments
presented to the court shall be signed by the attorney presenting the same.
Comment
Rule 35.5 continues practice under formerly applicable URCCC 1.11.
Rule 35.6 - Entry of Order and Duty of Clerk.
Immediately upon entry of an order or judgment of the court, the clerk of
court shall make a diligent effort to assure that all attorneys of record have
received notice of the entry of the order.
Comment
Rule 35.6 continues practice under former URCCC 11.05.
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